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Key points
•	 The	post-Soviet	Central	Asian	countries	 (Kazakhstan,	Kyrgyzstan,	Tajik-
istan,	Turkmenistan	and	Uzbekistan)	are	of	importance	for	Russia	as:	
	– 	a	 potential	 source	 of	 threats	 (terrorism,	 drugs	 and	 extremist	 ideas,	
flowing	both	from	there	and	from	more	distant	countries,	above	all	Af-
ghanistan);	
	– 	an	 area	 of	 its	 relations	 (rivalry	 and	 limited	 co-operation)	with	 other	
global	players:	China,	the	West	and	the	Islamic	world;	
	– 	an	area	of	Russian	integration	initiatives.	
Thus	it	is	a	kind	of	a	buffer	in	the	broader	meaning	of	the	term,	the	exist-
ence	of	which	improves	the	Russian	Federation’s	safety.	Central	Asia	is	not	
a	region	of	economic	priority	for	Moscow,	it	is	merely	a	major	source	of	raw	
materials	 (uranium	and	hydrocarbons	 that	 are	 re-exported	 to	 the	West)	
and	of	cheap	workforce.
•	 Russia	views	the	continuation	of	(or	expanding	in	the	best-case	scenario)	
its	 influence	 in	Central	Asia	as	a	necessary	condition	for	maintaining	its	
position	as	a	global	player.	The	loss	of	this	region,	understood	as	the	domi-
nance	of	another	external	player	being	entrenched	there	(at	present,	Rus-
sia	could	only	be	challenged	by	China	in	this	area),	would	also	be	painful	
for	Russia	in	symbolic	terms,	since	this	would	mean	the	failure	of	its	two	
centuries-long	expansion	in	this	direction,	and	would	seal	the	process	of	
disintegration	of	the	former	Tsarist	and	then	Soviet	empire.	
•	 Moscow’s	current	‘possessions’	(the	instruments	and	assets	it	has	at	its	dis-
posal)	still	ensure	it	a	limited	level	of	control	in	the	region.	However,	Rus-
sia’s	influence	has	eroded	significantly	over	the	past	two	decades	since	the	
collapse	of	the	USSR.	The	factors	which	have	contributed	to	this	include:	
	– the	passiveness	of	Moscow	itself,	which	only	became	engaged	more	se-
riously	as	a	mediator	during	the	civil	war	in	Tajikistan	(1992–1997);	
	– the	emergence	of	other	players	in	the	region;
	– the	ambitions	of	the	Central	Asian	governments,	who	have	been	mak-
ing	efforts	to	diversify	their	foreign	contacts.	
•	 The	consistent	actions	aimed	at	 integrating	the	post-Soviet	area	taken	at	
the	beginning	of	 the	present	decade	 (this	 integration	has	been	given	 top	
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priority	 in	Russia’s	 foreign	policy),	 together	with	 some	external	 circum-
stances	(the	threat	that	the	region	could	become	destabilised	following	the	
wind-up	 of	 the	 ISAF	 operation	 in	 Afghanistan	 scheduled	 for	 2014)	 have	
halted	the	further	erosion	of	Russian	influence,	although	a	reversal	of	this	
process	appears	unrealistic	now.	
•	 Russia	is	capable	–	albeit	to	a	limited	extent	–	of	influencing	the	situation	
in	Kyrgyzstan	and	Tajikistan,	and	also	to	a	certain	degree	in	Kazakhstan.	
Russia’s	engagement	 in	 the	hydro	energy	projects	 in	Kyrgyzstan	and	Ta-
jikistan	also	allows	it,	although	to	an	even	lesser	extent,	to	exert	influence	
on	Uzbekistan	 (which	relies	on	water	 from	rivers	whose	headwaters	are	
located	 in	 these	 two	 countries).	Moscow’s	 influence	 on	 Turkmenistan	 is	
marginal.	The	 limitations	of	Russian	policy	can	be	 illustrated	by	 the	ex-
ample	of	Kyrgyzstan:	it	took	Moscow	some	years	of	efforts	to	force	Bishkek	
to	close	the	US	military	air	base	in	Manas	(this	is	expected	to	take	place	in	
July	2014,	and	the	decision	was	taken	in	June	2013).	In	June	2010,	in	turn,	
despite	a	request	from	the	new	Kyrgyz	government,	Russia	chose	not	to	in-
tervene	in	the	ethnic	clashes	that	had	broken	out	in	the	south	of	the	coun-
try.	Moscow	is	unable	to	influence	the	succession	processes	taking	place	in	
the	region’s	countries,	although	its	informal	support	may	improve	a	given	
politician’s	chances	of	winning	the	struggle	for	power.	It	also	has	a	‘destabi-
lising	potential’,	which	for	example	it	employed	in	April	2010	by	helping	to	
overthrow	the	then	president	of	Kyrgyzstan,	Kurmanbek	Bakiyev.
•	 Russia’s	most	 important	 instruments	are	 the	network	of	old,	Soviet	 con-
nections,	 including	 personal	 contacts	 between	 politicians,	 businessmen	
and	law	enforcement	officers,	as	well	as	the	fact	that	quite	many	people	in	
the	region	–	albeit	a	decreasing	number	–	still	speak	Russian.	Over	time,	
the	role	of	these	intangible	assets	will	diminish.	However,	at	present,	Rus-
sia	 is	still	not	seen	as	a	 foreign	country.	 It	 is	 the	only	active	external	ac-
tor	in	Central	Asia	which	in	a	sense	is	at	the	same	time	part	of	the	region	
(due	to	the	language,	post-Soviet	sentiments,	the	open	labour	market,	etc.).	
Another	instrument	is	the	military	presence:	the	bases	in	Kyrgyzstan	and	
Tajikistan,	and	a	number	of	military	facilities	in	Kazakhstan.	The	political	
instruments	 include	Russia’s	 dominant	 position	 in	 the	 structures	which	
the	countries	from	this	region	are	members	of:	the	Commonwealth	of	In-
dependent	States	(CIS),	the	Eurasian	Economic	Community	(EAEC)	and	the	
Collective	Security	Treaty	Organisation	(CSTO),	as	well	as	the	presence	of	
several	million	expatriate	workers	from	this	region	in	Russia	(money	re-
mittances	 from	 expatriate	workers	 account	 for	 half	 of	 Tajikistan’s	GDP).	
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The	economic	instruments	include	the	Russian	monopoly	on	the	transit	of	
Central	Asian	oil	and	gas	to	the	West	and	the	tariff	policy.	
•	 Moscow	partly	owes	its	relatively	strong	position	in	the	region	to	the	still	
limited	 engagement	 of	 other	 players.	 Russia	 is	 the	 only	 external	 actor	
which	is	comprehensively	active	in	Central	Asia,	in	the	areas	of	politics,	se-
curity,	economy,	social	policy	(immigrants)	and	culture.	The	other	players	
are	focused	on	selected	sectors:	China	on	the	economy,	the	West	(especially	
the	USA)	on	security	issues,	and	the	global	Muslim	community	(umma)	on	
religious	and	spiritual	issues.	However,	this	situation	may	change	as	these	
actors’	ambitions	grow	–	especially	those	of	China,	which	seems	to	be	ready	
for	expansion	in	the	areas	of	politics	and	 ‘hard’	security	also.	This	is	be-
cause	the	perception	of	Central	Asia	has	changed:	Beijing	views	this	area	
less	 and	 less	 as	Russia’s	 exclusive	 zone	of	 influence,	 and	more	 and	more	
as	a	‘no	man’s	land’,	where	all	external	players	have	equal	rights	and	may	
compete	freely	with	each	other.	
•	 Preventing	other	actors	from	expanding	their	 influence	is	 just	as	 impor-
tant	for	Moscow	as	maintaining	its	own	influence	there.	This	is	because	it	
sees	the	countries	of	this	region	not	as	partners,	but	merely	as	objects	of	its	
policy	(one	exception	are	its	relations	with	Kazakhstan,	which	apart	from	
some	 issues	 are	 partnership-based).	 Another	 reason	 for	 this	 is	 the	 Cold	
War	paradigm,	still	present	in	the	Russian	way	of	thinking,	which	defines	
the	world	as	an	arena	where	superpowers	compete	for	their	zones	of	influ-
ence.	According	 to	 this	paradigm,	Moscow’s	policy	 towards	Central	Asia	
is	to	a	great	extent	an	effect	of	its	relations	with	Beijing	and	Washington	
(and	also	with	Ankara,	Tehran,	Delhi	and	Islamabad,	to	name	just	a	few).	
Therefore,	one	might	have	the	impression	that	it	is	sometimes	inconsistent	
and/or	reactive.	Moscow	has	declared	that	the	West	is	its	main	rival.	How-
ever,	it	seems	that	it	fears	China’s	growth	in	significance	much	more	in	the	
longer	term.	Russia	has	been	making	efforts	to	contain	Beijing’s	expansion,	
especially	through	the	 integration	of	 the	post-Soviet	area	under	 its	aegis	
(for	instance	the	influx	of	Chinese	goods	is	to	be	restricted	under	regula-
tions	adopted	as	part	of	 the	Customs	Union,	whose	present	members	are	
Russia,	Kazakhstan	and	Belarus).	
•	 	The	integration	projects	are	intended	to	bind	the	participating	countries	
to	Russia	for	good,	which	would	allow	it	to	act	as	the	leader	of	a	group	of	
countries.	 The	 presence	 of	 Central	 Asian	 countries	 among	 them	 allows	
these	projects	to	be	seen	as	intercontinental,	truly	Eurasian.	The	Russian	
8O
SW
 S
TU
D
IE
S 
 4
/2
01
4
initiatives	cover	the	areas	of	economy	(the	Eurasian	Economic	Community,	
the	Customs	Union	and	the	Common	Economic	Space)	and	defence	(the	Col-
lective	Security	Treaty	Organisation).	The	integration	processes	are	to	be	
crowned	with	the	establishment	of	the	Eurasian	Union	(EAU),	which	will	
combine	 the	 two	components.	Russia	wants	 this	 integration	 to	cover	 the	
largest	 possible	 number	 of	 countries,	 although	 –	 due	 to	 resistance	 from	
some	former	Soviet	republics	(especially	Ukraine),	and	the	change	in	the	
balance	 of	 forces	 in	 Central	Asia	 to	 Russia’s	 disadvantage	 –	Moscow	has	
been	placing	more	emphasis	on	the	tempo	and	the	deepening	of	integration	
over	the	past	few	years.	This	does	not	mean	that	it	has	given	up	its	concept	
of	‘broad’	integration.	In	September	2013	Yerevan	unexpectedly	announced	
that	it	would	join	the	Customs	Union,	which	was	hastily	created	in	2010–
2011	and	still	has	only	three	members	(Bishkek	was	the	only	one	to	have	
declared	 it	would	 join	the	Customs	Union	before	this,	and	Dushanbe	has	
not	ruled	this	out).	Contrary	to	Russian	expectations,	the	countries	from	
this	region	are	not	interested	in	political	integration,	which	would	involve	
the	establishment	of	supranational	structures	and	authorities.	
•	 The	greatest	 challenge	 to	 the	Russian	policy	 towards	Central	Asia	 is	 the	
US’	declared	withdrawal	of	its	major	forces	from	Afghanistan	(the	wind-up	
of	the	ISAF	mission).	Russia	views	this	as	both	a	threat	(a	possible	uncon-
trolled	destabilisation	in	the	region	would	drive	great	numbers	of	refugees	
to	Russia,	and	could	cause	 the	 loss	of	a	 ‘buffer’	outside	Russia’s	 southern	
frontier)	 and	 an	 opportunity	 (fearing	 destabilisation,	 the	 Central	 Asian	
governments	could	then	become	more	willing	to	participate	in	Russian	in-
tegration	projects).	
•	 The	tests	of	success	for	Moscow’s	policy	will	be:
	– in	 bilateral	 terms	 –	 the	 implementation	 of	military	 agreements	with	
Kyrgyzstan	and	Tajikistan;	the	establishment	of	a	second	military	base	
in	 Kyrgyzstan	 (in	 the	 south	 of	 the	 country,	 close	 to	 the	 border	with	
Uzbekistan)	 and	 the	possible	 return	of	Russian	border	 guards	 to	 the	
Tajik-Afghan	 border;	 the	 successful	 completion	 of	 at	 least	 one	 of	 the	
large	hydro	energy	projects;	and	maintaining	its	present	influence	in	
Kazakhstan,	regardless	of	who	the	next	president	will	be;
	– in	regional	terms	–	the	success	of	the	Customs	Union	(accession	of	other	
countries	that	will	benefit	in	a	tangible	way	from	membership),	followed	
by	the	establishment	of	the	promised	Eurasian	Union	jointly	with	the	
member	states	of	the	Customs	Union,	and	the	launch	of	efficient	(and	
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not	merely	superficial)	structures	and	mechanisms	already	as	part	of	
the	Eurasian	Union;	and	maintaining	its	control	of	the	region	at	least	at	
the	present	level;	
	– in	 global	 terms	 –	 containing	 the	 growth	 of	Western	 and	 (especially)	
Chinese	influence;	maintaining	its	monopoly	in	the	area	of	‘hard’	secu-
rity	(the	CSTO,	which	formally	collaborates	with	the	UN,	will	remain	
the	only	defence	alliance	which	Central	Asian	countries	are	members	
of)	and	the	international	community’s	acceptance	of	this	(any	possible	
US	or	Chinese	military	presence	may	only	be	manifested	upon	approval	
from	Russia	and	on	Russian	terms).
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introduction
The	term	‘Central	Asia’	as	used	in	this	paper	encompasses	five	countries	which	
are	former	Soviet	republics:	Kazakhstan,	Kyrgyzstan,	Tajikistan,	Turkmeni-
stan	and	Uzbekistan.	Four	of	them	are	governed	by	more	or	less	authoritarian	
regimes,	where	the	president	has	strong	power	and	can	hold	his	office	for	an	
unlimited	number	of	 terms.	The	exception	is	Kyrgyzstan,	where	the	central	
government	has	always	been	relatively	weak,	and	where	a	parliamentary	sys-
tem	was	adopted	after	the	coup	in	2010.	
Many	authors	emphasise	that	these	countries	do	not	form	a	region	in	the	po-
litical	 sense,	 since	despite	 their	 similarities	 and	geographical	 situation	 they	
have	no	common	(precisely,	regional)	interests	to	share	with	each	other1.	Even	
when	dealing	with	common	threats	 (drug	smuggling,	 terrorism	and	 Islamic	
fundamentalism)	 the	 individual	 Central	 Asian	 governments	 are	 unwilling	
to	take	joint	action,	and	instead	they	prefer	co-operation	with	external	play-
ers	(such	as	Russia	or	the	USA).	This	may	be	due	to	the	fact	 that	the	origins	
of	these	threats	are	not	only	external	(Afghanistan	or	Pakistan)	but	also	do-
mestic.	Thus,	mutual	co-operation	would	have	given	some	countries	from	this	
region	 insight	 into	 the	domestic	 affairs	of	 the	others.	No	 regional	 organisa-
tion,	with	the	exception	of	the	ephemeral	bodies	created	in	the	1990s,	has	been	
established	in	Central	Asia	without	an	external	force	(Russia	or	China)	being	
involved.	The	infrastructure	in	use	on	the	state	borders,	which	are	closed	now	
and	then	for	the	movement	of	people	and	goods,	recalls	the	Cold	War:	barbed	
wire,	watchtowers,	minefields.	This	illustrates	the	state	of	relations	between	
the	neighbours,	which	are	characterised	by	distrust	resulting	from	the	large	
number	of	still	unresolved	problems	dating	back	to	the	Soviet	period	(territo-
rial	and	ethnic	disputes,	including	those	over	some	countries’	exclaves	located	
within	other	countries,	conflicts	over	water,	etc.).
All	these	differences,	plus	the	fact	that	politics	in	Central	Asia	is	strongly	per-
sonalised	(the	leaders’	dominating	impact	on	the	stances	their	countries	take)	
have	forced	the	external	players,	 including	Russia,	to	focus	on	bilateral	con-
tacts	and	maintain	good	relations	with	individual	 leaders.	On	the	one	hand,	
1	 For	example,	Alexey	Malashenko	has	noted	that	“More	than	twenty	years	after	the	Soviet	
collapse,	Central	Asia	can	be	spoken	of	only	as	a	conglomerate	of	independent	countries,	
each	 in	 the	 process	 of	 forming	 its	 own	national	 interests	 and	 foreign	 policy	 priorities.”	
(Alexey	Malashenko,	 ‘The	 Fight	 for	 Influence.	Russia	 in	Central	Asia’,	Washington	 2013,	
page	13-14).
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this	 makes	 it	 possible	 to	 capitalise	 on	 disagreements	 between	 individuals	
countries	in	the	region	(e.g.	Tajikistan	and	Kyrgyzstan,	which	are	located	in	
the	upper	reaches	of	 the	big	rivers	and	have	more	water	than	necessary,	vs.	
Uzbekistan	and	Turkmenistan,	which	have	insufficient	amounts	of	water).	On	
the	other	hand,	this	requires	great	flexibility,	taking	conflicting	interests	into	
account	and	responding	to	mutually	exclusive	expectations.
The	global	powers	are	interested	in	the	region	mainly	because	of	its	raw	ma-
terials	(hydrocarbons,	uranium	etc.),	transit	transport	routes	and	security	is-
sues	(with	respect	to	the	proximity	of	Afghanistan).	As	a	consequence	of	moves	
made	by	other	players,	combined	with	the	relatively	inactive	and	inconsistent	
policy	Moscow	adopted	in	the	first	years	following	the	collapse	of	 the	USSR,	
and	the	Central	Asian	countries’	efforts	aimed	at	emancipation,	Russia’s	previ-
ous	hegemonic	position	has	weakened	over	time.	When	Vladimir	Putin	became	
president	of	Russia	in	2000	(and	especially	after	the	USA	and	its	NATO	allies	
launched	the	intervention	in	Afghanistan	in	autumn	2001),	Moscow	embarked	
on	a	much	more	active	policy	there,	although	has	not	prevented	its	influence	
from	eroding	further.	This	process	only	slowed	down,	while	not	reversing	the	
tendency,	when	Vladimir	Putin	resumed	the	presidency	in	2012,	and	when	the	
reintegration	of	the	post-Soviet	area	was	recognised	as	one	of	the	top	priori-
ties	in	Russian	foreign	policy.	Moscow	views	Central	Asia	today	as	an	essential	
element	of	 its	 integration	projects,	and	also	as	a	field	for	rivalry	and	limited	
co-operation	with	the	West	(especially	the	USA)	and	China.	It	is	still	a	major,	
and	at	times	dominant,	actor	in	the	region,	but	it	must	respect	the	interests	of	
the	other	external	actors.	
This	 analysis	 is	 intended	at	presenting	Russian	policy	 towards	Central	Asia	
more	than	twenty	years	since	the	collapse	of	the	USSR.	Chapter	I	is	an	attempt	
to	answer	the	question	of	how	significant	this	region	was	for	Moscow	in	the	
past,	since	it	was	first	conquered	by	Tsarist	Russia	until	the	end	of	the	first	dec-
ade	in	the	post-Soviet	period	(the	years	2000-2001	mark	the	caesura:	Vladimir	
Putin	assumed	power	in	Russia,	and	the	USA	and	its	allies	 launched	the	op-
eration	in	Afghanistan	following	the	September	11	terrorist	attacks	in	2001).	
Chapter	 II	 discusses	 the	goals	 of	 the	Russian	policy,	 the	means	 employed	 to	
implement	them,	the	Russian	instruments	and	in	broader	terms	Russia’s	‘pos-
sessions’	in	the	region.	Chapter	III	focuses	on	the	multilateral	policy	adopted	
by	Russia	–	its	involvement	in	regional	organisations	and	integration	efforts.	
This	 chapter	also	 includes	a	presentation	of	 the	region	 in	 the	context	of	 the	
withdrawal	of	major	US	forces	from	Afghanistan	scheduled	for	the	end	of	2014.	
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i. central asia in Moscow’s policy. the historical 
bacKground
1.  the russian conquest of the region
Russia’s	 first	 contacts	with	 Central	 Asia	 date	 back	 to	 the	 16th	 century.	 The	
ground	for	further	expansion	was	prepared	by	legations	sent	by	Moscow	to	the	
local	khanates	in	order	to	establish	trade	contacts	and	collect	information	on	
their	political	systems,	economic	situations	and	ethnic	relations.	The	first	ter-
ritories	were	conquered	in	the	1730s:	then	Russia	annexed	what	is	now	north-
western	Kazakhstan,	which	had	been	controlled	by	the	Junior	Juz	(one	of	the	
three	 Kazakh	 hordes)	 and	 bordered	 on	 Khwarezm	 (the	 Khanate	 of	 Khiva).	
In	the	1740s,	Saint	Petersburg	extended	its	protectorate	over	the	Middle	 Juz,	
which	bordered	on	the	lands	of	Bukhara,	the	region’s	strongest	state	formation	
at	that	time.	In	the	first	decades	of	the	19th	century,	Russia	annexed	the	lands	
of	the	Senior	Juz	(what	is	now	south-eastern	Kazakhstan,	and	then	was	a	pe-
riphery	of	the	Khanate	of	Kokand).
The	permanent	conquest	of	Central	Asia	began	in	the	mid-19th	century.	With-
in	 decades,	 Russia	 annexed	 a	 vast	 area	 stretching	 from	 the	 Caspian	 Sea	 to	
China	and	from	Siberia	to	India	and	Persia.	At	that	time	it	was	referred	to	as	
Western	Turkestan	(to	draw	a	distinction	between	Eastern	Turkestan,	which	
was	part	of	China).	Turkic	peoples	predominated	there,	as	is	still	the	case	to-
day.	The	exceptions	are	Indo-European	Tajiks	(and	also	the	Yaghnobi	people,	
and	the	Pamir	peoples),	and	the	Chinese	Dungans.	The	northern	part	of	 the	
region,	the	steppe,	was	traditionally	a	land	of	nomads,	while	the	southern	part,	
where	the	deserts	and	mountains	prevailed,	had	more	permanent	human	set-
tlements,	concentrated	in	oases.	
Russia’s	excuse	for	the	conquest	was	its	‘cultural	mission’,	the	need	to	civilise	
the	‘primitive’	peoples	in	the	region	and	to	establish	lasting	peace	among	them,	
guarantee	security	to	trade	between	Europe	and	Asia	and,	last	but	not	least,	
protect	itself	from	being	invaded	by	nomads.	However,	the	economic	(Saint	Pe-
tersburg	was	interested	in	cotton	fields	and	silkworm	farms)	and	geopolitical	
factors	were	the	most	important.	The	expansion	in	Central	Asia	was	an	element	
of	the	Russian-British	rivalry	known	in	history	as	the	‘Great	Game’.	This	rival-
ry	lasted	for	almost	the	entire	19th	century,	and	also	covered	the	neighbouring	
regions	and	countries:	the	Caucasus,	Iran,	Afghanistan,	India	and	Tibet.	The	
two	empires	did	not	become	involved	in	open	clashes,	although	their	armies	
did	fight	against	the	forces	of	local	leaders	who	were	backed	or	provoked	by	the	
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opposite	side.	An	intensive	diplomatic	and	espionage	game	was	also	in	place.	
Saint	Petersburg’s	intention	was	to	gain	access	to	the	Indian	Ocean	(via	Iran	
and	Afghanistan)	and	to	contain	the	expansion	of	the	British	Empire.	London	
would	not	allow	this,	and	it	also	desired	to	protect	the	‘jewel	in	the	crown’	of	its	
controlled	territories,	India.	The	rivalry	intensified	after	Russia’s	defeat	in	the	
Crimean	War	 (1853–1856),	which	 restricted	Russian	 influence	 in	Europe	 and	
provided	a	stimulus	for	more	intense	expansion	in	the	eastern	and	southern	
directions.	The	agreement	of	 1895,	under	which	Russia	gained	control	of	 the	
greater	part	of	the	Pamirs,	marked	the	final	stage	of	the	Great	Game.	The	new	
Russian	territories	were	separated	from	the	British	ones	by	a	buffer	formed	by	
the	Wakhan	Corridor,	which	was	offered	to	Afghanistan.	
The	Tsar’s	administration	did	not	interfere	with	the	life	of	local	communities	
in	Central	Asia,	and	the	influx	of	Slavonic	settlers	was	initially	limited.	This	
situation	began	to	change	towards	the	end	of	the	19th	century.	By	1897,	Rus-
sians	(along	with	Ukrainians	and	Belarusians)	already	accounted	for	almost	
9%	of	Turkestan’s	population2,	while	in	the	early	20th	century,	as	part	of	the	
reforms	launched	by	Prime	Minister	Pyotr	Stolypin,	Slavs	started	to	settle	in	
Central	Asia	on	a	mass	scale.	The	demographic	imbalance	was	one	of	the	causes	
of	an	uprising	which	broke	out	in	1916	on	what	is	now	the	frontier	of	Tajikistan,	
Uzbekistan	and	Kyrgyzstan,	expanding	rapidly	over	the	whole	of	Turkestan.	
This	insurgence	was	brutally	suppressed.	Some	Kyrgyzs	and	Kazakhs	escaped	
to	China,	which	further	 influenced	the	change	in	the	ethnic	makeup	of	 this	
part	of	the	region.	
2. central asia in the soviet period
In	the	Soviet	Union,	as	in	the	Russian	Empire,	Central	Asia	played	the	role	of	
the	supplier	of	raw	materials,	which	were	 then	processed	 in	western	Soviet	
republics.	At	 that	 time,	 in	addition	 to	cotton	and	silk,	 it	 supplied	wheat	and	
mineral	resources:	oil,	natural	gas,	iron,	uranium	and	non-ferrous	metal	ores,	
and	sulphur.	The	local	production	did	not	satisfy	the	local	needs.	Fuel,	petro-
leum	products,	various	kinds	of	machinery	and	equipment,	as	well	as	consum-
er	goods	needed	to	be	brought	from	other	parts	of	the	Soviet	Union.	The	local	
budgets	generated	deficits,	and	the	region	strongly	relied	on	subsidies	which	
were	used	to	finance	infrastructural	and	other	investments.	
2	 Russians	alone	accounted	for	7.6%.	My	own	calculations	based	on	the	data	from	the	1897	
census,	available	at:	http://demoscope.ru/weekly/ssp/rus_lan_97.php?reg=117
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The	Soviet	leadership	wanted	to	integrate	the	residents	of	this	region	with	the	
other	peoples	within	the	USSR	which,	according	to	the	ideology	of	internation-
alism	and	Communist	propaganda,	would	lead	over	time	to	the	development	
of	a	uniform	Soviet	nation.	The	support	for	Slavonic	settlements	and	the	in-
creasingly	widespread	knowledge	of	 the	Russian	 language	were	 intended	 to	
facilitate	the	achievement	of	this	goal.	These	actions	were	only	partly	success-
ful.	The	former	nomads,	Kazakhs	and	Kyrgyz,	who	are	culturally	close,	proved	
to	be	the	most	susceptible	to	Russification.	These	nations	were	less	Islamised	
and	had	come	into	contact	with	Russians	earlier	than	their	neighbours	(this	is	
especially	true	of	the	Kazakhs	from	the	Junior	and	Middle	Juz).	Furthermore,	
they	had	 lost	 the	majority	of	 their	elites	as	a	consequence	of	 the	uprising	 in	
1916.	In	addition	to	all	this,	Slavs	were	the	most	willing	to	settle	in	Kazakhstan	
and	Kyrgyzstan	(which	were	partly	desolate	after	the	uprising).	In	turn,	the	
southern	part	of	the	region	was	Sovietised	to	only	a	minimal	extent,	since	Slavs	
were	almost	absent	(with	the	exception	of	cities,	where	they	formed	a	particu-
lar	kind	of	ghetto),	and	Islam	strongly	rooted	in	local	traditions	survived	there.	
The	administrative	division	of	the	region,	which	took	its	final	form	in	the	mid-
1930s,	 turned	out	 to	be	 the	most	durable	Soviet	 legacy.	Five	Soviet	republics	
(which	would	become	independent	states	after	1991)	and	one	autonomous	re-
public	(Karakalpakstan	within	Uzbekistan)	were	set	up	at	that	time.	This	ac-
celerated	the	process	of	modern	nations	being	formed	(especially	the	six	titular	
nations),	but	at	the	same	time	caused	their	separation	and	the	disintegration	
of	what	used	to	be	their	common	cultural	ground3.	It	was	impossible	to	con-
sistently	separate	the	individual	ethnic	groups	in	all	parts	of	the	region:	when	
the	Fergana	Valley	was	divided	among	Uzbekistan,	Tajikistan	and	Kyrgyzstan,	
a	number	of	 enclaves	 owned	by	 their	neighbours	 (Uzbeks	 in	Tajikistan	and	
Kyrgyzstan,	Tajiks	in	Kyrgyzstan	and	Uzbekistan,	etc.)	were	additionally	de-
limited.	Furthermore,	a	numerous	Tajik	minority	inhabited	Uzbekistan,	while	
Tajikistan	 and	Kyrgyzstan	were	 home	 to	 significant	Uzbek	minorities.	 This	
3	 The	factors	which	contributed	to	the	cultural	unity	of	this	region	(regardless	of	the	exist-
ing	strong	local	identities)	included	ethnic	and	linguistic	affinity,	and	especially	the	reli-
gion	which	the	peoples	who	 lived	there	share	 (Sunni	 Islam,	and	Ismailism	–	a	branch	of	
Shia	Islam	–	only	among	the	residents	of	the	Pamirs).	The	most	significant	divide	was	the	
one	between	nomads	and	settled	people.	This	distinction	was	more	important	than	ethnic	
differences.	For	example,	Uzbeks	and	Tajiks	living	in	the	cities	of	what	is	now	Uzbekistan	
before	the	Bolshevik	Revolution	were	known	by	the	common	name	of	Sarts,	since	they	were	
perceived	as	one	group.	In	the	opinion	of	some	researchers,	the	process	of	the	formation	of	
modern	nations	in	the	region	is	still	not	complete.	Hence	the	great	significance	of	informal	
groups,	who	are	connected	with	clan	bonds	or	a	common	place	of	origin,	in	Central	Asian	
political	life.	
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was	not	really	important	when	these	republics	were	part	of	the	USSR	(if	one	
disregards	the	dissatisfaction	of	those	groups	of	people	who	felt	they	had	been	
disadvantaged,	such	as	the	Tajiks	from	Samarkand,	which	had	been	made	part	
of	Uzbekistan).	However,	when	 the	Soviet	Union	collapsed,	 this	 gave	 rise	 to	
serious	disputes	and	conflicts.	The	borders	delimited	in	the	Fergana	Valley	be-
came	an	especially	strong	source	of	 tension:	 they	cross	 the	 transport	routes	
(roads	and	railways)	and	watercourses,	thus	adversely	affecting	the	economies	
and	political	relations	among	the	countries	in	the	region.	
3. Moscow vs. central asia in the first years since the collapse  
of the ussr
As	Dmitri	Trenin,	director	of	the	Carnegie	Moscow	Centre,	has	noted,	the	Cen-
tral	Asian	republics	“did	not	separate	from	the	USSR:	instead,	the	Union,	hav-
ing	collapsed,	left	them	to	their	fate”4.	Russia,	which	along	with	Ukraine	and	
Belarus	disassembled	the	Soviet	state,	did	not	show	any	major	activity	in	the	
region	until	the	end	of	the	1990s5.	It	also	seemed	not	to	notice	that	sovereign	
entities	with	their	own	aspirations	began	emerging	there	from	the	amorphous	
‘post-Soviet	 area’.	 Irina	Zvyagelskaya	 from	MGIMO	believes	 that	 “one	of	 the	
main	reasons	why	Central	Asia	was	abandoned	was	the	desire	among	the	Rus-
sian	 first-wave	 democrats	 to	 get	 rid	 of	 the	 political	 ballast	 of	 authoritarian	
regimes	which	had	grown	on	the	Communist	Soviet	substratum	and,	 in	 the	
opinion	of	those	democrats,	were	ready	to	back	Communist	retaliation”6.	Alek-
sandr	 Solzhenitsyn	was	 a	 patron	 of	 this	 approach;	 he	had	 already	 appealed	
in	1990	for	relinquishing	the	Soviet	 ‘borderlands’	which	had	been	supported	
financially	 by	 Moscow,	 and	 instead	 strengthening	 the	 Russian	 ‘core’7.	 The	
4	 Дмитрий Тренин, ‘Post-Imperium:	евразийская история’, Москва	2012,	page	176.
5	 One	exception	was	Moscow’s	active	engagement	as	a	mediator	and	intermediary	between	
the	parties	to	the	civil	war	in	Tajikistan	(1992–1997).
6	 Ирина Звягельская, ‘Становление государств Центральной Азии. Политические про­
цессы’, Москва 2009,	page	41.
7	 In	his	appeal	for	separating	at	least	eleven	republics	(Moldova,	the	three	Baltic,	the	three	
Caucasian	and	the	four	Asian	republics,	except	for	Kazakhstan)	from	Russia,	even	against	
their	 will,	 Aleksandr	 Solzhenitsyn	 especially	 strongly	 emphasised	 the	 burden	 generat-
ed	by	Central	Asia:	“[Russia]	will	be	able	to	straighten	up	even	more	once	it	has	shed	the	
onerous	burden	of	the	Central	Asian	 ‘underbelly’,	 that	equally	ill-considered	conquest	of	
Alexander	II”.	The	writer	extended	his	argumentation	to	Kazakhstan	with	certain	reser-
vations:	“As	for	Kazakhstan,	its	present	huge	territory	was	stitched	together	by	the	commu-
nists	in	a	completely	haphazard	fashion:	wherever	migrating	herds	made	a	yearly	passage	
would	be	called	Kazakhstan.	[…]	Today	the	Kazakhs	constitute	noticeably	less	than	half	the	
population	of	the	entire	 inflated	territory	of	Kazakhstan.	They	are	concentrated	in	their	
long-standing	ancestral	domains	along	a	large	arc	of	lands	in	the	south,	sweeping	from	the	
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loosening	of	the	bonds	with	the	region	was	accompanied	by	the	paternalistic	
belief	that	the	Central	Asian	republics	had	no	other	choice	but	to	rely	on	Rus-
sia,	and	therefore	Russia	did	not	have	to	make	any	effort	to	remain	appealing	
to	them:	when	Russia	had	carried	through	economic	reforms,	they	would	come	
back	 to	 it	by	 themselves	on	Russian	 terms	 (i.e.	without	Moscow	subsidising	
their	budgets).	
Contrary	 to	 this	 assumption,	 it	 did	 not	 take	 long	 for	 the	 new	 independent	
states	to	appreciate	the	benefits	of	acting	as	sovereign	entities	on	the	interna-
tional	arena,	and	thus	they	had	no	motivation	to	go	back	under	the	Kremlin’s	
protectorate.	russia’s position in the region eroded deeply in the 1990s. 
this was an effect of a number of factors, which can be divided into three 
groups. the first one includes negligence by Moscow itself – its	passive-
ness,	paternalism	(Malashenko	and	Zvyagelskaya	have	pointed	out	to	the	low	
competences	of	the	diplomats	who	were	delegated	to	this	region,	who	did	not	
speak	the	local	languages	and	were	unfamiliar	with	the	cultural	background)	
and	almost	complete	lack	of	interest	in	the	ethnic	Russians	living	there,	which	
local	regimes	could	understand	as	a	declaration	of	désintéressement	in	the	fu-
ture	of	Central	Asia.	the second group includes actions by other external 
players, whose activity increased in the region which russia had ‘aban-
doned’. Initially,	these	actors	were	Turkey	and	Iran,	whose	cultures	have	most	
in	common,	and	also	Saudi	Arabia,	Pakistan	and	India.	At	the	same	time,	Chi-
na	became	interested	in	the	region,	soon	followed	by	the	West,	including	the	
USA.	These	actors	at	first	offered	social	and	cultural	co-operation	to	gradually	
include	economic,	political	and	defence	issues	in	their	offer.	
Other	countries	became	active	 in	the	region	in	response	to	the	expectations	
of	Central	Asian	capitals,	who	were	searching	for	their	place	in	the	system	of	
international	relations	in	Eurasia	(which	was	accompanied	by	the	search	for	
a	new	post-Soviet	 identity	 and	 state	 ideology)	 and	desired	 to	diversify	 their	
foreign	 contacts.	the processes that took place in the region itself and 
the actions taken by the regional leaders form the third group of factors 
which have undermined russia’s position and significance. In	 this	 con-
text,	it	is	essential	to	mention	de-Sovietisation,	which	locally	took	the	form	of	
de-Russification	combined	with	re-Islamisation	(other	former	Soviet	republics	
extreme	east	westward	almost	to	the	Caspian	Sea,	the	population	here	is	indeed	predomi-
nantly	Kazakh.	And	if	it	should	prove	to	be	their	wish	to	separate	within	such	boundaries,	
I	 say	Godspeed.”	 (Aleksandr	 Solzhenitsyn,	 ‘Rebuilding	 Russia.	 Reflections	 and	 tentative	
proposals’,	translated	and	annotated	by	Alexis	Klimoff,	New	York	1991,	pages	7-12).
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primarily	 rejected	 the	 Soviet	 socio-economic	 system,	while	 in	 Central	 Asia	
“the	Soviet	era’s	social	[collective]	values	[...]	had	quickly	been	organically	in-
tegrated	 into	 local	 [Muslim]	 traditions”8).	 In	effect,	Moscow’s	hegemonic	po-
sition	has	been	undermined.	Russia	has	lost	its	role	as	the	only	civilisational	
‘point	of	reference’,	but	at	the	same	time	it	has	remained	appealing	as	a	place	
to	study	or	work,	and	many	residents	of	the	region	have	felt	strongly	bound	to	
the	Russian	language	and	culture.	However,	at	the	turn	of	the	century,	apart	
from	Russia	the	region	was	also	oriented	towards	the	West	(as	an	embodiment	
of	welfare	and	a	source	of	modern	technologies),	China	(as	a	source	of	cheap	
consumer	goods	and	a	desirable	investor)	and	to	a	certain	extent	towards	the	
Islamic	countries	(a	source	of	non-material	values).	To	maintain	what	was	left	
of	its	influence,	Russia	was	forced	to	enter	the	competition	with	other	entities	
in	the	area	which	it	saw	as	its	‘own’.	
The	presence	of	external	players	and	the	competition	emerging	between	them	
have	inclined	some	researchers	to	propose	the	thesis	that	a	‘new	Great	Game’	
has	begun9.	Disputable	as	 it	may	be	 (at	present,	 the	Central	Asian	countries	
are,	at	 least	formally,	 independent	entities),	this	analogy	appears	reasonable	
to	a	certain	extent.	
8	 Alexey	Malashenko,	‘The	Fight	for	Influence	...’,	op. cit.,	page	27.
9	 Igor	Zonn	and	Sergey	Zhiltsov	have	written	that	the	‘Great	Game.2’	differed	from	the	first	
one	only	in	the	number	of	the	players	(which	has	increased	significantly)	and	the	value	of	
the	funds	allocated	for	the	rivalry,	now	reaching	hundreds	of	millions	of	US	dollars	(Игорь 
Зонн, Сергей Жильцов, ‘Стратегия США в Каспийском регионе’, Москва	2003,	page	148).
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ii. russia’s goals and its Means of achieving theM
1. the hierarchy of the goals
Relations	with	individual	Central	Asian	countries	(with	the	exception	of	Ka-
zakhstan)	are	not	granted	high	priority	in	Russian	foreign	policy,	but	the	re-
gion	as	a	whole	is	a	very	essential	element	of	it.	Central	Asia	is	important	for	
Moscow	as	an	area	covered	by	Russian	integration	initiatives,	a	space	for	re-
lations	with	the	West,	China	and	the	Islamic	world,	and	last	but	not	least,	as	
a	potential	source	of	threats	(originating	both	from	there	and	from	more	dis-
tant	countries,	primarily	Afghanistan).	Thus	in	any	case	it	is	treated	as	a	sub-
ject,	and	is	most	often	viewed	as	a	‘soft	underbelly’,	i.e.	a	buffer	whose	presence	
could	improve	the	impermeability	of	the	Russian	borders.	At	the	same	time,	
this	 is	 the	 last	 part	 of	 the	 Soviet	 ecumen,	 apart	 from	Belarus	 and	Armenia,	
where	the	Kremlin	can	still	feel	like	a	political	leader,	albeit	ever	more	rarely	
and	with	numerous	reservations.	For	this	reason,	Moscow’s	presence	and	in-
fluence	 in	Central	Asia	are	essential	 for	 its	prestige,	 since	 its	 status	as	a	 su-
perpower	depends	on	them.	thus russia’s basic and most important goals 
are to maintain its influence there (and expand it, in the optimal case)10 
and to restrict the influence of other actors, so that it has the decisive say 
in the region’s most important issues, and that this prerogative not be 
questioned by any of the major players. This	in	particular	concerns	secu-
rity	issues,	in	the	broad	meaning	of	the	term.	As	regards	the	economy,	Moscow	
seems	to	be	acknowledging	China’s	 increasing	significance	and	expected	fu-
ture	dominance	(especially	in	the	areas	of	transport	and	communication),	al-
though	it	has	been	making	attempts	to	retain	its	advantage	in	selected	market	
segments,	such	as	investments	in	the	hydroelectric	sector.	
Thus	Russia	desires	 that	Central	Asia,	which	 it	believes	 to	be	 its	 zone	of	 in-
fluence,	 be	 unquestionably	 perceived	 as	 such	 by	 all	 the	 parties	 concerned.	
All	other	Russian	goals	are	subordinate	to	this	vision.	These	can	be	classified	
within	four,	partly	overlapping,	areas:	politics,	security	(both	‘soft’	and	‘hard’),	
economy	and	‘soft	power’11.	The	operation	of	regimes	in	Central	Asia	which	are	
10	 This	influence	is	understood	in	traditional	terms.	At	the	end	of	the	first	decade	of	the	21st	
century,	Chinese	experts	would	often	clearly	compare	the	region	to	a	fertile	but	neglected	
garden	located	off	the	beaten	track,	guarded	by	a	dangerous	dog	who	was	unable	to	properly	
cultivate	the	garden	but	would	not	let	in	anyone	from	the	outside	who	would	wish	to	take	
care	of	this	(OSW’s	conversation	with	Adil	Kaukenov,	a	political	expert	and	Sinologist,	Al-
maty,	12	December	2011).
11	 Soft	power	is	usually	defined	as	a	given	country’s	capability	to	gain	and	strengthen	its	in-
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friendly	towards	Russia	and	willing	to	respect	its	interests	is	essential	to	all	
these	areas.	In	the	political area, Moscow	also	wants	these	countries	not	to	
enter	into	alliances	with	any	other	external	actors,	but	to	remain	within	the	
structures	which	it	controls	or	co-controls	(such	as	the	Shanghai	Co-operation	
Organisation,	SCO).
In	 the	 security area, Russia’s	 primary	 goal	 is	 for	 the	 entire	 region	 to	 be	
covered	with	a	 collective	 security	 system	which	 it	has	approved,	and	 in	 the	
short	term,	to	minimise	the	possible	negative	consequences	of	the	wind-up	of	
NATO’s	operation	in	Afghanistan	in	2014.	This	overriding	goal	includes	a	num-
ber	of	 lower-level	goals:	expanding	Russia’s	military	presence	 in	 the	region,	
preventing	other	countries’	(especially	US)	troops	from	being	deployed	there,	
the	return	of	Russian	border	guards	 to	 the	Tajik-Afghan	border,	and	also	 to	
serve	as	 ‘soft	security’,	by	reducing	the	volumes	of	drugs	smuggled	to	Russia	
and	restricting	illegal	immigration	levels,	among	other	measures.
In	 the	area of the economy,	Russia	desires	 to	keep	Central	Asian	countries	
dependent	on	it	in	selected	areas	(investments	in	the	hydro	energy	sector,	sup-
plies	 of	 fuels	 and	 petroleum	 products,	maintenance	 of	military	 equipment,	
etc.).	It	also	wants	to	maintain	its	position	as	a	monopoly	in	the	transit	of	hy-
drocarbons	from	Central	Asia	to	the	West.	
In	the	area of soft power,	Moscow	would	like	as	a	minimum	to	maintain	its	
previous	level	of	influence:	common	knowledge	of	the	Russian	language	across	
the	region,	the	dominance	in	the	information	space	of	Russian	and	local	Rus-
sian-speaking	media	(especially	electronic),	and	the	orientation	of	part	of	the	
cultural	and	political	elites	towards	Russia.	
Contrary	to	numerous	Russian	declarations,	it	appears	that	it	does	not	intend	to	
stabilise	the	situation	in	the	region,	but	it	rather	wants	a	state	of	‘controlled	in-
stability’	to	be	maintained	there.	This	allows	it	to	act	as	an	arbiter,	and	possibly	
to	take	advantage	of	the	situation	by	placing	various	kinds	of	pressure	on	the	
conflicting	parties.	One	proof	of	this	thesis	is	that	Russia	refrained	from	inter-
vening	in	southern	Kyrgyzstan	at	the	time	of	the	ethnic	Kyrgyz-Uzbek	clashes	
in	June	2010	(although	the	then	Kyrgyz	interim	government	had	asked	for	such	
an	 intervention).	 Another	 example	 is	 Russia’s	 long-running	 game	 concern-
ing	the	plans	to	build	large	hydropower	plants	in	Kyrgyzstan	(Kambar	Ata	I)	
fluence	owing	to	the	attractiveness	of	its	culture,	politics	and	ideology.	Unlike	hard	power,	
which	involves	the	use	of	violence,	yielding	to	soft	power	is	principally	voluntary.	
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and	Tajikistan	(Rogun),	which	are	opposed	by	Uzbekistan12	–	Moscow	has	been	
avoiding	taking	a	clear	stance	on	this	matter,	from	time	to	time	declared	its	
assistance	and	even	participation	in	the	construction,	and	then	failed	to	com-
ply	with	its	obligations,	thus	wielding	a	constant	instrument	of	pressure	over	
several	countries.	In	turn,	the	riots	which	took	place	in	July	2012	in	the	Gorno-
Badakhshan	autonomous	province	of	Tajikistan	(which	have	proven	that	Du-
shanbe	does	not	have	full	control	over	its	territory)	probably	accelerated	the	
process	of	signing	the	Tajik-Russian	military	agreement,	which	provides	for	
long-term	Russian	military	 presence	 in	 this	 country	 (the	 Tajik	 government	
had	been	playing	for	time	before	that,	by	setting	numerous	preconditions)13.
2. the available instruments 
Russia	has	a	wide	array	of	instruments	it	can	use	to	influence	the	situation	in	
the	region.	These	are	of	various	natures	and	can	be	applied	to	various	mutually	
overlapping	orders.	For	ease	of	reference,	these	can	be	classified	as	political,	
military,	economic	and	soft	power	instruments.	
The	political	instruments include	dominance	of	the	regional	organisations	
which	Central	Asian	countries	belong	to	(such	as	the	Commonwealth	of	Inde-
pendent	States,	the	Eurasian	Economic	Community	and	the	Collective	Security	
Treaty	Organisation).	Russia	can	push	through	some	solutions	more	easily	at	
these	forums	than	by	means	of	bilateral	relations.	One	example	is	the	Decem-
ber	2011	decision	by	the	CSTO	member	states	under	which	the	deployment	of	
a	military	base	by	a	country	which	did	not	belong	to	the	organisation	in	any	
of	 the	CSTO	member	states	would	require	approval	 from	the	other	member	
states14.	This	has	in	fact	enabled	Russia	to	veto	such	projects.	
In	countries	where	Russian	influence	is	the	strongest	(Kyrgyzstan	and	Tajik-
istan),	support	offered	to	a	local	politician,	whether	officially	or	not,	may	facili-
tate	electoral	success	or	strengthen	that	politician’s	position.	This	instrument	
was	employed	in	the	case	of	the	team	who	took	power	in	Kyrgyzstan	as	a	conse-
quence	of	the	coup	in	April	2010	(Moscow	was	the	first	to	recognise	the	de facto	
new	government;	in	statements	from	Moscow,	the	head	of	the	interim	govern-
ment,	Roza	Otunbayeva,	had	been	referred	to	as	the	prime	minister	from	the	
12	 Tashkent	even	considers	the	possible	construction	of	the	Rogun	power	plant	as	a	casus belli.
13	 For	more	on	this	topic,	see	the	section	devoted	to	Russian-Tajik	relations.
14	 The	present	CSTO	member	states	are	Russia,	Kazakhstan,	Kyrgyzstan,	Tajikistan,	Armenia	
and	Belarus.
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very	beginning,	etc.)	and	President	Almazbek	Atambayev	(who	was	received	
by	Russian	 leaders	during	his	electoral	campaign,	when	he	did	not	 formally	
hold	any	position	in	the	state	administration).
The	presence	of	millions	of	Central	Asian	expatriate	workers	in	Russia	offers	
Moscow	a	very	strong	political	instrument15.	Facilitations	available	to	them	in	
fact	mean	support	for	the	regimes	in	Central	Asia.	To	a	great	extent,	immigrants	
to	Russia	lift	the	burden	off	the	local	labour	markets.	The	likelihood	of	social	
tension,	which	is	a	threat	to	each	government,	is	thus	reduced.	Furthermore,	
expatriate	workers	send	remittances	to	their	families,	thus	supporting	the	lo-
cal	budgets	in	various	forms	(in	the	case	of	Tajikistan,	the	total	value	of	bank	
transfers	alone,	without	taking	into	account	cash	brought	back	by	individual	
persons,	equals	nearly	half	the	country’s	GDP16).	The	Russian-Tajik	agreement	
struck	in	autumn	2012,	which	provides	for	facilitations	to	Tajik	immigrants,	
can	be	seen	in	this	context	as	a	sign	of	support	for	President	Emomali	Rahmon,	
who	was	running	for	another	term	in	office	on	6	November	2013.	In	turn,	the	
announcements	 that	stricter	migration	 laws	will	be	adopted,	and	 the	osten-
tatious	deportations	of	 illegal	 immigrants	 from	Russia,	 represents	a	 form	of	
threatening	pressure	on	individual	governments.	For	example,	Moscow	used	
this	tool	in	autumn	2011,	when	a	group	of	hundreds	of	Tajiks	were	deported,	
a	move	which	 forced	 Dushanbe	 to	 revise	 the	 verdict	 concerning	 two	 pilots	
from	a	Russian	company	who	had	been	sentenced	to	 imprisonment.	 (On	the	
other	hand,	however,	Dushanbe	chose	at	the	same	time	not	to	sign	an	agree-
ment	concerning	a	Russian	military	base,	which	Moscow	had	been	insisting	
on;	this	agreement	was	signed	only	a	year	later,	following	the	aforementioned	
riots	in	Badakhshan).
On	 18	April	 2013,	 President	Vladimir	 Putin	 announced	 that	 citizens	 of	 CIS	
member	 states	 entering	 the	 Russian	 Federation	 would	 be	 required	 to	 hold	
a	passport	starting	from	1	January	2015	(so	far,	people	travelling	between	Russia	
15	 The	precise	number	of	immigrants	from	Central	Asia	is	not	known.	The	estimates	cover-
ing	all	expatriate	workers	(also	from	other	countries,	 including	Ukraine)	range	between	
5	and	15	million.	According	to	data	from	the	Federal	Migration	Service,	as	of	the	end	of	2012	
(generated	on	 the	basis	of	 the	 so-called	migration	cards	 foreigners	are	 required	 to	com-
plete	upon	entry	to	Russia),	around	2.3	million	citizens	of	Uzbekistan,	around	1.1	million	
citizens	of	Tajikistan,	around	550,000	citizens	of	Kazakhstan,	around	540,000	citizens	of	
Kyrgyzstan	and	around	26,000	citizens	of	Turkmenistan	were	staying	 in	Russia.	 It	must	
be	assumed	that	 the	great	majority	of	 them	are	expatriate	workers.	Алексей Бессуднов, 
‘Сколько гастарбайтеров в России?’,	Slon,	27	December	2012,	http://slon.ru/russia/skolko_
gastarbayterov_v_rossii-870263.xhtml
16	 For	more	information	see	the	section	devoted	to	Russian-Tajik	relations.
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and	Central	Asia	 –	with	 the	 exception	 of	 Turkmenistan	 –	 have	needed	 only	
their	domestic	identification	documents	–	identity	cards).	When	these	changes	
are	adopted,	the	privilege	of	entering	Russia	without	a	passport	will	remain	
with	citizens	of	the	countries	which	belong	to	the	Customs	Union:	Kazakhstan	
and	Belarus17.	This	decision	is	intended	at	encouraging	other	countries	to	join	
the	Customs	Union.
the most spectacular instrument is the russian military presence in	the	
form	of	military	bases	in	Kyrgyzstan	(Kant	air	base)	and	Tajikistan	(the	201st	
ground	troop	base,	the	largest	outside	Russia),	where	a	total	of	around	8500	–	
9000	Russian	soldiers	serve.	In	addition	to	the	bases,	Russia	has	several	other	
military	facilities	in	Kyrgyzstan,	Tajikistan	and	Kazakhstan	(the	Kant	air	base	
is	part	of	the	CSTO	Rapid	Reaction	Force,	but	it	is	integrated	with	the	Russian	
defence	system)18.	These	are	the	only	foreign	military	facilities	in	the	region,	
except	 for	 those	 linked	 to	NATO’s	 operation	 in	Afghanistan:	 the	US	Transit	
Centre	at	Manas	airport	near	Bishkek	in	Kyrgyzstan,	the	German	transit	air	
base	in	Uzbekistan’s	Termez,	and	the	small	French	base	at	the	airport	in	Du-
shanbe,	Tajikistan19.
The	economic instruments include	the	assets	Russia	owns	in	the	countries	
of	this	region20,	and	also	its	dominant	position	in	the	transit	of	Central	Asian	
oil	 and	gas	 to	 global	 (especially	Western)	markets.	 For	 example,	 despite	 the	
launch	of	the	pipelines	running	to	China,	75%	of	the	oil	exported	from	Kazakh-
stan	(the	country	with	the	largest	oil	deposits	in	the	region)	is	transported	via	
Russian	territory.	When	the	capacity	of	the	Tengiz–Novorossiysk	oil	pipeline	is	
increased,	this	share	will	grow	even	more.	
17	 Agata	Wierzbowska-Miazga,	 ‘Kreml	 zwiększy	kontrolę	nad	migracją.’	Tydzień na Wschodzie,	
OSW,	24	April	2013,	http://www.osw.waw.pl/pl/publikacje/tydzien-na-wschodzie/2013-04-
24/	kreml-zwiekszy-kontrole-nad-migracja
18	 The	 Russian	military	 presence	 in	 the	 region	will	 be	 discussed	 in	 detail	 in	 the	 sections	
devoted	to	Russia’s	relations	with	Kyrgyzstan,	Tajikistan	and	Kazakhstan.
19	 Józef	 Lang,	Marek	Matusiak,	 Krzysztof	 Strachota,	 ‘A	 new	 chapter	 in	 relations	 between	
NATO	&	the	USA	and	Central	Asia’,	EastWeek,	OSW,	21	March	2012,	http://www.osw.waw.pl/
en/publikacje/analyses/2012-03-21/a-new-chapter-relations-between-nato-usa-and-cen-
tral-asia
	 The	base	in	Dushanbe	have	been	closed	completely	in	2013.	In	November	2012,	France	signed	
an	agreement	with	Kazakhstan,	granting	it	the	right	to	use	Shymkent	airport	in	the	south	
of	the	country	during	the	withdrawal	of	its	forces	from	Afghanistan.
20	 These	will	be	presented	in	detail	in	the	sections	devoted	to	Russia’s	bilateral	relations	with	
the	Central	Asian	countries.
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Central	Asian	countries	rely	on	supplies	of	a	number	of	Russian	products,	in-
cluding	petroleum	products.	This	provides	Moscow	with	another	economic	in-
strument,	the	tariff	policy.	The	imposition	of	a	100%	export	duty	on	1	April	2010	
on	such	products	sold	to	Kyrgyzstan	(which	are	then	re-exported,	for	instance,	
to	Afghanistan	and	Tajikistan)	adversely	affected	Kyrgyzstan’s	economy.	This	
intensified	public	dissatisfaction,	and	as	a	consequence	contributed	indirectly	
to	the	overthrow	of	the	then	President	Kurmanbek	Bakiyev’s	administration.	
In	turn,	more	than	a	year	before,	at	the	time	of	a	severe	economic	crisis,	Rus-
sia	offered	Kyrgyzstan	a	non-repayable	grant,	a	loan	at	a	low	interest	rate,	and	
promised	 to	 invest	US$1.7	billion	 in	 the	construction	of	a	hydropower	plant.	
In	response	to	this,	Bishkek	(as	Moscow	expected)	made	an	initial	decision	to	
close	the	US	air	base	in	Manas	(and	the	effective	withdrawal	from	this	decision	
has	led	to	a	serious	crisis	in	Kyrgyz-Russian	relations)21.
a cultural affinity resulting from a sense of shared history is one of rus-
sia’s most important soft power instruments22.	As	a	consequence,	the	Rus-
sian	 state	 feels	 like	 ‘home’	 to	 a	 significant	proportion	of	Central	Asian	 resi-
dents,	who	would	not	define	it	as	a	foreign	country.	For	many	of	them,	including	
almost	all	the	members	of	the	local	ruling	elites,	Russian	is	still	not	a	foreign	
language.	People	whose	personality	was	formed	in	the	USSR	still	govern	the	
countries	 in	 this	 region;	 the	present	 leaders	entered	adulthood	between	 the	
1950s	and	1970s,	were	educated	in	the	Russian	language,	and	are	still	bound	by	
a	network	of	various	connections	with	Russia	 (economic,	cultural,	 interper-
sonal,	etc.),	which	affect	their	sympathies	and	political	choices23.	This	situation	
will	continue	for	at	least	fifteen	to	twenty	years	(the	people	born	at	the	time	of	
the	collapse	of	the	USSR	will	be	in	their	forties	and	will	start	taking	important	
positions	in	state	administrations	only	around	the	year	2030).
21	 These	 issues	will	 be	 discussed	 in	 a	more	 detailed	way	 in	 the	 section	 outlining	Russian-
-Kyrgyz	relations.	Russia	also	indirectly	contributed	to	the	overthrow	of	President	Bakiyev	
by	resorting	to	political	(ostentatiously	receiving	representatives	of	the	then	Kyrgyz	oppo-
sition	in	Moscow)	and	soft	power	instruments	(broadcasting	programmes	denouncing	the	
Bakiyev	clan	on	Russian	TV,	which	is	very	popular	in	Kyrgyzstan).
22	 This	refers	to	the	‘culture	code’	shared	by	Russians	and	many	residents	of	other	post-Soviet	
countries	(especially	the	elder	and	middle	generations)	resulting	from	their	being	familiar	
with	the	same	films,	books	and	songs.	In	Central	Asia,	this	legacy	is	definitively	rejected	
only	by	Muslim	radicals.	For	obvious	reasons,	its	role	will	fall	objectively	over	time.
23	 The	term	‘Russian	parties’,	which	is	disputable	and	imprecise,	 is	sometimes	used	in	publi-
cations	to	refer	to	the	informal	groups	of	Moscow-oriented	politicians	operating	in	Central	
Asian	countries,	who	sometimes	act	as	Russian	lobbies	(analogously,	the	terms	‘Western	par-
ties’	and	‘Chinese	parties’	are	also	in	use;	but	for	the	time	being	these	play	only	a	minor	role).
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Russia’s	intangible	assets	are	enhanced	owing	to	the	easy	accessibility	of	Rus-
sian	 (and	 local	 Russian-speaking)	 media,	 especially	 electronic	 (TV	 and	 the	
Internet).	 The	 Russian	 language	 predominates	 in	 Kazakhstan’s	 information	
space,	which	is	strongly	influenced	by	the	Russian	media.	For	example,	Presi-
dent	Nursultan	Nazarbayev	publishes	his	articles	in	the	Russian	daily	Izvestia.	
The	situation	in	Kyrgyzstan	is	similar.	In	Tajikistan,	a	number	of	newspapers	
are	published	in	Russian,	Internet	portals	are	as	a	rule	bi-	or	trilingual	(Tajik-
-Russian-English),	 and	 the	Tajik	 language	predominates	on	TV.	The	Russian	
language	occupies	less	space	in	Uzbekistan	and	Turkmenistan,	but	it	has	not	
been	ousted	completely,	and	still	has	a	great	advantage	over	English.	Russian	
is	 still	 the	most	natural	 language	used	by	representatives	of	expert,	artistic	
or	business	circles	from	various	countries	(in	the	Southern	Caucasus,	English	
is	already	a	serious	alternative	to	Russian	among	people	in	their	thirties	and	
younger).	Furthermore,	Russian	plays	an	important	role	in	the	country’s	pop	
culture.	
All	this	offers	Russia	a	great	advantage	over	the	other	players	active	in	the	re-
gion:	the	West,	and	especially	China.	However,	over	time,	this	advantage	will	
naturally	weaken,	in	particular	if	Moscow	fails	to	actively	promote	the	Rus-
sian	language	and	culture24.	Following	the	collapse	of	the	USSR,	the	range	of	
the	Russian	language’s	influence	has	shrunk	significantly:	at	first	in	the	early	
1990s	during	the	mass	migrations	of	ethnic	Russians	to	Russia25,	and	then	as	
a	consequence	of	 its	gradually	being	superseded	by	 the	national	 languages	
in	offices,	education	facilities,	media	and	culture.	Over	two-thirds	of	schools	
with	 Russian	 as	 the	 language	 of	 instruction	were	 closed	 in	 Turkmenistan	
and	Tajikistan,	and	half	in	Kazakhstan	and	Uzbekistan,	in	the	1990s	alone.	
In	2001,	all	such	schools	were	transformed	into	bilingual	establishments	in	
Turkmenistan26.	More	 and	more	 representatives	 of	 the	new	generations	of	
Kazakhs,	 Kyrgyzs,	 Tajiks	 and	 Uzbeks	 entering	 adulthood,	 especially	 from	
the	provincial	areas,	either	do	not	speak	Russian	at	all,	or	speak	it	poorly	or	
24	 The	present	position	of	the	Russian	language	in	Central	Asia	is	not	an	effect	of	Moscow’s	ac-
tivity	or	efforts.	Instead,	it	is	part	of	the	legacy	of	living	in	one	state.	Russia	has	been	pursu-
ing	a	comprehensive	soft	power	policy	for	just	a	few	years.	The	Russkiy Mir Foundation	was	
established	on	21	June	2007,	and	Rossotrudnichestvo – the	Federal	Agency	for	the	Common-
wealth	of	Independent	States,	Compatriots	Living	Abroad	and	International	Humanitarian	
Co-operation	–	on	6	September	2008.	In	Central	Asia,	Russkiy Mir holds	various	seminars,	
conferences	and	exhibitions.
25	 According	 to	 the	 1989	 census,	 around	 9.5	million	Russians	 lived	 in	Central	Asia	 and	 ac-
counted	for	almost	20%	of	the	region’s	total	population.	At	present,	no	more	than	5.5	million	
(less	than	10%)	of	them	have	remained	there.	
26	 Alexey	Malashenko,	‘The	Fight	for	Influence	...’,	op. cit.,	page	29.
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understand	it	at	the	most.	This	also	applies	to	expatriate	workers	employed	
in	Russia27.
Moscow	has	not	capitalised	on	the	presence	of	the	still	significant	Russian	
minority	 in	 Central	 Asia,	 especially	 in	 Kazakhstan28.	 The	website	 of	 the	
Russian	Embassy	in	Astana	lists	dozens	of	Russian	minority	organisations,	
stating	their	contact	data	(these	include	also	cultural	centres	for	other	eth-
nic	groups	living	in	Russia,	e.g.	Caucasians)29,	and	similar	data	concerning	
other	countries	can	be	found	on	the	websites	of	Rossotrudnichestvo	offices30.	
However,	 the	 large	 number	 of	 organisations	 does	 not	 always	 mean	 that	
they	are	active.
nevertheless, potential threats are inherent in some of the instruments 
available to russia. The	presence	of	immigrants,	including	illegals,	is	one	
such	‘double-edged	sword’.	One	could	risk	the	statement	that	Russia	has	be-
come	dependent	on	the	cheap	workforce	from	this	part	of	the	former	USSR	
–	 its	absence	would	create	a	difficult-to-fill	gap	 in	 the	Russian	 labour	mar-
ket31.	At	the	same	time,	the	presence	of	immigrants	generates	ethnic	tension	
in	Russian	cities,	and	extremist	ideas	(including	radical	Islam),	increasingly	
popular	among	immigrants,	are	a	source	of	concern.	No	detailed	data	allow-
ing	an	assessment	of	 the	scale	of	 this	phenomenon	are	available.	However,	
the	fact	that	the	problem	is	serious	(and	at	least	that	the	fear	of	it	is	shared	by	
the	government	and	the	Russian	public	alike)	has	been	proven	by	police	ac-
tions	taken	from	time	to	time	against	unofficial	mosques	operating	in	places	
where	the	concentration	of	immigrants	is	high,	including	marketplaces.	For	
27	 According	to	estimates	of	the	Russian	Migration	Service,	only	half	of	immigrants	are	able	
to	complete	a	simple	questionnaire	in	Russian	by	themselves,	and	between	15%	and	20%	do	
not	know	Russian	at	all.	This	is	due	to	the	fact	that	almost	25%	of	the	CIS	citizens	who	cross	
the	 Russian	 border	 were	 born	 after	 1986.	Михаил Фалалеев, ‘Гастарбайтеров обяжут 
говорить по­русски’,	 Российская Газета,	 14	May	 2013,	 http://www.rg.ru/2013/05/14/mi-
granti-site.html
28	 Probably	so	as	not	to	worsen	relations	with	the	partners	from	this	region.	This	issue	has	not	
been	raised	at	any	CIS	summits	or	at	any	other	forums	of	the	Commonwealth,	which	proves	
that	Moscow	has	taken	a	completely	different	approach	to	this	problem	than	it	has	in	rela-
tions	with	the	Baltic	states.	It	is	worth	reminding	that	protecting	Russian	citizens	was	also	
used	as	a	casus belli	in	the	Russian-Georgian	war	in	August	2008.	
29	 http://www.rfembassy.kz/tm/russian_mission_in_kazakhstan/organizacii_ros_soot-
echestvenn/
30	 For	 example	 see	 http://kgz.rs.gov.ru/node/16,	 http://tjk.rs.gov.ru/node/16,	 http://uzb.
rs.gov.ru/node/16
31	 Immigrants	partly	take	jobs	which	Russians	view	as	low-prestige	(caretaker,	garbage	col-
lector,	construction	worker,	etc.).
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example,	271	people	were	detained	in	Saint	Petersburg	during	a	police	raid	in	
February	201332.
3. relations with individual countries
By	employing	the	 instruments	available	 to	 it,	Russia	has	been	attempting	to	
achieve	its	goals	in	Central	Asia	through:	
1. bilateral	relations	with	Central	Asian	states;
2. rivalry	and	limited	co-operation	with	external	players:	the	West	(the	USA,	
and	partly	the	EU)	and	China;
3. multilateral	 diplomacy	 (integration	 of	 the	 post-Soviet	 area	 by	 building	
a	system	of	regional	organisations	where	it	has	assumed	the	dominant	po-
sition).
These	vectors	are	inter-related;	for	example,	the	issue	of	the	US	military	pres-
ence	at	Manas	airport	near	Bishkek	in	Kyrgyzstan	has	been	raised	not	only	in	
bilateral	talks	(both	Russian-Kyrgyz	and	Russian-US)	but	also	during	multilat-
eral	discussions	(for	example,	at	the	SCO	and	CSTO	forums).
Moscow is still capable of influencing the current situation in central 
asian countries, albeit not to the same extent everywhere and not always 
successfully, as has been shown in the examples referred to previously 
in this text. what it cannot do is create the situation there. It	has	main-
tained	most	of	its	influence	in	Kyrgyzstan	and	Tajikistan	(although	it	does	not	
have	 a	monopoly	 position	 even	 there),	 much	 less	 in	 Kazakhstan	 (President	
Nazarbayev’s	openness	to	co-operation	and	Russian	initiatives	has	been	work-
ing	to	its	benefit)	and	almost	none	in	Uzbekistan,	let	alone	Turkmenistan.	The	
Kremlin	may	successfully	back	a	candidate	for	president	of	Kyrgyzstan	or	Ta-
jikistan	(although	it	is	unable	to	impose	its	own	candidate	on	these	countries),	
but	its	impact	is	much	more	limited	in	the	case	of	the	succession	processes	in	
Kazakhstan	and	Uzbekistan33.	Most	 likely,	 the	balance	of	 forces	among	 local	
32	 Wojciech	Górecki,	 ‘Raid	on	Muslims	 in	St.	Petersburg’,	EastWeek,	OSW,	13	February	2013,	
http://www.osw.waw.pl/en/publikacje/analyses/2013-02-13/raid-muslims-st-petersburg	
33	 Moscow	has	taken	behind-the-scenes	actions	to	reinforce	the	position	of	potential	succes-
sors	whom	it	 sees	as	useful,	 and	 to	 reduce	 the	chances	of	 those	 less	desirable.	Naturally	
little	is	known	about	such	moves,	and	it	is	difficult	to	predict	how	successful	they	will	be.	
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elites	(as	was	the	case	in	Turkmenistan	after	Saparmurat	Niyazov’s	death	in	
2006)	will	play	the	decisive	role	in	choosing	the	successors	to	Nursultan	Naz-
arbayev	and	Islam	Karimov.	The	external	factor	may	play	a	certain	role,	but	
the	impact	will	come	from	several	directions,	and	will	depend	on	the	dynamic	
balance	within	the	China–Russia–USA	triangle	existing	at	a	given	time.	The	
fact	that	Moscow	has	been	unable	to	force	any	of	the	Central	Asian	states	(and	
the	CIS	in	general)	 to	recognise	Abkhazia	and	South	Ossetia	as	 independent	
states	since	the	Russian-Georgian	war	in	2008	is	another	proof	of	Russia’s	lim-
ited	influence.	
russia’s advantages include its comprehensive presence in the region, 
covering the areas of politics, security, economy and soft power, and the 
great number and diversity of the instruments available to it as a conse-
quence of this. it is therefore able, despite limited means, to pursue a rel-
atively successful policy towards two or three countries in this region, 
although not towards central asia as a whole. in this context, Moscow 
may only attempt to contain the expansion of other powers in this re-
gion.	The	Russian	stance	on	the	US	military	presence	in	the	region	following	
the	attacks	of	 11	September	2001	 could	 serve	as	an	example.	Russia	 initially	
backed	the	coalition’s	intervention	in	Afghanistan,	and	did	not	oppose	the	es-
tablishment	of	 the	US	military	bases	 in	Kyrgyzstan	and	Uzbekistan34.	How-
ever,	 later,	 fearing	US	dominance	 in	 the	 region,	 it	 took	a	number	of	 actions	
which	were	aimed	on	the	one	hand	at	restricting	Western	military	presence	in	
the	region,	and	on	the	other	at	making	Russia	the	sole	decision-maker	in	this	
area	(Moscow	wanted	Washington	to	discuss	the	presence	of	US	bases	with	it	
directly,	and	not	with	Bishkek	and	Tashkent).	These	efforts	were	unsuccess-
ful	for	several	years	(Bishkek,	by	using	tricks	of	formalities	and	procedures,	
continued	renewing	its	consent	for	US	forces	to	use	the	Manas	air	base).	How-
ever,	the	Kyrgyz	government	finally	decided	that	the	US	military	presence	in	
Most	commentators	interpreted	the	nomination	of	Timur	Kulibayev	(President	Nursultan	
Nazarbayev’s	son-in-law,	who	is	believed	to	be	his	most	 likely	successor)	as	a	member	of	
Gazprom’s	board	of	directors	on	30	June	2011	as	Russia’s	‘investment’	in	this	promising	poli-
tician.	In	turn,	President	Islam	Karimov’s	daughter	Gulnara	(who	until	recently	had	been	
mentioned	as	one	of	his	possible	successors)	has	as	a	rule	been	presented	unfavourably	in	
the	Russian	media,	which	may	be	an	element	of	an	intentional	campaign	aimed	at	discredit-
ing	her.	For	instance,	it	was	suggested	that	Karimova	was	involved	in	the	takeover	of	Uzbek	
assets	in	the	Russian	company	MTS	(see	the	section	devoted	to	Russian-Uzbek	relations);	
then	the	media	spread	the	rumour	that	her	luxury	Moscow	apartment,	worth	US$10	mil-
lion,	had	been	seized,	which	later	turned	out	to	be	untrue.	
34	 The	background	for	this	decision	and	the	Russian	manoeuvres	linked	to	the	US	bases	are	
discussed	in	more	detail	in	subsequent	chapters.	
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Manas	would	end	 in	summer	2014	 (if	 this	 really	happens,	 the	evacuation	of	
ISAF	forces	from	Afghanistan	may	become	more	difficult,	and	logistic	support	
for	those	US	units	that	remain	in	Afghanistan	after	the	operation	has	been	for-
mally	closed	will	be	complicated).	At	the	same	time,	Russian	negotiations	with	
Kyrgyzstan	and	Tajikistan	ended	with	the	extension	of	its	troop	deployments	
in	these	countries	by	over	ten	years	or	even	a	few	decades.	
Moscow	supports	the	CASA-1000	project	which	envisages	the	development	of	
infrastructural	electric	energy	connections	between	Central	Asia	(Tajikistan	
and	Kyrgyzstan)	and	Southern	Asia	 (Afghanistan	and	Pakistan),	although	 it	
initially	opposed	the	move	as	the	project	would	lessen	the	region’s	dependence	
on	Russia.	However,	it	appears	that	Moscow	primarily	sees	the	project	as	an	el-
ement	of	counterbalance	to	the	US	concept	of	a	‘Broader	Middle	East’	or	‘Broad-
er	Central	Asia’35.	It	has	even	expressed	its	readiness	to	invest	in	the	project,	on	
condition	that	Russia’s	Inter	RAO	is	granted	the	role	of	project	operator.
Russia’s	relations	with	China	have	developed	in	a	different	way	in	this	region.	
The	launches	of	the	oil	pipeline	running	from	Kazakhstan	in	2006,	and	of	the	
gas	pipeline	from	Turkmenistan	in	2009,	marked	the	end	of	Russia’s	monopoly	
on	hydrocarbons’	transit	from	this	region	(a	short	gas	pipeline	running	from	
Turkmenistan	to	Iran	had	been	built	before;	but	Russia	has	maintained	its	mo-
nopoly	on	transit	in	the	Western	direction).	In	2010,	the	value	of	Central	Asia’s	
trade	with	China	exceeded	the	value	of	its	trade	with	Russia.	The	Chinese	ex-
pansion	has	been	raising	serious	concern	in	Moscow,	albeit	alleviated	by	the	
fact	 that	Beijing	has	been	 trying	not	 to	 ‘hurt	 Russia’s	 imperial	 feelings’,	 and	
has	not	articulated	this	as	expressly	as	its	reservations	about	Western	activ-
ity.	Many	Russian	experts	claim	that	there	can	be	no	rivalry	between	Moscow	
and	Beijing	in	this	region36.	Both	countries	are	members	of	the	Shanghai	Co-
operation	Organisation	(SCO)37;	this	structure,	active	in	the	areas	of	security	
and	economic	co-operation,	serves	as	an	informal	platform	for	dialogue,	and	is	
used	to	consult	the	stances	taken	by	Russia	and	China,	as	well	as	to	neutralise	
any	tension	emerging	between	them.	It	is	also	intended	to	counterbalance	the	
US	military	presence	in	Central	Asia.
35	 Malik	Muhammad	Ashraf,	‘TAPI	and	CASA-1000’,	The Nation,	23	March	2013,	http://www.
nation.com.pk/pakistan-news-newspaper-daily-english-online/columns/23-Mar-2013/
tapi-and-casa-1000
36	 Marcin	Kaczmarski,	 ‘The	bear	watches	 the	dragon.	The	Russian	debate	on	China’,	Policy 
Briefs, OSW,	no.	31,	February	2013,	page	20.
37	 The	other	SCO	members	are	Kazakhstan,	Kyrgyzstan,	Tajikistan	and	Uzbekistan.
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the Kremlin has been pinning great hopes for strengthening its posi-
tion in central asia on multilateral diplomacy. the eurasian economic 
union/the eurasian union (the eeu/eau), which like the sco will com-
bine the economic and military components, is expected to be the crown-
ing achievement of the post-soviet area integration project promoted by 
vladimir putin, and the participation of central asian countries is a vi-
tal element of this project. It	is	planned	that	the	Union	will	begin	to	operate	
in	all	material	 aspects	 in	2015–2016;	 its	 fundamental	 assumption	 is	not	only	
a	counterpoise	to	the	activity	of	the	West,	but	also,	as	it	seems,	that	of	the	SCO,	
which	is	falling	more	and	more	under	Chinese	influence38.
In	 its	bilateral	 relations	with	Central	Asian	countries,	Moscow	 is	as	a	 rule	
clearly	oriented	towards	the	regimes	operating	there,	and	does	not	keep	any	
official	contacts	with	the	opposition,	or	any	other	alternative	elites	such	as	
social	movements	or	non-governmental	organisations39.	It	appears	that	Rus-
sia	is	satisfied	with	the	authoritarian	government	model	that	predominates	
there,	since	it	views	this	as	more	stable	than	the	democratic	model.	As	seen	
from	 this	perspective,	 its	 support	 for	 local	 leaders	 (Moscow	does	not	 raise	
human	 rights	 issues,	 does	 not	 criticise	 violations	 of	 international	 conven-
tions,	 recognises	 the	 results	 of	 rigged	 elections,	 etc.40)	may	 be	understood	
as	investments	that	are	expected	to	yield	profits	in	the	form	of	various	con-
cessions	and	compromises.	Following	the	violent	suppression	of	the	Andijan	
riots	 in	May	 2005,	when	 Tashkent’s	 relations	with	 the	West	were	de facto 
frozen,	Moscow	acted	 as	Uzbekistan’s	 advocate	 at	 the	 international	 arena.	
The	 effects	 of	 this	 rapprochement	 included	 signing	 a	 treaty	 of	 alliance	 on	
14	November	2005,	which	allowed	Russia	to	establish	its	military	base	in	Uz-
bekistan	(although	it	has	not	succeeded	in	doing	so,	since	the	rapprochement	
turned	out	to	be	temporary).
38	 The	recently	established	regional	economic	structures	where	Moscow	is	the	dominant	ac-
tor	are	the	Eurasian	Economic	Community,	the	Customs	Union	of	Belarus,	Kazakhstan	and	
Russia,	and	the	Common	Economic	Space.	The	CSTO	is	in	charge	of	the	military	component.	
The	 ideological	 foundation	of	 these	structures	 is	 ‘Neo-Eurasianism’,	which	draws	on	 the	
Eurasianism	concepts	born	in	the	1920s,	according	to	which	Russia	is	not	part	of	the	West,	
but	 forms	 a	 separate	 civilisation.	 Supporters	 of	 Neo-Eurasianism	 (including	 Aleksandr	
Dugin)	appeal	for	integration	with	Central	Asian	countries,	claiming	that	Russia	needs	to	
maintain	primacy	in	Eurasia	for	civilisational	and	cultural	reasons.	For	more	on	the	inter-
national	and	multilateral	aspects	of	Russian	policy	in	Central	Asia,	see	Chapter	III.
39	 Unofficial	contacts	are	kept,	and	some	political	emigrants	from	this	region	live	in	Russia.
40	 Beijing	understands	the	principle	of	non-interference	in	the	domestic	affairs	of	other	coun-
tries	in	a	similar	way.
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In	this	context,	Russia’s	relations	with	Kyrgyzstan,	where	the	government	has	
been	overthrown	twice	since	2005,	are	an	exception.	In	the	period	which	pre-
ceded	the	coup	of	2010,	the	Kyrgyz	opposition	activists	who	would	later	take	
power	 visited	Moscow	 on	 a	 regular	 basis.	 Moscow	 also	 maintained	 official	
contacts	with	all	the	major	political	forces	in	Kyrgyzstan	after	the	coup.	This	
seems	to	prove	the	thesis	that	Russia	does	not	rule	out	the	possibility	of	further	
government	changes	there.	
When	drawing	the	map	of	Russian	influence	in	Central	Asia,	one	should	start	
precisely	with	 Kyrgyzstan,	where	 this	 influence	 is	 beyond	 doubt	 strongest.	
Russia	also	has	a	strong	influence	in	Tajikistan,	while	its	impact	on	Uzbekistan	
and	 Turkmenistan	 is	 clearly	weaker.	 Kazakhstan,	whose	 co-operation	with	
Russia	is	based	on	completely	different	principles	than	the	rest	of	the	region,	is	
incomparable	to	the	other	Central	Asian	countries	in	this	context,	and	should	
be	discussed	separately.	
3.1. Kyrgyzstan
3.1.1. russia’s assets
The military presence
Russia	has	four	military	facilities	in	Kyrgyzstan,	the	most	important	of	which	
is	the	Kant	air	base	(located	20	km	east	of	Bishkek)41,	which	it	leases	along	with	
the	adjacent	railway	siding.	The	other	 facilities	are	a	naval	communications	
centre	in	Chaldovar	(next	to	Spartak	village	close	to	the	city	of	Kara-Balta)42,	
a	naval	 testing	 site	on	Lake	 Issyk-Kul,	where	 torpedoes	are	 tested	 (the	head	
41	 Formally,	Kant	Air	Base	no.	999	of	the	Russian	Air	Force’s	5th	Air	Army.	The	base	was	opened	
on	22	September	2003,	but	the	first	soldiers	had	already	been	deployed	there	in	2002.	This	
was	the	first	military	base	Russia	opened	outside	its	territory	following	the	collapse	of	the	
USSR,	and	was	Moscow’s	response	to	the	US	opening	the	Manas	Air	Base	(see	3.1.2.	An	out-
line	of	Russian-Kyrgyz	relations).	The	base	lease	agreement	was	entered	for	a	15-year	term	
(and	may	be	automatically	extended	for	five	more	years).	However,	a	new	agreement	was	
signed	on	29	May	2009,	setting	a	49-year	lease	term	(with	an	option	to	be	extended	by	25	
years).	It	is	estimated	that	around	1500	soldiers	are	in	service	at	Kant	Air	Base,	which	for-
mally	is	a	part	of	the	CSTO	Rapid	Reaction	Force.	
42	 The	338th	communication	centre	of	the	Russian	Navy.	
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office	is	located	in	Koysary,	near	the	city	of	Karakol)43	and	a	radio	seismic	labo-
ratory	in	Mailuu-Sai	(with	a	branch	in	Ichke-Suu)44.
Russia	and	Kyrgyzstan	signed	an	agreement	during	President	Vladimir	Putin’s	
visit	to	Bishkek	on	20	September	2012.	Pursuant	to	this	agreement,	all	four	of	
these	facilities	will	be	combined	into	one	base	in	2017.	The	agreed	term	for	the	
operation	of	this	united	base	is	15	years	(i.e.	until	2032),	and	can	be	extended	for	
subsequent	five-year	periods.	 In	early	2013,	 there	was	speculation	 in	 the	Rus-
sian	press	that	once	this	document	was	ratified	by	the	two	parties45,	Russia	could	
again	propose	the	opening	of	another	base	in	Kyrgyzstan,	most	likely	in	the	city	
of	Osh	in	the	south	of	the	country46,	but	no	such	proposal	has	yet	been	made.
Furthermore,	tens	of	officers	from	Russian	border	troops	are	acting	as	advis-
ers	in	Kyrgyzstan	(they	are	probably	staying	in	Osh).	Their	status	is	unclear47.	
Representatives	of	the	Russian	Federal	Drug	Control	Service	(FSKN)	are	also	
stationed	in	Osh.	
The economic presence
Russian	economic	assets	were	until	recently	much	more	modest	than	its	mili-
tary	 ones,	 although	 Kyrgyzstan	 had	 received	 a	 great	 deal	 of	 interest	 from	
leading	Russian	companies	operating	in	the	hydro	energy,	gas	&	oil,	mining,	
primary	 and	 arms	 sectors	 (such	 as	 RAO	UES,	 RusGidro,	 Atomredmetzoloto	
and	Gazprom;	the	latter	was	engaged	in	initial	exploration	of	the	Kugart	and	
43	 The	954th	anti-submarine	weapon	 testing	base.	Ozero,	a	Russian-Kyrgyz	 joint	venture	 in	
charge	of	torpedo	testing,	is	part	of	this	base	(which	reports	to	the	Russian	Navy).	
44	 The	1st	automated	seismic	station	and	the	17th	radio-seismic	laboratory	of	the	Seismic	Ser-
vice	of	the	Russian	Ministry	of	Defence.	
45	 Kyrgyzstan	ratified	this	agreement	on	19	December	2012,	and	Russia	on	27	April	2013.
46	 Айданбек Акмат уулу, ‘Российская военная база в Оше?’,	Азаттык,	1	March	2013	(http://
rus.azattyk.org/content/kyrgyzstan_russia_military_base/24916457.html).	 No	 additional	
base	was	mentioned	 in	 the	document	of	20	September	2012,	but	 this	 topic	had	been	dis-
cussed	at	least	since	2009	–	the	then	presidents,	Dmitri	Medvedev	and	Kurmanbek	Bakiyev,	
even	signed	a	preliminary	agreement	to	this	effect	on	1	August	2009,	which	was	opposed	by	
Uzbekistan	(http://www.altair.com.pl/news/view?news_id=3190).
47	 Кубанычбек Жолдошев, ‘Какой статус у пограничников РФ в Кыргызстане?’,	Азаттык,	
17	April	 2012	 (http://rus.azattyk.org/content/kyrgyzstan_russia/24550893.html).	Around	
5000	Russian	border	guards	were	stationed	in	Kyrgyzstan	until	1999	(under	an	agreement	
signed	in	1992),	keeping	an	eye	on	the	border	with	China,	Bishkek	airport	and	periodically	
also	 the	Kyrgyz-Tajik	border	 (during	 the	civil	war	 in	Tajikistan).	 It	 is	 a	proven	 fact	 that	
a	group	of	40	Russian	border	guards/advisers	based	in	Kyrgyzstan	were	sent	from	the	north	
to	the	south	of	the	country	in	spring	2010.	
32
O
SW
 S
TU
D
IE
S 
 4
/2
01
4
Vostochny	Mailuu-Suu	IV	sites).	26	May	2013	marked	a	breakthrough:	the	Kyr-
gyz	government	decided	to	sell	Gazprom	all	its	assets	in	the	national	gas	com-
pany,	Kyrgyzgaz	(for	a	symbolic	price	of	one	dollar	in	exchange	for	writing	off	
the	 company’s	debts	 and	 investments,	 around	US$650	million	within	a	five-
year	timeframe),	which	needs	to	be	seen	as	a	Russian	success	and	a	reinforce-
ment	of	Russia’s	position	in	both	Kyrgyzstan	and	the	entire	region48.	Other	in-
vestments	planned	by	Russia	have	not	yet	been	launched	for	political	reasons	
(see	3.1.2.	An	outline	of	Russian-Kyrgyz	relations).
In	2005,	MTS	company	spent	US$150	million	to	buy	a	51%	stake	in	Tarino	Ltd.,	
the	owner	of	the	Kyrgyz	mobile	communication	network,	Bitel.	However,	these	
assets	were	then	taken	over	by	Kyrgyz	entities49.
In	2006,	Gazpromneft	bought	a	filling	station	chain	in	Bishkek50.	Gazpromneft-
Aero	 Kyrgyzstan,	 a	 Russian-Kyrgyz	 joint	 venture,	 which	 took	 over	 air	 fuel	
supplies	from	the	US-leased	Manas	Transit	Centre,	was	launched	in	Septem-
ber	2011.	The	company	supplied	147,000	tonnes	of	fuel	worth	US$169	million	in	
the	first	year	of	its	operation51.
In	2009,	Tremadon	Ventures	Ltd.,	a	Russian	firm	registered	in	the	Virgin	Is-
lands,	 paid	 US$16.5	million	 for	 a	 9.99%	 share	 in	 Highland	 Gold,	 a	 company	
which	owns	gold	mines	in	Russia	and	Kyrgyzstan.	Highland	Gold	was	granted	
the	gold	mining	licences	for	the	Unkurtash	and	Karatube	projects	in	201252.
48	 ‘Kyrgyz	Gvt.	 Approves	Agreement	 on	Kyrgyzgas	 Sale	 to	Gazprom’,	 RIA	Novosti,	 26	May	
2013,	http://en.ria.ru/world/20130526/181357205.html 
	 The	Russian-Kyrgyz	inter-governmental	agreement	to	this	effect	was	signed	on	26	July	2013	
in	Moscow	(‘«Кыргызгаз» продан «Газпрому» за один доллар’,	Fergananews.com,	29	July	
2013,	http://www.fergananews.com/news/21020).
49	 Unless	 otherwise	 indicated,	 the	 information	 on	 Russian	 investments	 in	 Kyrgyzstan	
and	 other	 Central	 Asian	 countries	 originates	 in	Marek	Menkiszak,	 Ewa	 Paszyc,	 Iwona	
Wiśniewska,	‘Aktywność	gospodarcza	Rosji	za	granicą	w	latach	2004–2010’	(OSW Report).	
All	 parts	 of	 the	 report	 are	 available	 in	 Polish	 at:	 http://www.osw.waw.pl/pl/publikacje/
raport-osw/2011-08-17/aktywnosc-gospodarcza-rosji-za-granica-w-latach-2004-2010
	 For	information	on	the	further	development	of	the	MTS	transaction	see Игорь Цуканов, 
‘МТС ищет киргизские активы на Сейшелах’, Ведомости,	14	March	2013.
50	 The	chain	consists	of	116	stations	(http://www.gpnbonus.ru/our_azs/).
51	 ‘“Газпромнефть Аэро Кыргызстан” поставила топлива на ЦТП “Манас” за год на $169 
миллионов’,	Aviation Explorer,	2	October	2012,	http://www.aex.ru/news/2012/10/2/98754/
	 The	establishment	of	this	company	can	be	interpreted	as	meeting	Moscow’s	expectations	
halfway,	since	it	had	wanted	to	influence	the	operation	of	Manas	(see	Marek	Menkiszak,	
‘Russia’s	Afghan	Problem.	The	Russian	Federation	and	the	Afghanistan	problem	since	2001’,	
OSW Studies	no.	38,	September	2011,	page	104).
52	 http://www.highlandgold.com/investor/releases/2012-07-24.aspx
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Soft power
The	constitution	(Article	10(2))	guarantees	Russian	“official	language”	status	in	
Kyrgyzstan.	However,	pursuant	to	the	amendments	to	the	National	Language	
Act	of	13	March	2013,	all	official	documents	must	be	issued	in	the	Kyrgyz	lan-
guage	only	(although	the	constitutional	provision	is	still	in	force)53.	According	
to	estimates	made	in	early	2013,	52.5%	residents	of	Kyrgyzstan	speak	Russian	
(76.4%	speak	Kyrgyz	and	1.2%	speak	English)54.	Kyrgyz	is	the	language	of	in-
struction	in	64.2%	schools	in	Kyrgyzstan,	Russian	in	9.14%	schools,	and	Uzbek	
in	5.5%,	while	21%	of	the	schools	use	mixed	languages	of	instruction.	Most	stu-
dents	at	higher	education	facilities	are	still	taught	in	Russian55.
An	agency	of	Rossotrudnichestvo56	 actively	 operates	 in	Kyrgyzstan,	 supporting	
Russian	 national	minority	 organisations57	 and	 co-operating	with	 educational	
(including	the	Kyrgyz-Russian	Slavic	University58)	and	cultural	institutions	(the	
Chinghiz	Aitmatov	State	National	Russian	Drama	Theatre)	and	the	media:	 lo-
cal	Russian-language	(the	Vecherniy Bishkek newspaper,	and	the	News-Asia	In-
ternet	portal)	as	well	as	Russian	media,	which	have	their	offices	in	Kyrgyzstan	
53	 ‘Киргизия запретила русский язык в делопроизводстве’,	Mail.ru,	13	March	2012,	http://
news.mail.ru/politics/12319087/
	 ‘В Киргизии государственные документы теперь будут только на киргизском языке’,	
Mail.ru,	14	March	2013,	http://news.mail.ru/politics/12343155/
54	 Kaliya	Duishebayeva,	‘About	52.6	percent	of	Kyrgyzstan’s	population	speaks	Russian’,	24.kg,	
6	March	2013,	http://eng.24.kg/community/2013/03/06/26221.html	
	 According	to	estimates	made	in	2004,	30%	of	residents	of	Kyrgyzstan	spoke	Russian	in	eve-
ryday	life,	while	less	than	8%	of	them	were	ethnic	Russians;	Александр Арефьев, ‘Сколько 
людей говорят и будут говорить по­русски?’,	Демоскоп Weekly,	251/252	(http://demoscope.
ru/weekly/2006/0251/s_map.php#1).
55	 Kaliya	Duishebayeva,	 ‘About	52.6	percent…’,	op. cit.	Apart	from	local	higher	education	fa-
cilities,	six	branches	of	Russian	universities	and	two	Kyrgyz-Russian	universities	operate	
there	(http://www.russia.edu.ru/obruch/sng/1115/).
56	 http://kgz.rs.gov.ru/	
	 This	website	is	frequently	updated,	and	contains	a	lot	of	practical	information.	As	in	other	
countries,	the	Russian	Science	and	Culture	Centre	operates	in	Kyrgyzstan	under	the	ae-
gis	of	Rossotrudnichestvo,	which	hosts	various	cultural	and	social	events,	and	has	a	library	
of	its	own.	
57	 More	 than	 40	 such	 organisations	 are	 registered	 in	 Kyrgyzstan.	 32	 of	 them	 are	 mem-
bers	 of	 the	 Russian	 Coordination	 Council	 in	 Kyrgyzstan	 (Координационный совет 
российских соотечественников в Кыргызстане,	http://korsovet.kg/,	situation	as	of	1	June	
2012).	In	turn,	the	members	of	the	Association	of	Compatriots’	Guilds	(Ассоциация Гильдий 
Соотечественников,	http://www.ags.kg/index.php?option=com_frontpage&Itemid=1)	 in-
clude	around	150	firms,	whose	owners	or	investors	are	Russians.	These	firms	are	divided	
into	‘guilds’,	depending	on	the	sector	they	operate	in.	
58	 http://krsu.edu.kg/index.php?lang=en	The	number	of	students	is	approximately	11,000.	
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(Rossiyskaya Gazeta).	No	information	on	the	nature	of	this	co-operation	is	avail-
able.	However,	 it	can	be	assumed	that	 in	addition	 to	propagating	 the	agency’s	
activity,	grants	and	study	visits	for	journalists,	it	may	also	cover	the	publication	
of	articles	that	contribute	to	building	a	positive	image	of	Russia59.
Three	 so-called	 ‘Russian	 centres’	 operate	 in	 Kyrgyzstan	 under	 the	 ae-
gis	of	 the	Russkiy Mir	 Foundation60:	 in	Bishkek	 (at	 the	Bishkek	University	of	
Humanities)61,	Kant	(at	the	oblast	library)62	and	Osh	(at	the	Osh	branch	of	the	
Russian	State	Social	University)63,	and	 in	addition	to	 these:	 the	 training	and	
consultation	centre	at	Kyzyl-Kiya64,	the	centre	of	Slavonic	studies	at	the	Kyr-
gyz-Russian	Slavic	University65,	the	Slavonic	Culture	Centre	in	Bishkek66,	and	
the	Association	of	Russian	Language	and	Literature	Teachers	in	Kyrgyzstan67.	
The	foundation	also	declares	on	its	websites	that	it	co-operates	with	a	number	
of	Kyrgyz	media68.	As	with	Rossotrudnichestvo,	it	is	difficult	to	give	any	details	
of	this	co-operation.
Russian	is	the	predominant	language	in	Kyrgyzstan’s	information	space.	It	is	
used	by	the	following	media:	
59	 The	newspapers	Vecherniy Bishkek	and	Dla Vas,	the	Internet	portal	News-Asia	and	the	local	
office	of	the	Rossiyskaya Gazeta	daily	newspaper	are	specified	on	the	agency’s	websites	in	the	
‘Partners’	section	(in	addition	to	educational	and	cultural	institutions	and	official	Russian	
agencies	(the	embassy,	the	agency	of	the	Federal	Migration	Service,	and	the	Russian	trade	
representative	office):	http://kgz.rs.gov.ru/node/14
60	 The	Russkiy Mir Foundation	runs	Russian	centres	in	various	countries	across	the	globe	in	
co-operation	with	local	education	institutions	(most	often	universities).	Their	form	(equip-
ment,	activity	directions)	is	the	same	everywhere,	but	the	specific	programmes	and	pro-
jects	they	implement,	including	the	various	kinds	of	Russian	courses,	are	adjusted	to	local	
conditions.	
61	 http://www.russkiymir.ru/russkiymir/ru/catalogue/company_view.html?id=2861
62	 http://www.russkiymir.ru/russkiymir/ru/catalogue/company_view.html?id=2862
63	 http://www.russkiymir.ru/russkiymir/ru/catalogue/company_view.html?id=2863
64	 http://www.russkiymir.ru/russkiymir/ru/catalogue/company_view.html?id=5122&catalo
g=&country=83&region=&city=
65	 http://www.russkiymir.ru/russkiymir/ru/catalogue/company_view.html?id=14828&catal
og=&country=83&region=&city=
66	 http://www.russkiymir.ru/russkiymir/ru/catalogue/company_view.html?id=14047&catal
og=&country=83&region=&city=
67	 http://www.russkiymir.ru/russkiymir/ru/catalogue/company_view.html?id=13765&catal
og=&country=83&region=&city=
68	 These	are	the	radio	stations:	Almaz,	Avto-Radio	and	Maks,	the	Internet	portals:	Karablar.org,	
StanRadar.com	and	Forum.kg,	and	the	State	Television	and	Radio	Company	of	Kyrgyzstan:	
http://www.russkiymir.ru/russkiymir/ru/catalogue/catalog.html?country=83&pager.offs
et=0&pageIndex=1&pageSize=10
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1. Russians	from	Russia,
2. local	Russians	(local	editions	of	the	press	issued	in	Russia)	and	
3. Kyrgyz	using	the	Russian	language.
The	first	group	principally	includes	Russian	TV,	which	is	accessible	across	the	
country	(broadcast	both	via	terrestrial	transmitters	and	in	cable	networks)69,	
as	well	as	Russian	news	Internet	portals.	
The	second	group	includes	local	branches	of	the	Russian	press.	These	are:	Kom­
somolskaya Pravda Kyrgyzstan	 (with	a	circulation	of	 15,000	copies),	Moskovsky 
Komsomolets Aziya	 (7000),	Argumenty i Fakty v Kyrgyzstane	 (5000)	and	Rossiy­
skaya Gazeta v Kyrgyzstane	(3500)70.	A	significant	section	of	the	Kyrgyz	media	
also	use	the	Russian	language.	The	share	of	programmes	which	local	TV	and	
radio	stations	can	broadcast	in	Russian	is	restricted	by	law	(over	fifty	percent	
must	be	broadcast	 in	 the	Kyrgyz	 language71).	Newspapers	published	 in	Rus-
sian	 and	Kyrgyz	have	 similar	 shares	 in	 the	press	market,	 although	 the	 for-
mer	 have	 clearly	 higher	 circulation	 levels.	 These	 include:	Vecherniy Bishkek,	
which	 is	published	three	 times	a	week	(daily	 issue	at	 14,500	copies,	and	Fri-
day	issue	at	40,000	copies),	Delo N	(40,000)	and	Slovo Kyrgyzstana	(14,000	with	
supplements).	 The	 newspapers	 published	 in	 the	 Kyrgyz	 language	 include:	
Daat	 (50,000),	 Kyrgyz Tuusu	 (20,000),	 Agym	 (17,000)	 and	 Aaalam	 (13,000).	
The	Ay­Danek	 newspaper	 is	 published	 in	both	Russian	 and	Kyrgyz	 (20,000).	
The	key	Kyrgyz	news	Internet	portals	(24kg.org,	AKIpress.org,	Azattyk.org,	Ka­
bar.kg,	Knews.kg,	KyrgyzNews.com,	Vesti.kg)	are	published	in	Russian,	although	
most	of	them	also	have	Kyrgyz	versions	(and	sporadically	also	English,	Turkish	
or	Uzbek	versions).	
3.1.2. an outline of russian-Kyrgyz relations
Kyrgyzstan	was	one	of	the	Central	Asian	countries	which	backed	the	coalition	
operation	in	Afghanistan	following	the	terrorist	attacks	in	the	USA	on	11	Sep-
tember	2001,	and	to	have	made	their	territory	available	for	the	purposes	of	the	
69	 Аркадий Дубнов, ‘Как живут русские в Киргизии’,	StanRadar.com,	 15	 June	 2013,	 http://
stanradar.com/news/full/3037-kak-zhivut-russkie-v-kirgizii.html
70	 The	newspaper	circulation	volumes	in	Kyrgyzstan	here	and	further	in	this	text	have	been	
taken	from	Media	Center,	http://monitoring.kg/?pid=69
71	 Аркадий Дубнов, ‘Как живут...’,	op. cit.
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operation	(although	Bishkek	had	attempted	to	conduct	an	independent	policy	
even	before,	one	proof	of	which	is	 its	accession	to	the	WTO	in	1998).	The	US	
air	base	started	operating	at	Manas	airport	in	December	2001.	Moscow,	which	
itself	backed	the	coalition,	did	not	oppose	this.	However,	at	the	same	time,	it	
commenced	consultations	aimed	at	restricting	the	Western	military	presence	
and	establishing	closer	co-operation	with	Central	Asian	countries	in	the	area	
of	security72.	It	seems	that	Moscow	was	not	so	concerned	about	the	existence	
of	the	base,	but	rather	the	fact	that	it	had	had	no	influence	on	the	conditions	of	
its	stationing,	and	did	not	take	part	in	the	decision-making	process73.	Russia	
and	China	ensured	that	an	appeal	for	setting	the	schedule	for	the	international	
forces’	withdrawal	from	Afghanistan	was	included	in	the	joint	declaration	at	
the	Shanghai	Co-operation	Organisation’s	summit	in	Astana	on	5	July	200574.
Moscow	hoped	that	 following	the	 ‘Tulip	Revolution’	 in	Kyrgyzstan	of	March	
2005,	the	administration	of	the	new	president	Kurmanbek	Bakiyev,	who	de-
fined	Russia	as	“Bishkek’s	strategic	and	most	important	ally,”	would	take	Rus-
sian	interests	into	account	in	their	policy.	Bakiyev	hinted	that	he	saw	no	point	
in	further	operation	of	the	air	base	in	Manas,	but	he	took	no	action	to	termi-
nate	the	lease75.
On	3	February	2009	Bakiyev	announced	that	his	government	had	decided	to	
close	 the	base	 (and	 the	parliament	passed	 the	relevant	resolution	on	 19	Feb-
ruary).	Beyond	any	doubt,	this	decision	had	been	forced	by	Moscow	–	it	was	
72	 Marek	Menkiszak,	 ‘Russia’s	Afghan	problem…’,	op. cit.,	 page	 102.	Kyrgyzstan	and	Russia	
were	allies	under	the	Collective	Security	Treaty	signed	on	15	May	1992	(the	CST;	Uzbekistan,	
where	a	US	base	was	also	established,	did	not	sign	the	protocol	to	extend	the	term	of	the	
document	in	1999);	a	foreign	military	presence	was	contrary	to	the	spirit	of	the	Tashkent	
Treaty,	yet	Moscow	assumed	that	“US	bases	were	better	than	terrorist	bases.”	Nevertheless,	
it	was	decided	at	a	session	on	14	May	2002	in	Moscow	that	the	CST	be	transformed	into	an	
international	organisation	(the	CSTO),	which	was	supposed	to	tighten	the	bonds	between	
Russia	and	the	other	signatories,	including	Central	Asian	states	(at	that	time	Kazakhstan,	
Kyrgyzstan	and	Tajikistan;	Uzbekistan	rejoined	the	organisation	in	2006-2012).
73	 Dmitri	Trenin	writes,	“The	Russian	leaders	would	most	likely	agree	to	extending	the	lease	
[of	the	Manas	base],	however	provided	that	Moscow	signed	an	agreement	with	Washington	
to	this	effect,	where	Bishkek	would	only	act	as	a	subcontractor.”	(Дмитрий Тренин,	‘Post-
Imperium...’,	op. cit.,	page	178).
74	 For	more	information	on	this	declaration,	see	chapter	III.
75	 Most	likely,	Bishkek	did	not	want	to	lose	the	lease	rent	(over	US$17	million	annually)	as	well	
as	the	lucrative	supply	contracts,	worth	many	times	more,	especially	those	concerning	fuel	
supplies	(these	were	implemented	by	firms	linked	to	the	Bakiyev	clan).	Wojciech	Górecki,	
‘Russia’s	position	on	the	events	in	Kyrgyzstan	(April–June	2010),	OSW Commentary,	no.	38,	
27	July,	http://www.osw.waw.pl/en/publikacje/osw-commentary/2010-07-27/russias-posi-
tion-events-kyrgyzstan-april-june-2010	
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announced	almost	simultaneously	that	Russia	would	offer	assistance	to	Kyr-
gyzstan	worth	US$2.15	billion,	 including	US$150	million	as	a	non-refundable	
grant,	and	US$300	million	as	a	loan	on	preferential	conditions	(both	of	these	
sums,	a	total	of	US$450	million,	have	been	made	available	to	Kyrgyzstan).	The	
remaining	US$1.7	billion	was	 to	be	granted	as	a	 loan	 for	 the	construction	of	
the	Kambar-Ata	1	hydropower	plant76.	This	assistance	was	commonly	seen	as	
Bishkek’s	‘charge’	for	closing	the	Manas	air	base.
Contrary	to	his	promises,	however,	on	7	July	2009	Bakiyev	signed	an	agreement	
which	allowed	the	USA	to	continue	using	the	Manas	site.	The	following	trick	
was	used:	the	base	was	renamed	as	a	‘Transit	Centre.’	The	lease	rent	was	also	
raised,	up	to	over	US$60	million	annually77.	Moscow	expressed	its	“disappoint-
ment”	in	connection	with	the	renewal	of	the	lease	of	Manas,	which	should	be	
understood	as	strong	dissatisfaction.	In	response,	 it	took	action	to	deploy	its	
second	military	base	 in	Kyrgyzstan.	At	first	Bishkek	played	 for	 time	during	
the	talks,	suggesting	that	the	base	could	be	located	in	Batken	district	(south-
western	Kyrgyzstan,	close	to	the	border	with	Tajikistan)78,	to	announce	later	
that	a	Kyrgyz	military	training	centre	would	be	located	in	the	same	district	(in	
co-operation	with	the	USA,	which	declared	it	would	allocate	US$5.5	million	for	
this	project)79.
76	 Ibid.	A	deal	 setting	up	 the	Russian-Kyrgyz	 company,	 Inter	RAO/Electric	Power	Plants	 of	
Kyrgyzstan	(each	party	holding	a	50%	stake),	was	struck	in	April	2009.	The	company	was	
put	in	charge	of	building	power	plants.	RAO	UES	of	Russia	had	already	signed	a	memoran-
dum	envisaging	the	construction	of	two	hydropower	plants	on	the	Naryn	river:	Kambar-
-Ata	1	and	Kambar-Ata	2	with	the	government	in	Bishkek	in	August	2004	(it	was	assumed	
that	the	power	plants	could	supply	electricity	to	Kazakhstan,	Russia	and	China).	It	is	un-
clear	whether	Moscow	really	wanted	to	become	engaged	in	these	projects,	or	whether	it	was	
an	attempt	to	put	pressure	on	Uzbekistan	(which	fears	that	the	implementation	of	the	hydro	
energy	projects	in	Kyrgyzstan	and	Tajikistan	could	restrict	its	access	to	water).
77	 See	Konrad	Zasztowt,	 ‘Rywalizacja	Rosji	 i	NATO	w	Azji	Środkowej’,	Bezpieczeństwo Naro­
dowe,	 volume	 11/2009,	pages.	 132–134.	Washington	also	undertook	 to	offer	US$117	million	
as	non-returnable	assistance	to	the	Kyrgyz	government,	part	of	which	would	be	spent	on	
developing	the	airport’s	infrastructure	and	supporting	anti-drug	police	units	(the	USA	al-
located	a	 total	of	US$33	million	between	 the	early	 1990s	and	2009	on	equipping	military	
facilities	in	Kyrgyzstan.	See	KABAR	Press	Agency,	23	October	2009).
78	 ‘Kyrgyzstan:	A	Hollow	Regime	Collapses.	International	Crisis	Group’,	Asia Briefing,	no.	102,	
Bishkek-Brussels,	27	April	2010.
79	 KABAR	Press	Agency,	23	October	2009.	Bishkek	was	deluding	Moscow	in	a	similar	way	in	
the	area	of	economy.	 In	February	2009,	President	Bakiyev	undertook	negotiations	to	en-
sure	that	the	Kyrgyz	debt	of	US$180	million	would	be	cancelled	in	exchange	for	handing	
over	a	48%	stake	in	the	weapon	manufacturer,	Dastan,	to	Russia.	However,	it	later	turned	
out	that	the	Kyrgyz	government	held	only	a	37.665%	stake,	and	the	rest	of	the	shares	were	
owned	by	private	shareholders.	When	the	deal	with	Moscow	was	struck,	 the	president’s	
son,	Maksim	Bakiyev,	started	buying	up	these	shares,	as	a	consequence	of	which	their	pric-
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Moscow	has	manifested	its	dissatisfaction	with	Bakiyev’s	policy	in	three	ways:	
by	 increasing	 its	economic	pressure	on	Kyrgyzstan,	by	orchestrating	an	an-
ti-Bakiyev	campaign	 in	 the	Russian	media,	 and	by	enhancing	contacts	with	
the	Kyrgyz	opposition.	The	Russian-Kyrgyz	three-year	economic	co-operation	
plan,	signed	on	27	February	2010,	did	not	take	the	loan	on	the	construction	of	
the	Kambar-Ata	1	hydropower	plant	into	account80.	Furthermore,	on	1	April,	
Russia	imposed	the	aforementioned	100%	export	duty	on	petroleum	products.	
At	the	same	time,	the	Russian	media	started	publishing	materials	aimed	at	dis-
crediting	Bakiyev’s	regime	(where	accusations	of	large-scale	corruption	were	
especially	frequent)	and	denouncing	the	network	of	his	clan	and	business	con-
nections.	
Bakiyev	lost	power	on	7	April	2010	as	a	consequence	of	another	revolution	in	
Kyrgyzstan.	There	 is	no	proof	 that	 the	Russian	government	was	directly	 in-
volved	in	the	coup.	However,	one	could	risk	the	statement	that	it	was	a	source	
of	 inspiration	 (the	 accusations	 brought	 against	 the	 Bakiyev	 administration	
on	Russian	TV,	which	is	popular	in	Kyrgyzstan,	were	certainly	a	factor	which	
fuelled	 the	 protests),	 and	was	 even	 ‘lobbying’	 for	 the	 president’s	 overthrow	
among	the	opposition	elites.	Russia	was	the	first	country	in	the	world	to	recog-
nise	the	de facto	new	government,	but	its	support	for	Roza	Otunbayeva’s	team	
was	not	unconditional.	The	Manas	issue	became	the	litmus	test.	Meanwhile,	
Otunbayeva	announced	that	Bishkek	would	respect	its	previous	arrangements	
with	the	USA.	Then	the	Kyrgyz	side	started	playing	for	time,	using	the	political	
transformation	of	the	country	as	an	excuse	and	thus	demonstrating	its	inde-
pendence	(when	the	lease	term	expired	in	July	2010,	it	was	automatically	ex-
tended	for	one	year,	since	the	parliament	which	could	have	terminated	it	was	
to	be	elected	only	in	October,	and	the	term	of	the	parliament	in	session	at	that	
time	was	about	to	end).
The	new	president,	Almazbek	Atambayev,	who	took	his	office	on	1	December	
2011,	returned	to	the	Manas	issue.	During	talks	with	a	delegation	from	the	US	
Department	of	State	visiting	Kyrgyzstan	in	February	2012,	he	announced	that	
“no	foreign	military	contingent	should	be	present	at	Manas	civilian	airport	by	
es	rose.	Then	Bishkek	declared	that	it	could	hand	over	its	shares	and	suggested	that	Moscow	
could	buy	the	remaining	shares	at	market	price.	(Wojciech	Górecki,	‘Russia’s	position	on	the	
events…’,	op. cit.).
80	 ‘Kirgistan	 bez	 rosyjskich	 pieniędzy	 na	 hydroenergetykę’,	 Tydzień na Wschodzie,	 OSW,	
3	March	2010.	Since	early	2010,	Bakiyev’s	team	had	been	making	efforts	to	ensure	that	the	
investment	would	be	financed	by	China.
39
O
SW
 S
TU
D
IE
S 
 4
/2
01
4
summer	2014.”81	He	has	reiterated	this	declaration	on	several	more	occasions,	
although	no	binding	decisions	to	this	effect	have	been	taken.	
Kyrgyz-Russian	relations	seriously	deteriorated	in	the	first	half	of	2012.	Rus-
sia	 demanded	 to	 be	 given	 significant	 assets	 in	 the	Kyrgyz	 economy82,	wish-
ing,	as	it	seems,	to	‘test’	the	new	government’s	readiness	to	co-operate.	In	re-
sponse,	Bishkek	pointed	to	the	Russian	debt	linked	to	the	use	of	the	Kant	Air	
Base	 (which	Moscow	 immediately	 repaid).	 President	 Vladimir	 Putin	 signed	
a	number	of	agreements	 in	Bishkek	on	20	September	2012,	 including	the	al-
ready	mentioned	agreement	on	the	united	military	base	(which	Moscow	de-
sired	especially	strongly).	Russia	undertook	once	again	to	fund	and	construct	
the	Kambar	Ata	 1	hydropower	plant,	as	well	as	 the	power	plant’s	cascade	 in	
the	upper	reaches	of	the	Naryn	river.	It	also	wrote	off	part	of	the	Kyrgyz	debt	
(US$189	million	out	of	US$489	million).	The	economic	deals	were	quite	general	
and	failed	to	include	a	number	of	vital	details,	which	may	give	rise	to	concern	
that	they	would	not	be	implemented,	as	before.	
In	May	2013,	the	Kyrgyz	government	decided	to	terminate	the	USA’s	 lease	of	
Manas,	and	President	Atambayev	signed	an	act	to	this	effect	on	26	June83.	The	
US	military	presence	in	Manas	is	expected	to	come	to	a	definite	end	on	11	July	
2014,	which	the	Russian	side	is	satisfied	with.	However,	some	experts	have	re-
cently	started	stating	that	Bishkek	may	be	ready	to	make	another	volte-face,	
and	the	US	forces	will	remain	at	Manas	as	part	of	a	new	formula	after	this	date	
as	well84.	Statements	from	President	Atambayev	himself	seem	to	place	these	
speculations	on	pretty	firm	ground85.
81	 ‘Кыргызстан: Президент А. Атамбаев и представитель госсекретаря США обсудили 
судьбу базы «Манас»’,	Fergananews.com,	20	February	2012,	http://www.fergananews.com/
news.php?id=18194	
82	 Including	 a	 75%	 stake	 in	 the	 weapon	manufacturer,	 Dastan	 (it	 was	 agreed	 in	 February	
2009	that	the	stake	would	be	48%)	and	a	75%	stake	in	the	company	in	charge	of	building	
the	Kambar-Ata	1	power	plant	(instead	of	the	50%	stake	as	agreed	in	April	2009).	‘Россия не 
выполняет свои обязательства’,	Коммерсанть Власть,	16	April	2012	[A	conversation	be-
tween	Yelena	Chernenko	&	Kabay	Karabekov	and	the	prime	minister	of	Kyrgyzstan,	Omur-
bek	Babanov].
83	 Józef	Lang,	‘Kyrgyzstan	has	terminated	the	agreement	with	the	US	on	the	Manas	air	base’,	
EastWeek,	OSW,	 10	 July	 2013,	 http://www.osw.waw.pl/en/publikacje/analyses/2013-07-10/
kyrgyzstan-has-terminated-agreement-us-manas-air-base	
84	 Ibid.
85	 ‘Алмазбек Атамбаев: Не все американские войска будут выведены из Кыргызстана’,	
Kant.kg,	21	May	2013,	http://kant.kg/2013-05-21/almazbek-atambaev-ne-vse-amerikanskie-
voyska-budut-vyivedenyi-iz-kyirgyizstana/
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Moscow	still	has	significant	influence	among	politicians	in	Kyrgyzstan86.	An-
other	important	factor	is	the	generally	positive	attitude	of	that	country’s	peo-
ple	 towards	Russia,	which	 is	 an	effect	of	both	 their	positive	 sentiment	with	
regard	to	the	Russian	culture	and	language,	and	of	the	Russian	government’s	
conscious	policy	(those	wishing	to	be	granted	Russian	citizenship	do	not	have	
to	relinquish	citizenship	of	Kyrgyzstan,	they	can	travel	to	Russia	and	search	
for	work	there,	etc.).	This	generally	positive	evaluation	is	still	unaffected	by	
the	fact	that	anti-Russian	sentiments	arise	from	time	to	time	in	Kyrgyzstan,	
most	often	as	the	consequence	of	racial	aggression	addressed	to	Kyrgyz	living	
in	Russia.	It	is	possible	that	such	sentiments	will	become	aggravated	over	time.	
Moscow	maintains	contacts	with	all	the	major	political	and	social	forces	in	the	
country,	and	the	fact	that	along	with	its	embassy	in	Bishkek	it	also	has	a	con-
sulate	general	in	Osh	is	helpful	in	this	context.	
russia – Kyrgyzstan
Russia	 is	Kyrgyzstan’s	most	 important	political	 and	economic	partner.	 It	
accounts	 for	 13%	 of	 Kyrgyz	 exports	 (third	 after	 Switzerland,	 32.6%	 and	
Kazakhstan,	24.1%)	and	33.2%	of	 its	 import	(first	before	China,	22.5%	and	
Kazakhstan,	 9.7%,	data	 for	 201287).	However,	Russian	promises	 to	 invest,	
especially	in	hydro	energy,	still	remain	unfulfilled.	Now	that	Bishkek	has	
allowed	Gazprom	to	take	over	Kyrgyzgaz,	the	only	serious	card	it	can	play	
in	talks	with	Moscow	is	the	possible	continuation	of	the	US	military	pres-
ence	(after	the	assumed	US	withdrawal	 from	Manas)	and	the	fact	 that	 it	
still	 remains	 outside	 the	 Customs	Union	 structures:	 for	 example,	 in	 ex-
change	for	joining	the	CU,	Kyrgyzstan	could	insist	on	the	construction	of	
the	Kambar-Ata	1	hydropower	plant88.	It	has	to	be	admitted	that	the	degree	
of	Kyrgyzstan’s	dependence	on	Russia	is	high.	
86	 None	 of	 the	major	 political	 forces	 in	Kyrgyzstan	manifests	 anti-Russian	 sentiments,	 and	
there	are	no	serious	anti-Russian	politicians	in	this	country.	Even	the	overthrown	President	
Bakiyev,	whose	actions	could	be	seen	by	the	Kremlin	as	unfriendly,	cannot	be	classified	as	
a	‘pro-Western’	politician.	He	was	actually	trying	to	manoeuvre	between	Washington	and	
Moscow,	and	to	capitalise	on	their	conflicting	interests	(his	moves	were	motivated	not	only	
by	the	interests	of	the	state,	but	also	by	financial	benefits	for	himself	and	his	family).
87	 http://stat.kg/index.php?option=com_content&task=view&id=135&Itemid=125
88	 Representatives	of	Kyrgyzstan’s	government	have	declared	their	will	to	join	the	Customs	
Union	 on	 numerous	 occasions;	 for	 example,	 President	 Atambayev	 said	 in	 an	 interview	
for	ITAR-TASS	agency	on	12	April	2013	that	Bishkek	had	taken	a	“firm	decision”	regarding	
this	issue	(but	he	also	emphasised	that	“this	does	not	depend	on	us	alone,	but	also	on	the	
CU	member	states	–	an	appropriate	decision	must	be	 taken	by	 the	 three	states”).	 Its	 for-
mal	accession	is	expected	in	2014.	Михаил Гусман, ‘Киргизия приняла твердое решение 
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3.2. tajikistan
3.2.1. russia’s assets
The military presence
Moscow	has	its	201st	ground	troop	base	in	Tajikistan	(the	largest	one	outside	
Russia),	which	consists	of	a	number	of	facilities	grouped	in	three	garrisons:	
Dushanbe,	 Kulab	 (Kulob)	 and	 Qurghonteppa	 (Kurgan-Tyube)89.	 Between	
6800	and	7500	soldiers	serve	there.	When	President	Putin	visited	Dushanbe	
on	5	October	2012,	an	agreement	extending	the	stationing	of	the	base	for	30	
years	was	signed	(until	2042;	the	previous	deals	would	have	expired	in	2014).	
Moscow	has	thus	guaranteed	itself	a	military	presence	in	Tajikistan	on	very	
favourable	terms.	The	document,	as	reported	by	the	Russian	side,	does	not	
provide	for	any	lease	rent,	and	partial	immunity	will	be	vested	in	the	soldiers	
on	duty	at	the	base	(similar	to	the	status	which	the	technical	embassy	staff	
have).	 In	exchange	Russia	has	undertaken	to	participate	in	the	modernisa-
tion	of	the	Tajik	army	and	training	local	officers90.	The	agreement	was	rati-
fied	by	Tajikistan	as	late	as	the	beginning	of	October	201391,	which	was	linked	
to	Dushanbe’s	strategic	manoeuvres	(see	section	3.2.2.	An	outline	of	Russian-
-Tajik	relations).
вступить в Таможенный союз – президент Атамбаев’,	 ITAR-TASS,	12	April	2013,	http://
www.itar-tass.com/c1/704922.html
89	 This	base	was	formally	opened	on	17	October	2004.	However,	the	troops	which	form	it	had	
already	been	stationed	in	Tajikistan	since	1989	(they	had	found	themselves	there	as	part	of	
the	201st	Motor	Rifle	Division	following	their	withdrawal	from	Afghanistan,	where	they	
had	been	part	of	the	Soviet	contingent).	When	the	civil	war	broke	out	in	Tajikistan	in	1992,	
the	Russian	government	decided	to	make	the	201st	division	part	of	the	Russian	army.	It	per-
formed	the	functions	of	peacekeeping	(under	the	aegis	of	the	CIS)	and	stabilisation,	and	in	
fact	backed	the	government	side	(a	force	of	around	15,000	soldiers).	When	the	war	ended	in	
1997,	the	division	remained	in	Tajikistan.	It	was	transformed	into	the	base	for	the	Ground	
Troops	of	the	Russian	Federation	in	1999	(although	the	agreement	concerning	this	has	not	
come	into	force,	 for	formal	reasons).	The	deal	of	2004	specified	the	real	estate	which	be-
longed	to	the	base	and	set	the	limits	of	the	plots	of	land	occupied	by	it.	
90	 Wojciech	Górecki,	‘Russia	stronger	in	Tajikistan’,	EastWeek,	OSW,	10	October	2012,	http://
www.osw.waw.pl/en/publikacje/analyses/2012-10-10/russia-stronger-tajikistan	
91	 ‘Таджикистан ратифицировал соглашение о статусе и условиях пребывания россий­
ской военной базы Узбекистана’,	 Fergananews.com,	 1	 October	 2013,	 http://www.ferga-
nanews.com/news.php?id=21271.	Russia	ratified	the	agreement	on	27	April	2013.	President	
Emomalii	Rahmon	promised	during	his	meeting	with	Vladimir	Putin	on	1	August	2013	that	
the	Tajik	parliament	would	do	the	same	in	autumn	2013.
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In	2008,	Russia	and	Tajikistan	signed	an	agreement	on	the	joint	use	of	the	Ayni	
air	base	near	Dushanbe.	However,	Tajikistan	is	the	sole	party	who	can	decide	
on	the	use	of	the	facilities.	
In	2004,	Russia	gained	supervision	for	49	years	over	the	Okno	space	surveil-
lance	site92	located	near	Nurak	in	south-western	Tajikistan.	The	site	is	situated	
at	2200	m	above	sea	level,	and	automatically	registers	any	objects	emerging	in	
space	at	an	altitude	of	up	to	40,000	km.
Russian	border	troops	were	stationed	in	Tajikistan	in	1992–200593.	A	group	of	
up	to	one	hundred	Russian	advisers	is	staying	there	now	(in	Dushanbe	and	on	
the	Tajik-Afghan	frontier)94.
The economic presence
Russia’s	largest	investment	in	Tajikistan	is	the	Sangtuda	1	Hydroelectric	Power	
Plant,	which	was	put	into	operation	in	July	2009	on	the	Vakhsh	river.	To	com-
plete	its	construction,	which	had	already	commenced	in	the	1980s95,	and	to	con-
tinue	its	operation,	a	Russian-Tajik	joint	venture	named	Sangtudinskaya	GES-1,	
in	which	the	Russian	government	and	firms	(principally	RAO	UES)	acquired	75%	
minus	one	share,	and	the	Tajikistan	government	25%	plus	one	share.	The	power	
plant	accounts	for	around	15%	of	the	electric	energy	generated	in	Tajikistan.	As	
of	1	June	2011,	the	company’s	shareholding	structure	was	as	follows:	the	Russian	
state-controlled	nuclear	energy	corporation,	Rosatom,	held	60.13%	of	its	shares,	
Inter	RAO	14.87%,	and	the	government	of	Tajikistan	25%	plus	one	share96.
92	 The	 1109th	 separate	 optic-electronic	 tracking	 station	 Nurek	 is	 part	 of	 the	 Space	 Defence	
Troops	of	the	Russian	Federation.	This	complex	has	been	in	operation	since	2002	(the	con-
struction	was	launched	in	1979);	http://www.fas.org/spp/military/program/track/okno.pdf
93	 Russian	troops	have	taken	over	the	Soviet	border	infrastructure.	The	process	of	Tajikistan	
taking	control	of	border	protection	commenced	in	1998	and	continued	until	2005	(the	criti-
cal	sections	of	the	border	with	Afghanistan	were	the	last	to	be	handed	over).	The	number	of	
Russian	border	guard	troops	in	Tajikistan	at	times	reached	up	to	11,500	soldiers	(local	Tajik	
soldiers	predominated	among	the	privates).
94	 This	group	initially	consisted	of	over	300	advisers;	 their	number	has	been	reduced	after	
they	were	accused	of	spying	in	2011	by	Sherali	Mirza,	the	head	of	the	Tajik	Border	Guard	
Service.	Кубанычбек Жолдошев, ‘Какой статус...’,	op. cit.
95	 This	power	plant	is	part	of	the	so-called	cascade,	a	complex	of	nine	hydropower	plants	on	
the	Vakhsh	river	designed	in	the	1950s	(six	of	them	are	in	operation,	two	–	including	the	
largest,	the	Rogun	power	plant	–	are	under	construction,	and	one	is	in	the	phase	of	initial	
preparatory	work).
96	 http://www.sangtuda.com/shareholder/
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Gazprom	 has	 been	 interested	 in	 Tajikistan	 for	 many	 years.	 A	 strategic	 co-
operation	deal	signed	by	Gazprom	and	the	government	in	Dushanbe	in	2003	
for	a	25-year	term	granted	the	company	a	licence	for	geological	exploration	of	
the	Sargazon	and	Rengan	oil	&	gas	fields,	 and	 later	 for	 the	Sarikamysh	and	
Western	 Shokhambary	 sites	 (the	 project’s	 operator	 is	Gazprom’s	 subsidiary,	
Zarubezhneftegaz).	The	latter	two	projects	turned	out	to	be	the	most	promis-
ing,	and	trial	production	has	been	launched	there97.	Gazpromneft	commenced	
its	activity	in	Tajikistan	in	2007.	At	present,	it	has	a	chain	of	25	filling	stations	
in	the	country98.
In	2001,	MegaFon,	a	Russian	mobile	telephone	operator,	and	Tajikistan’s	state-
owned	Tojiktelecom	established	TT	Mobile	company,	in	which	the	Russian	side	
acquired	a	75%	stake,	and	the	Tajik	side	a	25%	stake.	At	present,	this	company	
is	known	as	MegaFon-Tajikistan.
Soft power
As	 in	Kyrgyzstan,	 an	 agency	of	 the	Russian	Federal	Migration	Service	 op-
erates	 in	Tajikistan99.	 Russian	has	 the	 status	 of	 “language	 for	 inter-ethnic	
communication”	(Article	2	of	 the	constitution).	However,	 the	new	National	
Language	Act	adopted	on	7	October	2009	states	that	Tajik	is	the	only	language	
allowed	 in	 any	 official	 contacts	with	 the	 state	 administration100.	 In	March	
2010,	the	Tajik	parliament	adopted	an	act	lifting	the	obligation	to	publish	le-
gal	acts	in	Russian101.
Russian	is	the	language	of	instruction	in	15	out	of	the	3810	general	education	
schools102	in	Tajikistan.	In	addition	to	these,	there	are	95	Tajik-Russian,	61	Tajik-	
-Uzbek-Russian	 and	 3	 Tajik-Kyrgyz-Russian	 schools,	 as	 well	 as	 a	 Russian-
-Uzbek,	a	Russian-Kyrgyz	and	a	Russian-English	school.	Five	(public)	Russian	
97	 http://www.gazprom.ru/about/production/projects/deposits/tajikistan/;	
	 http://gazprom-international.com/ru/operations/country/tadzhikistan?overlay=true
98	 See:	http://www.gpnbonus.ru/our_azs/
99	 As	part	of	the	Russian	Embassy	in	Dushanbe.	Russia	also	has	a	consulate-general	in	Khujand.
100	 http://www.russkiymir.ru/russkiymir/ru/news/common/news4827.html
101	 http://inlang.linguanet.ru/Cis/CisRussianLanguage/detail.php?ELEMENT_ID=2574&PAGEN_1=2
102	 In	Tajikistan,	as	in	the	other	CIS	countries,	the	general	education	(secondary)	school	is	the	
most	important	link	of	the	education	system,	which	provides	education	at	primary,	middle	
and	secondary	school	levels.	Education	is	compulsory	in	Tajikistan	for	ten	years,	and	full	
secondary	education,	which	gives	the	right	to	enter	higher	education	schools,	is	achieved	
upon	the	completion	of	two	additional	years	of	education	(grades	11	and	12).
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schools	operate	independently	of	the	Tajik	education	system:	four	are	located	
where	Russian	military	units	 are	 stationed,	 and	one	operates	 as	part	 of	 the	
Russian-Tajik	Slavonic	University103.	Around	4500	students	receive	education	
(in	 Russian)	 at	 this	 university.	 Furthermore,	 a	 branch	 of	 the	Moscow	 State	
University	has	been	operating	in	Dushanbe	since	2009.	Russian	is	a	compul-
sory	subject	at	all	Tajik	higher	education	schools	(two	semesters,	106	hours	of	
classes)104.
Rossotrudnichestvo	 is	significantly	less	active	here	than	in	neighbouring	Kyr-
gyzstan.	This	 institution’s	website	 lists	only	 three	Russian	minority	organi-
sations105.	 Educational	 institutions	 predominate	 among	 the	 agency’s	 partner	
organisations	(the	Russian-Tajik	Slavonic	University,	the	State	Russian	Drama	
Theatre	of	Tajikistan,	the	Tajik	Association	for	Friendship	and	Cultural	Rela-
tions	with	Foreign	Countries,	etc.106)	–	the	absence	of	media	from	this	group	is	
worth	noting.
The	 Russkiy Mir Foundation	 runs	 four	 Russian	 centres	 in	 Tajikistan:	 all	 of	
them	operate	in	Dushanbe	as	part	of	various	higher	education	schools107.	The	
foundation	also	co-operates	with	a	number	of	Tajik	cultural	and	social	insti-
tutions,	Russian	minority	 organisations	 and	Russian-language	media	 (those	
with	national	coverage,	as	well	as	local	and	specialist	media,	such	as	Russian 
103	 http://www.rusemb.tj/ru/index/index/pageId/305/,	Data	for	2010.
104	 Ibid.
105	 Understood	in	the	broad	meaning	of	the	term	as	a	diaspora	of	nations	forming	the	indig-
enous	people	of	the	Russian	Federation	(one	of	them	is	an	organisation	of	Tajik	Ossetians	
and	another	of	Tajik	Tatars).	According	to	the	census	of	2000,	(ethnic)	Russians	account-
ed	 for	 approximately	 1.1%	 of	 Tajikistan’s	 population	 (68,200	 http://demoscope.ru/week-
ly/2005/0191/analit05.php);	in	December	2012,	the	Russian	Embassy	in	Dushanbe	estimated	
that	their	number	was	“over	40,000.”	(http://www.rusemb.tj/ru/index/index/pageId/276/).	
The	Russian	Coordination	Council	 of	 Tajikistan	 (Совет российских соотечественников 
Таджикистана),	which	has	been	operating	 since	2004,	 lists	 thirteen	minority	organisa-
tions	on	its	websites,	including	ten	from	Dushanbe	(http://russ.tj/category/obshchestven-
nye-organizatsii/gdushanbe).	At	least	several	other	organisations	(especially	those	which	
are	not	based	in	Dushanbe)	are	missing	from	this	list.	
106	 http://tjk.rs.gov.ru/node/14	
	 http://rs.gov.ru/node/1472
107	 http://www.russkiymir.ru/russkiymir/ru/catalogue/company_view.html?id=2859&cata
log=&country=82&region=&city=,	http://www.russkiymir.ru/russkiymir/ru/catalogue/
company_view.html?id=2160&catalog=&country=82&region=&city=,	http://www.russ-
kiymir.ru/russkiymir/ru/catalogue/company_view.html?id=2860&catalog=&country=82
&region=&city=,	http://www.russkiymir.ru/russkiymir/ru/catalogue/company_view.ht
ml?id=7204&catalog=&country=82&region=&city=
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Language and Literature at Schools of Tajikistan; some	of	them	are	co-financed	by	
the	foundation)108.
The	Russian	language	plays	an	important,	albeit	not	dominant,	role	in	Tajik-
istan’s	information	space.	Russian	TV	programmes	are	not	rebroadcast	there,	
unlike	in	Kyrgyzstan,	but	they	can	be	watched	via	cable	networks	and	satellite	
dishes,	which	are	in	common	use,	especially	in	the	provinces109.	From	time	to	
time	the	government	blocks	access	to	Russian	news	portals	(usually	this	co-
incides	with	a	worsening	of	relations	between	Dushanbe	and	Moscow)110.	As	
a	rule	TV	stations	in	Tajikistan	broadcast	programmes	in	the	Tajik	language	
(separate	news	blocks	are	also	available	in	Russian).	Russian	can	be	heard	a	lit-
tle	more	often	on	the	radio	(the	law	provides	that	content	in	the	Tajik	language,	
including	music,	must	fill	at	least	half	of	the	airtime	in	the	electronic	media.	
Some	radio	stations,	like	Vatan	and	especially	Oriono,	use	the	following	trick:	
they	broadcast	local	music,	while	their	news	and	publicist	programmes	are	al-
most	exclusively	in	Russian)111.
The	Russian-language	weeklies	Digest Press and	Vecherniy Dushanbe,	as	well	as	
Aziya­Plus,	which	is	published	twice	a	week	(this	corporation	also	owns	a	ra-
dio	 station	with	 the	same	name,	and	a	press	agency	which	uses	 the	website	
News.tj),	are	popular	among	Dushanbe’s	intelligentsia.	These	titles	have	a	small	
reach	outside	the	capital;	for	example,	Digest Press, which	is	a	kind	of	Tajik	press	
anthology,	has	a	circulation	of	around	10,000	copies	 (for	comparison,	Dzum­
huriya,	 the	official	organ	of	Tajikistan’s	president	and	government,	which	 is	
published	in	the	Tajik	language,	has	a	circulation	of	24,000	copies).	
Tajik	Internet	news	portals	usually	have	several	language	versions,	and	a	Rus-
sian	language	version	is	always	present.	The	most	popular	portals	are	Avesta.tj	
(Russian	and	English	versions112),	the	aforementioned	News.tj	(English,	Russia	
and	Tajik),	Ozodi.org	(Tajik	and	Russian),	Pressa.tj	(Russian	and	Tajik),	and	last	
but	not	least	Khowar.tj	(the	website	of	the	national	press	agency,	published	in	
Tajik,	Russian,	English	and	Arabic).
108	 http://www.russkiymir.ru/russkiymir/ru/catalogue/catalog.html?pageSize=40&catalog=
&country=82&region=&city=&company=
109	 http://www.echo.msk.ru/programs/linguafranca/1044568-echo/
110	 Аркадий Дубнов, ‘Русские в Таджикистане – исчезающая нация’,	 Pressa.tj,	 29	March	
2013,	http://pda.pressa.tj/news/russkie-v-tadzhikistane-ischezayushchaya-naciya
111	 Ibid.
112	 The	language	versions	are	specified	in	the	order	of	their	appearance	on	a	given	portal’s	website.	
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3.2.2. an outline of russian-tajik relations
Russia	played	a	major	role	in	ending	the	civil	war	in	Tajikistan.	The	govern-
ment	and	the	United	Tajik	Opposition	signed	the	final	peace	agreement	in	Mos-
cow	on	27	June	1997,	during	the	ninth	round	of	the	talks	between	the	two	par-
ties	to	the	conflict,	with	the	aid	of	the	UN	(an	initial	agreement	had	also	been	
concluded	 in	Moscow	six	months	previously).	The	country	was	very	heavily	
dependent	on	Russia	throughout	the	entire	1990s,	one	practical	manifestation	
of	which	was	the	currency	in	use,	which	was	either	Russian	or	closely	tied	to	
the	Russian	currency113.
After	11	September	2001,	Tajikistan,	like	its	neighbours,	supported	the	inter-
vention	in	Afghanistan,	seeing	the	Western	presence	in	the	region	as	an	op-
portunity	to	gain	a	broader	field	for	manoeuvre	and	diversify	its	foreign	policy.	
Dushanbe	allowed	NATO	aircraft	to	use	airports	and	airspace	on	its	territory,	
and	in	return	benefited	from	US	financial	assistance.	The	withdrawal	of	Rus-
sian	border	guards	from	Tajikistan	and	the	collaboration	with	India	covering	
the	renovation	of	Tajikistan’s	Ayni	air	base	(also	known	as	Gissar),	located	on	
the	outskirts	of	Dushanbe,	were	signs	of	the	Tajik	government’s	emancipation	
from	Moscow’s	influence114.
Russia	made	repeated	attempts	to	regain	its	influence	during	the	next	decade	
(and	is	still	doing	so).	Its	main	aims	were	as	follows:	the	regulation	of	the	status	
of	its	military	presence	(negotiating	a	long	term	for	the	stationing	of	its	base),	
the	 return	of	 its	border	guards,	 the	 lease	of	 the	Ayni	air	base,	 and	prevent-
ing	the	establishment	of	foreign	military	bases	in	Tajikistan.	To	achieve	these	
goals,	Moscow	has	been	making	various	kinds	of	friendly	gestures	as	well	as	
putting	pressure	 on	 the	 government	 (the	 carrot-and-stick	policy),	 using	 the	
same	instruments	in	both	cases.	Such	major	instruments	include	particularly	
the	hydro	energy	sector	(support	–	or	the	lack	of	support	–	for	the	construction	
of	hydropower	plants),	and	the	Tajik	expatriate	workers	in	Russia	(making	life	
easier	or	more	difficult	for	immigrants,	including	threats	of	mass	deportations;	
113	 Tajikistan	was	 the	 last	 former	Soviet	republic	 to	adopt	 its	own	currency.	This	happened	
only	at	the	end	of	2000,	when	the	Tajik	somoni	was	introduced	into	circulation	(it	became	
the	sole	means	of	payment	on	1	April	2001).	The	currencies	in	use	before	were	the	Soviet	
rouble	(until	January	1994),	the	Russian	rouble	(January	1994	–	May	1995),	and	finally	the	
Tajik	rouble	tied	to	the	Russian	currency	(May	1995–	March	2001).
114	 In	2002–2010,	India	spent	around	US$70	million	on	modernising	the	base,	for	instance	by	
extending	the	runway.	Furthermore,	Indian	Air	Forces	also	occasionally	used	the	Farkhor	
air	base	on	the	Tajik-Afghan	border.	
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for	more	details,	see	below	in	this	section).	In	turn,	Tajikistan	has	been	trying	
to	make	the	most	of	its	co-operation	with	Russia,	while	avoiding	an	increase	in	
dependence	and	retaining	some	room	for	manoeuvre	(owing	to	its	co-opera-
tion	with	other	global	actors).	
Moscow’s	strategy	can	be	tracked	using	the	hydro	energy	sector	as	an	exam-
ple.	Russia	 and	Tajikistan	 reached	 a	final	 agreement	 on	 the	 construction	 of	
the	Sangtuda	1	power	plant	in	October	2004.	This	was	–	to	use	the	comparison	
popular	among	commentators	–	at	the	same	time	a	‘carrot’	for	Dushanbe	and	
a	‘stick’	for	Tashkent	(Uzbekistan,	which	has	opposed	the	construction	of	large	
hydropower	plants	in	Kyrgyzstan	and	Tajikistan,	was	at	that	time	actively	en-
gaged	 in	co-operation	with	 the	USA,	which	was	using	 the	Karshi-Khanabad	
air	base	(see	section	3.3.2.	An	outline	of	Russian-Uzbek	relations).	Moscow	was	
implementing	this	project,	while	at	the	same	time	withholding	its	participa-
tion	 in	another	one,	 the	completion	of	 the	construction	of	 the	Rogun	power	
plant,	which	is	planned	to	be	the	largest	in	the	country115:	at	first	it	did	not	want	
its	relations	with	Uzbekistan	to	deteriorate	even	further,	and	then	it	desired	
to	establish	even	closer	relations	with	this	country	(when	the	West	had	with-
drawn	from	Uzbekistan	after	the	Andijan	massacre,	and	the	opportunity	arose	
to	deploy	Russian	units	at	the	Karshi-Khanabad	air	base).
Dushanbe	 made	 some	 concessions	 as	 a	 consequence	 of	 Moscow’s	 moves:	
Tajikistan’s	 government	 relinquished	 the	Okno	 complex	 to	Russia,	 agreed	 to	
the	transformation	of	the	201st	division	into	a	military	base,	and	refused	the	
establishment	of	a	US	base	in	Tajikistan	(which	was	being	withdrawn	from	Uz-
bekistan).	However,	Dushanbe	was	not	ready	for	long-term	military	agreements	
with	Russia,	nor	for	the	return	of	Russian	border	guards.	At	the	same	time,	it	
avoided	any	unambiguous	declarations,	suggesting	that	it	was	expecting	Russia	
to	become	involved	in	the	Rogun	project.	Tajikistan	was	also	trying	to	find	out	
whether	other	 investors,	 for	example	 from	China,	might	be	 interested	 in	 the	
project.	In	August	2008,	President	Dmitri	Medvedev	declared	in	Dushanbe	that	
Russia	was	ready	to	complete	the	construction	of	the	Rogun	power	plant,	but	he	
115	 In	 2004,	Tajikistan’s	 government	 signed	 an	 agreement	 envisaging	 the	 completion	 of	 the	
Rogun	construction	with	RusAl,	but	the	agreement	was	discontinued	in	2007	(the	parties	
were	unable	to	agree	on	the	height	of	the	dam:	Наталья Гриб, Владимир Соловьев, ‘Между 
Россией и Таджикистаном встала плотина’, Коммерсантъ,	 5	 September	 2007,	 http://
www.kommersant.ru/doc/801523).	 Dushanbe	 attempted	 unsuccessfully	 to	 interest	 RAO	
UES	 in	 this	project.	At	present,	 it	 is	unclear	whether	and	when	the	construction	will	be	
finished	(Tajikistan’s	government	has	announced	on	numerous	occasions	since	2007	that	it	
will	put	the	power	plant	into	operation	at	its	own	expense	and	effort).	
48
O
SW
 S
TU
D
IE
S 
 4
/2
01
4
cancelled	this	declaration	in	January	2009	during	his	visit	to	Tashkent	(saying	
that	Moscow	would	not	back	those	hydropower	plants	which	did	not	take	the	
interests	of	all	countries	in	the	region	into	account).	This	provoked	a	fierce	reac-
tion	from	Dushanbe;	President	Emomalii	Rahmon	cancelled	his	visit	to	Russia.	
It	appears	that	the	Kremlin’s	stance	changed	as	a	consequence	of	the	evolution	
of	 the	situation	concerning	Uzbekistan:	 in	November	2008,	 the	EU	 lifted	 the	
sanctions	imposed	on	this	country;	furthermore,	Tashkent	allowed	the	USA	to	
use	the	Termez	airport	for	stopovers.	The	fact	that	the	Kremlin	allowed	its	re-
lations	with	Dushanbe	(and	at	the	same	time	with	Bishkek)	to	deteriorate	may	
demonstrate	that	it	had	granted	higher	priority	to	relations	with	Tashkent;	or	
possibly	that,	given	the	influence	it	had	in	Tajikistan	(and	Kyrgyzstan)	anyway,	
the	losses	incurred	there	would	be	relatively	low	in	comparison	to	the	poten-
tial	gains	in	Uzbekistan.	The	tension	was	alleviated,	but	Tajikistan	avoided	any	
binding	declarations	regarding	the	Russian	base	for	the	next	two	years.	
An	opportunity	to	‘discipline’	Dushanbe	arose	on	8	November	2011,	when	two	
pilots	from	Russia’s	Rolkan	Investment	Ltd.	were	sentenced	by	a	court	in	Tajik-
istan	to	several	years	in	prison	on	charges	of	violating	flight	security	standards,	
illegal	border	crossing	and	smuggling116.	The	sentence	was	severely	criticised	by	
Russian	 senior	officials:	President	Dmitri	Medvedev	announced	Russia	would	
respond	“symmetrically	or	asymmetrically”,	depending	on	explanations	 from	
Tajikistan,	and	the	Russian	minister	of	foreign	affairs,	Sergey	Lavrov,	insisted	
that	the	sentence	be	revised.	At	the	same	time,	raids	on	illegal	Tajik	immigrants	
commenced	in	Moscow.	The	Russian	government	did	not	rule	out	imposing	a	ban	
on	 employing	 Tajik	 workers,	 arguing	 that	 infectious	 diseases	 were	 allegedly	
widespread	among	them.	Nationalist	movements	and	organisations	joined	the	
action,	which	was	accompanied	by	a	witch-hunt	in	the	media;	they	held	pick-
ets	 in	 front	of	Tajikistan’s	embassy,	among	other	activities.	Dushanbe	yielded	
to	the	pressure	(the	pilots	were	released),	but	it	only	resumed	the	binding	talks	
concerning	 the	Russian	base	 in	 summer	 2012,	most	 probably	 after	 coming	 to	
the	conclusion	that	a	Russian	military	presence	would	help	it	ensure	stability,	
given	 that	 the	 state	 structures	were	weak	and	 the	government	had	problems	
116	 The	pilots,	who	had	transported	non-military	cargo	for	ISAF	forces	in	Afghanistan	under	
a	contract	with	the	US	firm	Supreme	Food,	were	arrested	in	March	2011	following	an	emer-
gency	landing	in	Qurghonteppa.	The	matter	was	very	unclear;	some	clues	suggested	that	
the	entities	involved	could	have	participated	in	drug	trafficking	and	illegal	arms	trading.	
Katarzyna	Jarzyńska,	Wojciech	Górecki,	‘Crisis	in	Russian-Tajik	relations.	The	internation-
al	and	internal	dimensions	for	Russia’,	EastWeek,	OSW,	16	November	2011,	http://www.osw.
waw.pl/en/publikacje/analyses/2011-11-16/crisis-russian-tajik-relations-international-
and-internal-dimensions	
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controlling	its	own	territory	(as	previously	manifested	by	the	aforementioned	
riots	in	Gorno-Badakhshan	Autonomous	Province)117.
The	agreement	of	5	October	2012,	under	which	the	presence	of	the	201st	base	
was	extended	for	30	years,	met	one	of	Russia’s	key	demands.	However,	Moscow	
has	continued	its	efforts	to	ensure	its	other	demands	are	met:	access	to	Ayni	
airport	and	consent	to	the	return	of	Russian	border	guards	(which	is	vital	for	
Moscow	in	the	context	of	the	planned	wind-up	of	the	ISAF	mission).	Dushanbe	
has	declared	 that	 it	 can	 talk	about	Ayni	after	Russia	has	met	 its	 obligations	
under	other	agreements118:	in	addition	to	the	deal	on	the	military	base,	a	num-
ber	of	other	memoranda	were	signed	on	5	October	2012,	the	most	important	of	
which	provided	for	facilitations	to	Tajik	expatriate	workers	(others	concerned	
the	partial	lifting	of	the	duties	on	petroleum	products	exported	from	Russia,	
and	energy	co-operation:	Russia	promised	to	participate	 in	the	construction	
of	several	additional	small-	and	medium-sized	hydropower	plants)119.	For	the	
same	reason,	Dushanbe	postponed	the	ratification	of	the	agreement	concern-
ing	the	military	base	until	autumn	2013	(just	one	month	before	the	presidential	
election120).	Simultaneously,	according	to	media	leaks,	Tajikistan	is	continuing	
negotiations	on	Ayni	with	the	USA,	as	Washington	is	potentially	interested	in	
using	the	airport	when	it	withdraws	its	forces	from	Afghanistan121.
117	 There	was	media	speculation	at	the	time	as	to	whether	the	riots	could	have	been	inspired	
by	Russia.	This	was	provoked	by	a	statement	from	General	Vladimir	Chirkin,	command-
er	of	the	Russian	Ground	Forces,	who	said	a	month	before	the	riots	that	local	armed	con-
flicts	were	possible	in	Uzbekistan,	Tajikistan	and	Kyrgyzstan	(http://ria.ru/defense_safe-
ty/20120626/685459967.html#ixzz21d6Q7IRt).	 Even	 if	 such	 speculation	 was	 groundless	
(for	example,	Moscow	might	have	had	 intelligence	data	 suggesting	 that	clashes	could	be	
expected),	Russia	capitalised	on	this	situation,	 threatening	 that	 it	would	withdraw	com-
pletely	if	the	negotiations	failed;	this	made	the	government	of	Tajikistan	more	flexible,	as	
it	feared	possible	chaos	in	the	country	(at	some	point,	Moscow	even	withheld	the	financing	
of	 its	 own	base).	 For	more	 information	on	 the	 riots,	 see	Marek	Matusiak,	 ‘Tajikistan:	 in	
Badakhshan,	the	government	fights	with	former	field	commanders’,	EastWeek,	OSW,	25	July	
2012,	 http://www.osw.waw.pl/en/publikacje/analyses/2012-07-25/tajikistan-badakhshan-
government-fights-former-field-commanders	
118	 ‘Таджикистан отдаст РФ военный аэродром „Айни” после того, как Москва выполнит 
обещания’,	Rosbalt.ru,	 18	 January	2013,	http://www.rosbalt.ru/exussr/2013/01/18/1083101.
html
119	 The	media	branded	these	memoranda	as	Russia’s	‘payment’	for	Tajikistan’s	consent	to	the	
long-term	stationing	of	the	201st	base.	
120	 Russia	and	Tajikistan	signed	a	protocol	a	few	days	ahead	of	the	election,	on	29	October	2013,	
under	which	citizens	of	Tajikistan	were	allowed	to	obtain	a	work	permit	in	Russia	for	three	
years,	 and	not	 one	year	 as	 before.	 ‘Гражданам Таджикистана увеличили срок работы 
в России до трех лет’,	Fergananews.com,	 29	October	2013,	http://www.fergananews.com/
news.php?id=21423
121	 http://www.centrasia.ru/newsA.php?st=1363580760	
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Tajik	 expatriate	workers	 in	 Russia	 are	 a	 separate	 issue.	 Figuratively	 speak-
ing,	this	is	the	most	important	sector	of	the	Tajik	economy.	According	to	the	
World	Bank’s	calculations,	expatriate	workers	 in	2012	remitted	a	 total	of	al-
most	US$3.35	billion	to	their	homeland,	which	accounted	for	47%	of	Tajikistan’s	
GDP,	and	was	the	highest	ratio	on	the	global	scale.	(Liberia,	where	money	re-
mittances	reached	31%	of	GDP,	was	ranked	second,	Kyrgyzstan	(29%)	third,	Le-
sotho	(27%)	fourth	and	Moldova	(23%)	fifth122.)	During	the	first	two	months	of	
2013,	the	value	of	money	remittances	reached	US$360	million,	which	was	9%	
more	than	at	the	same	time	in	2012.	It	is	estimated	that	90%	of	emigrants	from	
Tajikistan	(a	total	of	at	least	1.1	million)	work	in	Russia.	In	January	and	Febru-
ary	2013,	over	150,000	people	left	Tajikistan	(24%	more	than	a	year	before),	and	
more	than	100,000	came	back123.
russia – tajikistan
Russia	accounts	for	25.4%	of	imports	into	Tajikistan	(first	ahead	of	Kazakh-
stan,	16%,	and	China,	12.9%)	and	7.9%	of	its	exports	(Tajikistan	sends	more	
goods	only	to	Turkey,	36.3%,	and	Afghanistan,	14.1%:	data	for	2012)124.	Since	
Tajikistan	does	not	border	on	Russia	or	Kazakhstan	directly,	(the	latter	be-
ing	a	member	of	the	Customs	Union),	Moscow’s	pressure	on	Tajikistan	to	
join	the	organisation	is	not	as	strong	as	in	the	case	of	Kyrgyzstan.	However,	
of	all	the	Central	Asian	countries	Tajikistan	could	be	most	affected	by	any	
possible	destabilisation	in	Afghanistan	following	the	withdrawal	of	the	US	
main	forces	(it	has	the	longest	border	with	Afghanistan).	This	may	make	
Dushanbe	inclined	to	enhance	its	co-operation	with	Moscow	in	the	area	of	
security	after	2014.
	 The	border	with	Afghanistan,	which	 is	 1200	km	 long	and	a	 source	of	numerous	 threats,	
could	 in	 this	case	serve	as	an	advantage	 for	Tajikistan,	since	 it	will	be	 the	country	most	
accessible	to	a	great	part	of	the	withdrawing	troops.	A	railway	connecting	Tajikistan	with	
Turkmenistan	is	planned	to	be	built	in	the	future.	This	would	provide	Tajikistan	with	an	
exit	to	the	external	world	(at	present,	all	major	roads	and	both	rail	lines	run	from	Tajikistan	
via	Uzbekistan,	which	allows	Tashkent	to	block	the	movement	of	people	and	goods	to	and	
from	this	country).
122	 The	publication	of	20	November	2012.	http://siteresources.worldbank.org/INTPROSPECTS/
Resources/334934-1288990760745/MigrationDevelopmentBrief19.pdf	
	 According	to	World	Bank	estimates,	the	value	of	the	money	remittances	reached	US$4	billion	
in	2013	(48%	of	Tajikistan’s	GDP):	http://www.worldbank.org/en/news/feature/2013/10/02/
Migrants-from-developing-countries-to-send-home-414-billion-in-earnings-in-2013
123	 ‘Трудовая миграция из Таджикистана усиливается’,	 Iarex.ru,	 20	 March	 2013,	 http://
www.iarex.ru/news/34877.html
124	 http://stat.tj/ru/img/a6069090cb7edbe5efb67aec241e9816_1359030405.pdf
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3.3.  uzbekistan
3.3.1.  russia’s assets 
The (lack of) military presence
Uzbekistan	is	the	only	Central	Asian	state	not	to	have	concluded	any	agreement	
with	Russia	regarding	the	presence	of	Russian	troops	on	its	territory	since	the	
collapse	 of	 the	USSR.	Russian	 soldiers	 entered	Uzbekistan	 for	 the	first	 time	
in	September	2005	as	part	of	a	small	 four-day	exercise.	 In	2006–2012,	when	
Uzbekistan	was	 a	member	of	 the	CSTO,	Russian	air	 forces	used	 the	Karshi-	
-Khanabad	military	air	base	for	stopovers.	Moscow	paid	Tashkent	with	sup-
plies	of	weapons,	ammunition	and	spare	parts125.
The economic presence
Russia	has	significant	economic	assets	in	Uzbekistan.	Leading	Russian	com-
panies	involved	in	the	oil	and	gas	sector	in	Uzbekistan	(and	also	in	Turkmen-
istan	and	Kazakhstan)	have	for	years	 invested	relatively	 little	 in	upstream	
projects,	focusing	mainly	on	the	purchase	and	transit	of	raw	materials.	The	
Russian	monopoly	on	hydrocarbon	transport	from	Uzbekistan	was	broken	in	
August	2012,	when	gas	began	to	be	exported	via	the	being	developed	Central	
Asia–China	gas	pipeline,	 running	 from	Turkmenistan	via	Uzbekistan,	 and	
on	 through	Kazakhstan	 to	China126	 (before	 this,	Turkmenistan	had	started	
exporting	natural	gas	and	Kazakhstan	crude	oil	 to	China).	Russia	 still	has	
the	monopoly	on	the	transport	of	Central	Asian	oil	and	gas	to	Europe,	and	it	
wants	to	maintain	this	position,	by	trying	to	prevent	the	emergence	of	any	
alternative	export	routes.	
125	 Александр Садчиков, ‘Ушла с базы. Россия может лишиться военных объектов 
за рубежом’,	Московские Новости,	 6	 July	 2012,	 http://mn.ru/society_army/20120706/	32221-	
6546.html
126	 The	supplies	commenced	under	the	framework	of	Uzbek-Chinese	contract	signed	in	2010,	
which	provides	for	exports	of	10	bcm	of	gas	(this	level	was	to	have	been	achieved	in	2013).	
Uzbekistan	is	the	region’s	largest	natural	gas	producer;	its	annual	output	reaches	around	
63	bcm	(2011),	of	which	 thus	 far	 it	has	exported	only	 11–12	bcm	(mainly	 to	Russia,	which	
re-exports	 this	 gas	 to	 EU	 member	 states,	 and	 also	 marginal	 amounts	 to	 Kazakhstan,	
Tajikistan	 and	 Kyrgyzstan).	 Aleksandra	 Jarosiewicz,	 ‘Uzbekistan	 starts	 gas	 exports	 to	
China’,	EastWeek,	OSW,	 19	September	2012:	http://www.osw.waw.pl/en/publikacje/analy-
ses/2012-09-19/uzbekistan-starts-gas-exports-to-china	
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Russia’s	largest	investor	is	LUKoil,	which	has	invested	some	US$2.5	billion	in	
Uzbekistan	since	2004,	and	its	total	investment	(taking	into	account	the	pro-
jects	currently	under	implementation)	could	exceed	US$6	billion.	LUKoil	is	en-
gaged	in	three	projects.	The	Production	Sharing	Agreement	(PSA)	with	the	na-
tional	holding,	Uzbekneftegaz,	concerning	the	Kandym-Khauzak-Shady	sites,	
was	signed	in	2004	for	a	35-years	term.	The	output	of	these	fields	reached	3.8	
bcm	of	natural	gas	in	2012	(LUKoil	had	a	share	of	3.3	bcm)	and	19,000	tonnes	
of	gas	condensate	(16,000	tonnes	to	LUKoil)127.	The	South-West	Gissar	project,	
which	encompasses	seven	oil	&	gas	fields,	was	launched	in	2008	(the	PSA	was	
signed	a	year	before,	for	a	35-year	term).	Its	output	in	2012	reached	1.15	bcm	of	
natural	gas	(LUKoil’s	share	was	1	bcm)	and	141,000	tonnes	of	oil	and	gas	con-
densate	(LUKoil’s	share	was	121,000	tonnes)128.	The	Aral	project	is	at	the	initial	
stage	of	implementation	(exploration	work,	with	the	seismic	tomography	tech-
nique	employed,	was	conducted	in	2007–2009).	The	shareholders	in	this	pro-
ject,	apart	from	LUKoil	(26.7%)	and	Uzbekneftegaz	(26.7%),	include	CNPC	from	
China	(26.7%)	and	the	Korea	National	Oil	Corporation	from	Korea	(20%).	In	the	
medium	term	(by	2018),	LUKoil	wants	to	achieve	a	total	annual	output	from	all	
the	three	projects	at	18	bcm	of	natural	gas,	0.5	million	tonnes	of	gas	condensate	
and	1	million	tonnes	of	oil129.
Gas	Project	Development	Central	Asia	AG	(GPD),	a	firm	registered	in	Swit-
zerland	and	50%	controlled	by	Gazprom	Germany,	formed	a	consortium	with	
Gazprom	Zarubezhneftegaz	(each	holding	a	50%	stake).	This	consortium	has	
operated	since	2009	under	a	PSA	concluded	for	a	15-year	term	at	the	Shakh-
pakhty	field;	in	2012,	its	output	reached	280	million	m3,	and	the	site’s	esti-
mated	reserves	are	39.9	bcm.	The	GPD	Group	also	holds	a	25%	stake	in	the	
Kokdumalak-Gaz	joint	venture,	which	in	2012	produced	5.2	bcm	of	associat-
ed	petroleum	gas	(APG),	of	which	3.1	bcm	was	exported.	In	turn,	the	output	
of	Gissarneftgaz,	which	is	40%	controlled	by	GPD,	reached	1.1	bcm	in	2012,	
of	which	0.9	bcm	was	exported.	In	addition	to	this,	113,000	tons	of	crude	oil	
and	33,000	of	condensate	were	produced.	This	company	also	extracts	small	
amounts	of	oil;	its	output	is	processed	locally	and	sold	on	the	domestic	mar-
ket130.	In	2009,	Gazprom	Zarubezhneftegaz	discovered	the	Dzhel	gas	field	in	
Uzbekistan.	
127	 http://www.lukoil-overseas.ru/projects/uzbekistan/81.php
128	 http://www.lukoil-overseas.ru/projects/uzbekistan/82.php
129	 http://www.lukoil-overseas.ru/projects/uzbekistan/79.php
130	 http://www.gazprom-germania.de/ru/cfery-biznesa/dobycha-prirodnogo-gaza.html
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Over	the	past	few	years,	Russia	has	offered	Uzbekistan	assistance	in	the	con-
struction	of	a	nuclear	power	plant	(it	has	been	supplying	nuclear	fuel	to	the	
Uzbek	test	reactor	under	an	agreement	signed	in	June	2007).	
Currency	exchange	(the	official	rate	is	significantly	different	from	the	black-
market	 rate),	 the	 transfer	 of	 funds	 abroad	 and	 the	 lack	 of	 high	 face-value	
banknotes	pose	serious	problems	to	foreign	firms	operating	in	Uzbekistan,	es-
pecially	medium-sized	and	small	ones131.	Since	2011,	the	media	have	reported	
more	and	more	frequent	cases	of	such	firms	being	taken	over	by	force	(includ-
ing	Russian132).	They	must	also	deal	with	restrictive	legal	regulations	and	ju-
dicial	practice.	For	example,	in	summer	2012,	the	Uzbek	authorities	cancelled	
the	licence	held	by	Uzdunrobita	mobile	telephone	network	operator	(100%	con-
trolled	by	Russia’s	MTS,	Mobil’nye	TeleSistemy)	for	“regular	and	repeated	vio-
lations	and	 failure	 to	 comply	with	 the	 supervising	body’s	 requirements.”	 Its	
four	managers	were	detained	on	tax	fraud	charges,	and	the	company’s	entire	
assets	were	seized.	The	company	opposed	the	charges	and	pointed	to	some	pro-
cedural	 irregularities	(for	example,	 its	representatives	had	not	been	allowed	
to	participate	in	the	court	proceedings)133.	The	Uzbek	economic	court	declared	
Uzdunrobita	bankrupt	on	22	April	2013.	Earlier,	in	late	2009/early	2010,	Rus-
sia’s	leading	food	manufacturer,	Wimm-Bill-Dann,	had	to	wind	up	its	business	
in	Uzbekistan	under	similar	circumstances134.
Soft power
The	process	of	de-Russification,	which	had	been	ongoing	for	two	decades	(see:	
3.3.2.	An	outline	of	Russian-Uzbek	relations),	slowed	in	around	2010;	the	Rus-
sian	 language	 is	no	 longer	barred	 from	 the	public	 space	 in	Uzbekistan,	 and	
members	of	the	elites,	including	the	political,	do	not	conceal	that	their	children	
and	grandchildren	attend	schools	where	Russian	is	the	language	of	instruction.	
131	 For	these	reasons,	many	airlines	have	withdrawn	or	reduced	their	number	of	connections	
with	Uzbekistan.	For	example,	Russia’s	Aeroflot	has	 regularly	 complained	about	various	
kinds	of	problems;	for	instance,	the	airline	had	over	US$50	million	in	its	Uzbek	accounts	
and	was	unable	to	dispose	of	the	money	in	any	way	in	autumn	2011	(‘Компания «Аэрофлот» 
просит правительство России ответить на «недружественные» запретительные меры 
со стороны Узбекистана’,	Fergananews.com,	21	March	2013, http://www.fergananews.com/
news/20382).
132	 There	were	well-known	cases	in	2011–2012,	when	Russian	owners	moved	entire	factories	
(machinery	and	equipment),	along	with	their	crew,	from	Uzbekistan	fearing	takeover.	This	
concerned	businesses	operating	outside	Tashkent.
133	 http://www.company.mts.ru/comp/press-centre/press_release/2012-08-31-1764524/
134	 Куркмас Бурибоев, ‘Зиндан для олигархов’,	http://www.compromat.ru/page_28923.htm
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Even	though	Russian	has	no	special	status	in	Uzbekistan	(it	is	treated	as	any	
other	 foreign	 language),	 registry	 documents	 (birth,	 death,	marriage	 certifi-
cates,	etc.)	can	again	be	completed	in	Uzbek	and	Russian	as	of	the	end	of	2012135.
848	general	education	schools	with	Russian	as	the	language	of	instruction	op-
erate	 in	Uzbekistan.	This	number	 is	equivalent	 to	8.6%	of	all	general	educa-
tion	schools	in	this	country	(8742	schools	teach	in	Uzbek,	417	in	Kazakh,	377	in	
Karakalpak	and	256	in	Tajik).	8.33%	of	the	total	number	of	pupils	attend	such	
schools136.	Higher	education	institutions	have	so-called	Russian	sectors,	where	
students	receive	education	in	Russian.	Branches	of	three	Russian	universities	
operate	 in	Tashkent:	 the	Russian	University	of	Economics	 (since	 1995,	 it	has	
over	500	students137),	Moscow	State	University	(since	2007,	230	students138)	and	
the	Russian	State	University	of	Oil	and	Gas	(since	2007,	around	600	students139).
The	Russian	minority,	who	used	to	form	a	diaspora	of	over	1.5	million	just	before	
the	USSR	collapsed	(more	than	8%	of	the	population)140,	has	shrunk,	depend-
ing	on	the	estimate,	to	between	250,000	and	900,000	people	(0.85–3%)141.	There	
are	few	Russian	minority	organisations,	a	dozen	or	so	at	the	most	(no	precise	
data	are	available)142.	They	 include	the	official	Uzbekistan-Russia	Friendship	
Association143	and	the	Russian	Business	Centre,	which	has	shown	little	activity	
(it	has	no	website	of	its	own).
135	 ‘Узбекским ЗАГСам разрешили использовать русский язык’,	Lenta.ru,	1	November	2012,	
http://lenta.ru/news/2012/11/01/language/	
	 It	appears	that	the	government	thus	wants	to	halt	the	further	emigration	of	the	non-Uzbek	
population	(they	are	being	replaced	in	large	cities	by	a	rural	Uzbek	population).
136	 Data	for	the	school	year	2012/2013:	http://uzedu.uz/rus/info/pokazateli/
137	 http://rea.uz/about/history/
138	 http://msu.uz/e/4f49c4da1adf57f542000000
139	 http://podrobno.uz/cat/obchestvo/kvoti+v+gubkina/
140	 According	 to	 the	census	of	 1989,	 1.65	million	people	 (8.3%	of	 the	 total	population	of	 the	
Uzbek	SSR).
141	 http://echo.msk.ru/programs/linguafranca/1120730-echo/	and	the	OSW’s	own	estimates.	
142	 These	are	predominantly	cultural,	and	to	a	lesser	extent	social	organisations;	first	of	all	the	Rus-
sian	Culture	Centre	(RCC)	in	Uzbekistan	and	its	affiliated	organisations	operating	across	the	
country	under	various	names,	e.g.	the	‘Russian	Culture’	Association	(in	Termez),	the	Bukhara	
District	 ‘Harmony	 and	Mercy’	 Russian	Culture	Centre,	 the	 ‘Rus’	 Centre	 in	 Samarkand,	 etc.	
(http://uzb.rs.gov.ru/node/16).	 The	RCC	operates	under	 the	 aegis	 of	 the	Republican	 Interna-
tional	Culture	Centre	–	cultural	centres	of	other	nations	also	operate	as	part	of	this	structure,	
including	Polish,	Armenian,	Korean,	Tajik,	etc.	(http://www.icc.uz/rus/cultural_centre/).	
143	 http://uzru.uz/	
	 This	 association	 operates	 under	 the	 aegis	 of	 the	 Council	 of	 Friendship	 Associations,	 to	
which	a	number	of	similar	structures	belong	(http://djk.uz/?do=friend).
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Rossotrudnichestvo’s	 agency	 in	 Tashkent	 co-operates	 with	 the	 Russian	 Cul-
ture	Centre	and	various	Uzbek	 institutions	while	holding	cultural	 and	 folk-
lore	events.	The	Russian	Science	and	Culture	Centre	offers	Russian	language	
courses.	The	Russkiy Mir Foundation	manages	five	specialist	language	‘cabinets’	
(one	each	in	Chinaz,	Fergana	and	Nukus,	and	two	in	Tashkent)144,	and	also	co-
holds	cultural	events	and	collaborates	with	the	Russian	diaspora145.	The	scope	
of	operation	of	the	two	Russian	government	agencies	is	clearly	smaller	than	in	
Tajikistan.
Russian	 still	 plays	 an	 essential	 role	 in	 Uzbekistan’s	 information	 space,	 al-
though	unlike	in	Tajikistan,	Russian	media	are	even	less	accessible.	Upon	the	
government’s	 instructions,	 cable	 network	 operators	 either	 temporarily	 or	
completely	exclude	some	TV	channels	from	their	offer	(they	can	be	watched	
by	owners	with	individual	satellite	aerials),	Russian	news	portals,	community	
network	services	and	some	blogs	are	blocked	from	time	to	time146.	Uzbek	TV	
stations	broadcast	selected	programmes,	especially	news,	in	Russian.	Local	ra-
dio	stations	allocate	more	of	their	airtime	for	programmes	in	Russian	(half	of	
the	time	must	be	filled	with	Uzbek	content)147.	Russian-language	newspapers’	
circulations	reach	between	5000	and	15,000	copies	(the	circulations	of	Uzbek-
language	newspapers	are	one	and	a	half	to	two	times	larger).	Pravda Vostoka 
and	Novosti Uzbekistana are	the	most	important	titles.	Some	press	is	published	
in	Russian	and	Uzbek,	like	the	government-controlled	Narodnoye Slovo	(Khalq 
Sozi)	 and	 the	 specialist	 magazine	 Nalogoviy Tamozhenniy Vestnik148.	 Russian	
is	an	important	language	in	Uzbek	news	portals,	both	official	and	independ-
ent:	along	with	those	which	publish	contents	only	Uzbek,	there	are	also	por-
tals	where	only	the	Russian	language	is	used	(e.g.	Vesti.uz	or	UzMetrnom.com, 
which	has	been	blocked	in	Uzbekistan).	Other	portals	have	both	Russian	and	
Uzbek	versions	(such	as	Uz24.uz	and	Ozodlik.org, which	is	supported	by	Radio	
Liberty),	and	sometimes	Russian,	Uzbek	and	English	versions	(e.g.	Podrobno.
uz).	The	website	of	the	news	agency	operating	as	part	of	Uzbekistan’s	Minis-
try	of	Foreign	Affairs	( Jahonnews.uz)	has	Russian,	Uzbek,	English	and	Arabic	
144	 http://www.russkiymir.ru/russkiymir/ru/rucenter/kabinet_list.html
145	 http://www.russkiymir.ru/russkiymir/ru/catalogue/catalog.html?pageSize=40&catalog=
&country=81&region=&city=&company=	
146	 For	 instance,	 this	ban	has	been	 imposed	on	TV	Centr,	TNT	and	STS.	Not	only	have	Rus-
sian	internet	portals	been	blocked,	but	also	Western	ones.	http://echo.msk.ru/programs/
linguafranca/1120730-echo/	
147	 Ibid.
148	 Ibid.
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versions,	and	the	website	of	 the	UNNA	press	agency	(Uza.uz)	 is	published	in	
Uzbek,	Russian,	English,	German,	French,	Spanish,	Arabic	and	Chinese.	The	
official	websites	of	government	 institutions	and	agencies	usually	have	 three	
language	versions:	Uzbek,	Russian	and	English.	
In	the	opinion	of	Uzbekistan’s	journalist	circles,	those	working	in	Russian	(es-
pecially	ethnic	Russians)	enjoy	a	little	more	freedom	than	their	Uzbek-speak-
ing	colleagues,	and	do	not	go	to	prison	for	their	work149.
3.3.2. an outline of russian-uzbek relations
Uzbekistan’s	strategic	location	(it	borders	on	all	the	other	Central	Asian	coun-
tries	and	on	Afghanistan),	demographic	potential	(almost	half	of	the	region’s	
population	live	there)	and	natural	resources	mean	that	from	the	very	begin-
ning,	Tashkent	has	aspired	to	assume	the	role	of	local	leader.	Such	ambitions	
have	been	manifested,	for	example,	by	its	unwillingness	to	participate	in	any	
structures	dominated	by	the	Kremlin.	Uzbekistan	has	been	vying	for	regional	
leadership	with	Kazakhstan,	however	while	 employing	 completely	different	
means	 and	 instruments.	While	Astana	 has	 joined	 all	 the	 integration	 initia-
tives,	often	as	their	initiator,	Tashkent	would	usually	distance	itself	from	them	
(albeit	not	 isolating	 itself,	 like	Turkmenistan).	 In	bilateral	 relations	with	 its	
neighbours,	it	would	usually	narrow	down	the	field	for	dialogue	without	seek-
ing	 a	 compromise,	 but	 instead	 highlighting,	 sometimes	 assertively,	 its	 own	
national	interests	and	pushing	through	solutions	that	are	beneficial	for	itself.	
This	has	given	rise	to	numerous	conflicts	(the	most	bitter	of	which	are	with	
Kyrgyzstan	and	Tajikistan).	
Uzbekistan	 has	 consistently	 and	 ostentatiously	 resisted	 the	 ‘post-colonial	
syndrome’	 since	 the	early	 1990s.	The	processes	of	de-Sovietisation	and	 the	
related	de-Russification	have	been	carried	out	in	several	stages.	The	fist	stage	
was	marked	by	 the	all-embracing	change	of	 the	Soviet	and	Russian	names	
(even	renaming	Pushkin	Street	in	Tashkent),	which	included	the	introduc-
tion	of	the	Latin	writing	system	to	the	Uzbek	language	in	1992	(although	the	
Cyrillic	script	is	still	in	use).	Another	stage	was	focused	on	removing	monu-
ments	and	other	objects	reminiscent	of	the	Soviet	and	previous	Russian	rule.	
All	monuments	 commemorating	 the	Great	Patriotic	War	 (the	eastern	cam-
paign	of	World	War	II)	were	removed	towards	the	end	of	the	first	decade	of	
149	 Ibid.
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this	 century150.	 For	 example,	 the	monumental	Defender	Of	 The	 Fatherland	
complex	and	a	 former	Christian	Orthodox	church	were	demolished	during	
one	day	in	autumn	2009151.	Tashkent	is	home	to	the	only	museum	of	Russian	
occupation	in	Central	Asia152.	
Tashkent’s	 ‘sinusoidal’	policy	 (involving	 longer	periods	of	 co-operation	with	
the	West,	interspersed	with	periods	of	closer	relations	with	Moscow)	is	usu-
ally	interpreted	as	an	effect	of	President	Islam	Karimov’s	unpredictable	deci-
sions.	However,	when	seen	from	the	perspective	of	the	last	two	decades,	the	
overall	aims	seem	consistent,	and	its	goals,	including	above	all	reinforcing	Uz-
bekistan’s	 sovereignty	and	 independence,	 are	 inalterable.	Following	 the	col-
lapse	of	the	USSR,	Uzbekistan	became	a	party	to	the	CST	(collective	security	
treaty)	 in	1992.	However,	 in	1999,	 it	chose	not	to	sign	the	protocol	extending	
the	 operation	 of	 the	 treaty.	 Instead,	 it	 joined	GUAM,	 a	 bloc	 of	 southern	CIS	
countries	demonstrating	a	pro-Western	approach.	After	11	September	2001,	it	
allowed	the	coalition	to	use	its	airspace,	and	a	US	airbase	was	established	at	
the	Karshi-Khanabad	military	airport.	Relations	between	Western	countries	
and	Tashkent	began	to	deteriorate,	partly	as	a	consequence	of	the	campaign	
by	human	rights	activists	who	had	criticised	their	governments	for	support-
ing	Karimov’s	dictatorship,	 and	also	due	 to	 the	president’s	 fear	of	 a	possible	
coloured	revolution	in	his	country.	The	West	froze	its	relations	with	Uzbeki-
stan	 after	 the	Andijan	massacre	 in	May	 2005	 (when	 opposition	 demonstra-
tions	were	brutally	suppressed	and	at	 least	187	people	were	killed,	and	most	
likely	much	more).	In	effect,	the	US	troops	had	to	leave	Karshi-Khanabad153.	As	
required	by	zero-sum	logic	(where	one	player	wins	the	other	 loses,	and	vice	
versa),	the	already	hinted	Uzbek-Russian	rapprochement	took	place	(Uzbeki-
stan	left	GUAM	and	joined	the	CSTO,	Tashkent	signed	an	alliance	treaty	with	
Moscow	and	allowed	Russian	air	forces	to	use	the	Karshi-Khanabad	air	base)154.	
When	the	West	started	lifting	its	sanctions	(2007–2008),	Tashkent	resumed	its	
150	 Most	probably	to	erase	the	traces	of	shared	Uzbek	and	Russian	history	from	the	collective	
memory.	
151	 In	summer	2013,	access	to	the	Russian	Pravoslavie.ru	and	Uzbek	Pravoslavie.uz	websites,	
and	also	to	the	Russian	Christian	Orthodox	television	Soyuz,	was	blocked	in	Uzbekistan.	
‘Но и в церкви всё не так…’,	 Uzmetronom,	 13	 August	 2013,	 http://www.uzmetronom.
com/2013/08/13/no_i_v_cerkvi_vsjo_ne_tak.html
152	 Вадим Трухачев, ‘Узбекистан включился в „войну с памятниками’,	Pravda.ru,	23	Novem-
ber	2009,	http://www.pravda.ru/world/formerussr/other/23-11-2009/1000713-0/
153	 Meanwhile,	German	and	Danish	units	were	able	to	use	the	Termez	airport	uninterruptedly.
154	 However,	the	country	Islam	Karimov	first	visited	following	the	Andijan	massacre	was	China.	
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previous	policy,	allowing	the	US	and	its	allies	to	use	the	Uzbek	airspace	and	
airports	again155,	and	announcing	its	participation	in	the	Nabucco	gas	pipeline,	
which	Moscow	sees	as	an	anti-Russian	project.	 In	October	2008,	Uzbekistan	
left	the	Eurasian	Economic	Community	(of	which	it	had	been	a	member	from	
March	2006)156.
Russia	made	an	attempt	to	keep	Uzbekistan	within	 its	orbit,	offering	higher	
prices	for	Uzbek	gas	in	addition	to	withdrawing	its	support	for	the	construc-
tion	of	large	hydropower	plants	in	Kyrgyzstan	and	Tajikistan:	during	President	
Dmitri	Medvedev’s	visit	to	Tashkent	in	January	2009,	he	confirmed	that	Mos-
cow	would	buy	Uzbek	gas	at	market	prices	(according	to	media	speculations,	
this	could	mean	a	price	of	around	US$300	per	1000	m3)157.	The	Russian	proposal	
was	made	when	the	construction	of	the	gas	pipeline	running	from	Turkmeni-
stan	to	China	was	nearly	complete.	Uzbekistan	intended	to	export	part	of	its	
output	via	this	pipeline,	and	so	this	offer	was	not	as	appealing	to	Tashkent	as	it	
would	have	been	a	few	years	before.	President	Islam	Karimov’s	visit	to	Moscow	
in	April	2010	did	not	mark	any	breakthrough.	The	summit	proved	that	the	two	
countries	had	conflicting	political	and	economic	interests	and	different	visions	
for	a	regional	security	system	in	Central	Asia158.
Uzbekistan	suspended	its	CSTO	membership	on	20	June	2012	(it	should	be	not-
ed	that	even	when	it	belonged	to	this	organisation,	it	did	not	take	part	in	its	
155	 Tashkent	 became	 more	 important	 for	 NATO	 when	 the	 Northern	 Distribution	 Network	
(NDN),	 handling	 supplies	 for	 the	 coalition	 forces	 in	Afghanistan,	was	 launched	 in	 2009	
(although	the	USA	seemed	undecided	as	to	whether	Uzbekistan’s	offer	should	be	accepted	
as	a	whole).	 Its	 short	border	with	Afghanistan	 (137	km)	 is	easily	accessible	 for	 land	 traf-
fic	(this	is	the	best-guarded	section	of	the	Afghan	border).	Another	benefit	is	the	fact	that	
the	city	of	Termez,	which	has	an	operating	military	airbase,	is	located	immediately	on	the	
border,	and	also	has	a	railway	connection	with	Afghanistan’s	Mazar-i-Sharif.	Even	those	
aircraft	which	do	not	continue	their	flight	from	Afghanistan	via	Uzbekistan,	but	through	
Tajikistan,	Kyrgyzstan	and	Kazakhstan,	use	Termez	airport.	US	Secretary	of	State	Hillary	
Clinton	visited	Tashkent	twice	in	2010–2011.	She	visited	the	country	for	the	first	time	in	De-
cember	2010	on	the	occasion	of	the	OSCE	summit	in	Kazakhstan	(Ms.	Clinton,	also	visited	
Bishkek	and	Astana).	She	returned	there	in	October	2011	(and	also	visited	Dushanbe).
156	 The	present	EAEC	members	are	Belarus,	Kazakhstan,	Kyrgyzstan,	Russia	and	Tajikistan.	
For	more	details	concerning	this	issue,	see	chapter	III.
157	 Maciej	Falkowski,	‘Miedwiediew	w	Uzbekistanie	–	Rosja	wysyła	sprzeczne	sygnały	do	Azji	
Centralnej’,	Tydzień na Wschodzie,	OSW,	27	January	2009,	http://www.osw.waw.pl/pl/pub-
likacje/tydzien-na-wschodzie/2009-01-28/miedwiediew-w-uzbekistanie-Russia-wysyla-
sprzeczne-sygnaly
158	 ‘Rosja–Uzbekistan:	szczyt	bez	przełomu.’,	Tydzień na Wschodzie,	OSW,	21	April	2010,	http://
www.osw.waw.pl/pl/publikacje/tydzien-na-wschodzie/2010-04-21/Rosja-uzbekistan-szc-
zyt-bez-przelomu
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military	exercises,	it	refused	to	participate	in	the	Collective	Operational	Reac-
tion	Forces	which	were	being	formed	as	part	of	the	organisation,	and	openly	
contested	its	plans;	for	example,	Uzbekistan	opposed	the	siting	of	a	CSTO	(de 
facto	Russian)	military	base	in	southern	Kyrgyzstan).	Apparently,	what	Tash-
kent	feared	most	was	Moscow’s	desire	to	coordinate	the	activities	of	the	CSTO	
member	states	in	foreign	and	security	policy	(which	in	fact	would	mean	great-
er	control	by	Russia).	One	of	the	initiatives	Tashkent	opposed	was	the	possibil-
ity	of	intervention	by	CSTO	Rapid	Reaction	Forces	in	any	of	the	member	states	
in	case	of	an	internal	threat	to	their	stability159.	Uzbekistan	announced	its	de-
cision	to	withdraw	from	the	CSTO	only	two	weeks	after	Vladimir	Putin’s	visit	
(this	was	his	third	official	 trip	since	his	resumption	of	the	presidency).	This	
demonstrated	even	more	strongly	Uzbekistan’s	ambition	to	conduct	its	 inde-
pendent	security	and	foreign	policy,	and	also	undermined	the	image	of	both	
Russia	and	Putin	in	the	region160.
russia – uzbekistan
Since	Uzbekistan	withdrew	from	the	CSTO,	it	has	been	able	to	co-operate	
with	the	USA	and	NATO,	without	the	need	to	consult	any	CSTO	member	
states,	above	all	Russia.	Uzbekistan	seems	to	expect	that	it	will	receive	not	
only	financial	gains	(for	example	in	the	form	of	transit	charges)	but	also	
some	 of	 the	weapons	 used	 by	 the	 international	 coalition	 upon	 its	 with-
drawal	from	Afghanistan.	It	has	also	been	speculated	that	a	permanent	US	
military	base	could	be	set	up	in	Uzbekistan	after	2014161.	However,	another	
reversal	of	the	alliances,	and	a	thaw	in	Tashkent’s	relations	with	Moscow	
(which	would	certainly	be	a	more	tactical	than	strategic	move)	cannot	be	
ruled	out162.	 It	 should	not	be	disregarded	 that	even	 though	Uzbekistan	 is	
159	 Marek	Matusiak,	‘Uzbekistan	withdraws	from	the	CSTO	once	again’,	EastWeek,	OSW,	11	July	
2012,	 http://www.osw.waw.pl/en/publikacje/analyses/2012-07-11/uzbekistan-withdraws-
csto-once-again	
160	 Most	likely,	Vladimir	Putin	wanted	not	only	to	show	his	appreciation	for	Uzbekistan,	but	
also	to	demonstrate	to	Kazakhstan,	Russia’s	regional	ally,	that	Moscow	has	broad	room	for	
manoeuvre	in	Central	Asia	(immediately	after	Tashkent,	he	went	to	Astana).
161	 Peter	Leonard,	‘US	Cozies	up	to	Outcast	Uzbekistan	for	Afghan	Role’,	Bigstory.ap.org,	6	July	
2012,	http://bigstory.ap.org/article/us-cozies-outcast-uzbekistan-afghan-role
162	 It	was	announced	at	 the	 time	of	 Islam	Karimov’s	visit	 to	Moscow	(15	April	2013)	 that	Uz-
bekistan	would	sign	an	agreement	on	the	CIS	free	trade	zone.	This	is	a	success	for	Moscow,	
but	this	does	not	restrict	Tashkent’s	sovereignty.	Wojciech	Górecki,	‘Uzbekistan’s	president	
in	Moscow:	limited	co-operation,	no	trust’,	EastWeek,	OSW,	17	April	2013,	http://www.osw.
waw.pl/en/publikacje/analyses/2013-04-17/uzbekistans-president-moscow-limited-coop-
eration-no-trust
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capable	of	blocking	other	countries	(especially	Tajikistan),	it	strongly	relies	
on	Russia	(and	Kazakhstan)	as	regards	the	transit	of	its	oil	and	gas	exports	
–	 it	does	not	border	on	China	 (or	on	 Iran	or	 through	 the	Caspian	Sea	on	
Azerbaijan	as	Turkmenistan	does).	Political	relations	between	Moscow	and	
Tashkent	are	characterised	by	total	distrust.	However,	Russia	is	still	a	vital	
trade	partner	for	Uzbekistan,	as	it	is	the	fourth	largest	recipient	of	Uzbek	
exports	(12.8%;	after	China,	18.5%,	Kazakhstan,	14.6%,	and	Turkey,	13.8%)	
and	the	 largest	 importer	 (20.6%;	before	China,	 16.5%,	South	Korea,	 16.3%,	
and	Kazakhstan,	12.8%;	data	for	2012)163.
3.4. turkmenistan
3.4.1. russia’s assets
The military presence
Turkmenistan	was	the	only	Central	Asian	state	not	to	sign	the	Tashkent	Trea-
ty	(the	Collective	Security	Treaty)	on	15	May	1992.	Nevertheless,	Moscow	and	
Ashgabat	signed	an	agreement	on	the	joint	protection	of	Turkmen	borders	for	
an	indefinite	term	in	1993.	An	operational	group	(consisting	of	up	to	3000	sol-
diers)	was	 formed	 in	March	 1994;	Russian	border	 guards	were	 stationed	on	
the	borders	with	Afghanistan	and	Iran164.	In	1995,	the	government	of	President	
Saparmurat	Niyazov	announced	that	Turkmenistan	had	adopted	the	status	of	
a	neutral	state.	As	a	consequence,	the	Russian	border	guards	left	Turkmeni-
stan	(the	last	unit	departed	in	December	1999)165.
The economic presence
Russia’s	economic	assets	in	Turkmenistan	are	quite	modest.	One	Russian	firm	
involved	in	projects	on	the	oil	&	gas	market	is	Itera,	which	continued	prepara-
tory	work	in	2013	on	the	Block	21	offshore	project	in	Turkmen	(the	estimated	re-
serves	of	this	site	are	219m	tonnes	of	oil	and	100	bcm	of	natural	gas).	Gazprom	
participated	 in	geological	 exploration	of	Caspian	offshore	gas	fields	 towards	
the	end	of	 the	first	decade	of	 this	century.	Another	major	Russian	player	on	
163	 https://www.cia.gov/library/publications/the-world-factbook/geos/uz.html
164	 ‘Государственная пограничная служба Туркменистана’,	 Agentura.ru,	 http://www.
agentura.ru/press/about/jointprojects/greatgame/pogranturkmen/
165	 ‘Туркмения отказывается от услуг российских пограничников’,	Scripts.online.ru,	27	May	
1999,	http://scripts.online.ru/misc/news/99/05/27_013.htm
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the	Turkmen	market	is	the	mobile	network	operator	MTS	(Mobil’nye	TeleSis-
temy).	In	2005,	this	company	(operating	as	MTS-Turkmenistan)	bought	a	to-
tal	of	100%	shares	in	BCTI,	then	the	country’s	largest	operator,	in	two	trans-
actions.	 It	had	2.4	million	customers	at	 the	end	of	 2010	 (while	 the	 country’s	
population	 is	 slightly	over	 5	million).	However,	 at	 that	 time	 it	was	 forced	 to	
suspend	its	services	since	the	five-year	term	of	the	deal	with	the	local	Ministry	
for	Communication	had	expired.	The	company	managed	to	renew	its	operation	
in	Turkmenistan	in	August	2012166.
Soft power
The	Turkmenisation	of	all	areas	of	public	life,	which	has	been	consistently	pur-
sued	together	with	the	isolationism	policy	by	the	country’s	two	post-independ-
ence	 presidents,	 Saparmurat	 Niyazov	 and	 Gurbanguly	 Berdymukhamedov,	
has	very	strongly	reduced	Russian	influence	in	the	soft	power	area	also167.	 It	
has	shrunk	even	more	as	a	consequence	of	 the	emigration	of	a	great	part	of	
the	ethnic	Russians	and	other	non-Turkmen	populations168.	One	school	with	
Russian	as	the	language	of	instruction	currently	operates	in	Ashgabat169.	Sin-
gle	classes	receiving	education	in	Russian	exist	in	some	other	schools	in	and	
outside	Ashgabat	(the	generally	shared	opinion	is	that	they	represent	a	higher	
level	than	classes	receiving	education	in	Turkmen)170.	In	around	2000,	the	Rus-
sian	 language	ceased	 to	be	used	 in	Turkmenistan’s	higher	education	schools	
–	all	 ‘Russian	sectors’	were	liquidated,	and	it	was	no	longer	possible	to	study	
in	 this	 language.	The	resulting	gap	has	been	partly	filled	with	a	network	of	
166	 ‘МТС вернулись на рынок Туркмении после почти двухлетнего перерыва’,	Gazeta.ru,	
30	August	2012,	http://www.gazeta.ru/business/news/2012/08/30/n_2507237.shtml
167	 For	example,	the	Latin	script	was	formally	introduced	to	the	written	Turkmen	language	as	
early	as	1991	(it	underwent	various	modifications	over	the	next	few	years).
168	 According	to	the	census	of	1989,	almost	334,000	Russians	lived	in	the	Turkmen	SSR	(nearly	
9.5%	of	the	republic’s	population).	It	is	estimated	that	around	165,000	Russians	live	in	Turk-
menistan	at	present	(3.23%	of	the	country’s	population).
169	 This	is	the	Turkmen-Russian	Pushkin	School,	which	has	been	operating	since	2002.	Around	
800	pupils	receive	education	at	this	school.	Its	graduates	have	the	right	to	seek	admission	to	
higher	education	schools	in	Russia.	Presidents	Gurbanguly	Berdymukhamedov	and	Dmitri	
Medvedev	officially	opened	its	new	venue	at	the	end	of	2009	(http://www.trsosh.edu.tm/
about.html).	According	to	media	reports,	parents	who	want	their	child	to	attend	the	school,	
which	is	seen	as	prestigious	and	representing	a	high	level,	need	to	pay	a	bribe	over	several	
thousand	 dollars	 (‘Туркменистан: Почем бесплатное образование в русской школе?’,	
Fergananews.com,	30	December	2009,	http://www.fergananews.com/articles/6420).
170	 http://www.echo.msk.ru/programs/linguafranca/1125130-echo/	
	 No	reliable	data	on	the	number	of	these	classes	are	available.
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Turkish	education	institutions171.	At	the	same	time,	relatively	many	people,	at	
least	 in	Ashgabat,	speak	Russian172.	The	education	programme	applicable	for	
the	school	year	2013/2014	specifies	‘national	language	and	literature’	in	the	lan-
guages	block,	and	‘Russian’	and	‘foreign	languages’	separately173.
Rossotrudnichestvo’s	agency	in	Turkmenistan	has	no	separate	website:	informa-
tion	on	 its	activity,	 such	as	cultural	events	and	celebrations	held	on	various	
occasions,	can	be	found	on	the	website	of	Rossotrudnichestvo’s	central	office174.	
Russkiy Mir has	no	centres	in	the	country.	The	foundation	on	its	website	makes	
references	to	the	Association	for	Cultural,	Trade	and	Economic	Contacts	with	
Russia	in	Turkmenistan	(it	has	six	branches	all	over	the	country175).	However,	
no	information	is	available	on	this	structure’s	activity.	
Access	to	the	Russian	media	is	marginal,	and	so	they	have	no	major	influence	
on	the	situation	of	Turkmenistan	(those	who	have	individual	satellite	aerials	
can	watch	Russian	TV,	but	–	as	can	be	concluded	from	press	reports	–	Turkish	
channels	are	more	popular	there176).	Unlike	in	other	Central	Asian	countries,	
the	Russian	printed	press	even	does	not	reach	Turkmenistan177.	Russian	web-
sites	are	blocked	to	an	even	greater	extent	than	in	Uzbekistan.
Turkmen	 TV	 stations	 broadcast	 only	 short	 news	 and	 entertainment	 blocks	
in	Russian.	One	exception	is	the	Turkmenistan	channel,	which	is	targeted	at	
171	 Fourteen	Turkmen-Turkish	general	education	schools,	a	Turkish	primary	school,	an	educa-
tion	centre	named	‘Bashkent’	and	the	International	Turkmen-Turkish	University	were	op-
erating	in	2009	in	Turkmenistan	(А. Шустов, ‘Русские школы вытесняются турецкими. 
Состояние русского образования в ЦентрАзии’,	 Baromig.ru,	 11	December	 2009,	 http://
www.baromig.ru/foreign-expierence/rossiyskaya-diaspora-za-rubezhom/russkie-
shkoly-vytesnyayutsya-turetskimi-sostoyanie-russkogo-obrazovaniya-v-tsentrazii.php).	
Around	1200	students	currently	receive	education	at	this	university.	The	number	of	stu-
dents	planned	for	the	academic	year	2015/2016	is	around	3000.
172	 My	own	observations	as	of	December	2011.	 I	 could	communicate	 in	Russian	without	any	
problems	in	taxis,	at	kiosks,	coffee	shops,	currency	exchanges	and	bazaars.	
173	 ‘Новой эпохе – новый образовательный потенциал’,	Turkmenistan.gov.tm,	3	March	2013,	
http://www.turkmenistan.gov.tm/?id=3465
174	 http://rs.gov.ru/node/1473	
	 No	activity	from	the	Russian	Science	and	Culture	Centre	in	Ashgabat	has	been	seen.	
175	 http://www.russkiymir.ru/russkiymir/ru/catalogue/catalog.html?pageSize=40&catalog=
&country=80&region=&city=&company=
176	 http://www.echo.msk.ru/programs/linguafranca/1125130-echo/	
177	 It	 can	only	be	 subscribed	 to	by	 selected	 institutions;	 single	copies	can	be	bought	at	high	
prices	at	marketplaces	and	bazaars	(they	are	brought	as	part	of	the	so-called	suitcase	im-
ports	by	individual	tradesmen).
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viewers	 abroad	 and	 broadcasts	 programmes	 in	 seven	 languages:	 Turkmen,	
English,	Russian,	French,	Chinese,	Arabic	and	Persian.	Turkmen	 is	 the	only	
language	spoken	on	the	radio.	The	most	popular	newspaper	is	Neitralnyi Turk­
menistan published	in	Russian	(a	circulation	of	over	45,000	copies,	while	Turk­
menistan	published	in	the	Turkmen	language	has	a	circulation	of	36,500	cop-
ies).	In	addition	to	this	newspaper,	several	magazines	are	published	in	Russian,	
including	Vozrozhdeniye.	The	website	of	 the	TDH	press	agency	has	Turkmen,	
Russian	and	English	versions,	as	do	the	news	portals	Turkmeninform.com	and	
Turkmenistan.gov.tm.
An	agency	of	the	Federal	Migration	Service	operates	as	part	of	the	Russian	em-
bassy	in	Ashgabat	(Russia	also	has	a	consulate	in	Turkmenbashi).	
3.4.2. an outline of russian-turkmen relations
Energy	issues	have	always	predominated	in	Russian-Turkmen	relations.	
When	the	USSR	fell	apart,	 ‘Central	Asia–Centre’,	running	to	Russia	via	Uz-
bekistan	 and	 Kazakhstan,	 was	 Turkmenistan’s	 only	 export	 gas	 pipeline.	
Moscow	wanted	this	situation	to	remain	unchanged,	and	to	maintain	its	mo-
nopoly	on	gas	transit178.	For	 this	reason	it	attempted	to	block	the	construc-
tion	of	any	new	connections.	It	was	especially	concerned	about	plans	to	build	
the	Trans-Caspian	gas	pipeline,	which	would	 connect	Azerbaijan	with	 the	
Baku–Tbilisi–Erzurum	route	and	supply	gas	to	Western	recipients,	as	well	as	
the	EU’s	Nabucco	project	running	along	the	same	route.	Russia	responded	to	
these	projects	in	2007	by	announcing	plans	to	build	competitive	routes:	the	
Caspian	Coastal	Gas	Pipeline179	and	South	Stream180.	In	turn,	Ashgabat	want-
ed	 a	 diversified	network	of	 gas	pipelines,	 so	 that	 it	was	no	 longer	depend-
ent	on	one	recipient,	and	gained	a	much	better	negotiating	position.	The	200	
178	 Most	Turkmen	gas,	like	Uzbek	gas,	was	re-exported	to	Western	Europe.	
179	 The	Caspian	Coastal	Gas	Pipeline,	with	a	planned	capacity	of	20	bcm,	was	to	run	along	the	
eastern	 coastline	 of	 the	 Caspian	 Sea	 from	Turkmenistan	 via	Kazakhstan	 to	 Russia,	 and	
connect	to	the	‘Central	Asia–Centre’	main.	An	initial	trilateral	agreement	(between	Russia,	
Kazakhstan	and	Turkmenistan)	concerning	its	construction	was	signed	in	November	2007.	
Russia	withdrew	from	this	project	in	October	2010.	
180	 The	South	Stream	pipeline	runs	along	nearly	the	same	route	as	that	planned	for	Nabucco	
(from	Russia	along	the	Black	Sea	bed	to	Bulgaria,	and	from	there	via	Serbia	and	Hungary	
to	Baumgarten	in	Austria,	and	in	the	two-branch	version	also	to	Greece	and	Italy).	The	in-
auguration	of	the	construction	of	the	offshore	section	was	celebrated	on	7	December	2012.	
Russia	 is	considering	sending	gas	 from	Turkmenistan,	Uzbekistan	and	Azerbaijan	using	
this	route.
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km-long	Korpezhe-Kurt	Kui	gas	pipeline	running	to	Iran	came	into	operation	
at	the	end	of	1997,	with	an	annual	capacity	of	8	bcm.	At	the	end	of	2009,	the	
Turkmenistan–China	 gas	 pipeline	was	 launched	 (it	 runs	 for	 over	 1800	km	
and	has	a	planned	capacity	of	40	bcm).
A	 section	 of	 the	 ‘Central	 Asia–Centre’	 gas	 pipeline	was	 damaged	 on	 9	April	
2009,	and	gas	supplies	from	Turkmenistan	to	Russia	were	withheld.	In	Turk-
menistan’s	opinion	the	damage	occurred	because	of	a	sudden	and	significant	
reduction	in	the	volume	of	gas	received	by	Gazprom.	Although	the	pipeline	was	
repaired,	gas	transport	was	not	resumed.	Gazprom	demanded	that	the	long-
term	contract	be	revised	and	the	gas	price	or	supply	volumes	be	reduced	(de-
mand	for	gas	and	gas	prices	had	fallen	significantly	in	Europe	as	a	consequence	
of	the	economic	crisis;	thus	Gazprom,	re-exporting	Turkmen	gas	and	reducing	
its	own	output,	was	unable	to	generate	the	expected	profits181).	The	core	of	the	
Russian-Turkmen	gas	conflict	was	Russia’s	desire	to	take	control	of	the	planned	
‘East–West’	gas	pipeline,	which	would	have	connected	Turkmenistan’s	largest	
gas	project,	Yolotan,	with	the	Caspian	Sea	coastline	(Moscow	was	concerned	
that	in	the	future	this	pipeline	could	become	part	of	the	Trans-Caspian	route	
promoted	by	the	USA	and	the	EU).	Gazprom	reduced	the	volume	of	Turkmen	
gas	received	soon	after	Ashgabat	rejected	Gazprom’s	offer	to	take	part	in	this	
project182.
This	conflict	inflicted	more	losses	on	Turkmenistan,	which	was	deprived	of	its	
planned	incomes	(around	US$1	billion	per	month,	according	to	estimates)	and	
was	forced	to	withhold	production	at	195	fields,	which	posed	the	risk	of	these	
fields	being	destroyed.	However,	the	upcoming	inauguration	of	the	gas	main	
running	to	China	and	the	accompanying	Chinese	loan	made	Russian	pressure	
less	 effective.	 Finally,	 supplies	 to	 Russia	 were	 resumed	 at	 the	 beginning	 of	
2010,	although	export	levels	reached	only	10.5	bcm	(the	level	before	the	crisis	
had	been	around	40	bcm).	An	additional	short	gas	pipeline	running	from	Turk-
menistan	 to	 Iran	 (Dovletabad–Khangiran,	 182	kilometres,	with	a	 capacity	of	
up	to	12	bcm)	was	opened	more	or	less	at	the	same	time,	in	early	January	2010.	
The	Trans-Caspian	gas	pipeline	could	ensure	Ashgabat	a	real	diversification	
of	outlets.	However,	Turkmenistan	is	likely	to	become	more	dependent	on	the	
181	 Furthermore,	Gazprom	had	started	paying	higher	rates	for	Turkmen	gas	a	few	months	be-
fore.	
182	 Aleksandra	Jarosiewicz,	‘Rosyjsko-turkmeńska	wojna	gazowa’,	Tydzień na Wschodzie,	OSW,	
3	 June	 2009,	 http://www.osw.waw.pl/pl/publikacje/tydzien-na-wschodzie/2009-06-03/
rosyjsko-turkmenska-wojna-gazowa
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Chinese	direction	in	the	coming	years	(the	contracts	signed	thus	far	provide	
for	supplies	at	65	million	m3).	
Relations	between	Ashgabat	 and	Moscow	were	 still	 very	 tense	 in	 2011	 and	
2012.	The	Russian	 restrictions	on	Turkmen	gas	 imports	were	accompanied	
by	a	campaign	in	the	Russian	media	suggesting	a	“Libyan	scenario”	in	Turk-
menistan183.
The	issues	which	received	most	attention	in	bilateral	relations	in	the	first	half	
of	2013	were	linked	to	a	new	citizenship	act	in	Turkmenistan,	where	dual	citi-
zenship	was	not	envisaged	as	a	possible	option.	This	affected	over	43,000	Rus-
sian	citizens	who	were	permanent	residents	in	Turkmenistan.	In	addition	to	
the	need	to	relinquish	one	of	the	citizenships	they	held,	they	were	concerned	
they	would	be	unable	to	travel	abroad.	Only	holders	of	biometric	passports	have	
been	allowed	to	leave	the	country	since	10	July.	However,	such	passports	have	
not	been	 issued	to	 these	 individuals	since	their	 introduction	 in	2006.	 Inten-
sive	diplomatic	consultations	 led	to	a	compromise,	owing	to	which	individu-
als	who	had	been	granted	dual	citizenship	before	10	April	2003	(the	presidents	
of	Russia	 and	Turkmenistan	 signed	a	protocol	 terminating	 the	dual	 citizen-
ship	agreement	on	that	day)	could	apply	for	new	passports.	The	new	passports	
would	later	also	be	made	available	to	those	who	had	gained	their	status	after	
this	date,	although	not	later	than	the	protocol’s	effective	date	(Turkmenistan	
ratified	it	on	22	April	2003,	and	Russia	was	expected	to	do	this	in	autumn	2013	
but	till	February	2014	it	didn’t;	the	protocol	will	come	into	force	following	the	
exchange	of	the	ratifying	documents)184.
183	 Aleksandra	 Jarosiewicz,	 ‘Turkmenistan	 getting	 closer	 to	 China’,	EastWeek,	 OSW,	 30	No-
vember	 2011,	 http://www.osw.waw.pl/en/publikacje/analyses/2011-12-01/turkmenistan-
getting-closer-to-china	
For	„Libyan	scenario”	see	e.g.:	Евгений Минченко, ‘Ливийский сценарий для Туркмении’,	
http://www.rbcdaily.ru/politics/opinion/562949982814811
184	 The	new	citizenship	act	finally	became	effective	in	Turkmenistan	on	3	July	2013.	Article	5,	
which	was	added	after	consultations	with	the	Russian	side,	provides	that	any	other	citizen-
ship	held	by	a	citizen	of	Turkmenistan	“shall	not	be	recognised”,	and	at	the	same	time	clari-
fies	that	individuals	who	hold	such	citizenship	shall	be	treated	solely	as	citizens	of	Turk-
menistan.	Thus	the	existence	of	such	individuals	became	legally	acceptable.	By	9	July	2013	
(the	last	day	on	which	the	old	Turkmen	passports	were	valid)	over	6000	individuals	hold-
ing	dual	Turkmen	and	Russian	citizenships	submitted	applications	for	biometric	passports,	
and	over	1000	had	already	obtained	the	new	document.	ИТАР­ТАСС,	9	July	2013.	The	text	of	
the	citizenship	act	is	available	at:	http://www.chrono-tm.org/2013/07/opublikovan-zakon-
o-grazhdanstve-turkmenistana/	
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russia – turkmenistan
Moscow	 is	 capable	 of	 influencing	 the	 situation	 in	 Turkmenistan	 to	 only	
a	minimal	extent,	since	this	country	has	pursued	a	policy	of	self-isolation	
combined	with	diversification	of	the	recipients	of	 its	oil	and	gas	exports.	
Russia	is	not	an	important	recipient	of	Turkmen	exports	(the	first	position	
is	held	by	China,	66%,	followed	by	Ukraine,	7%,	and	Italy,	4.5%),	although	
a	13%	share	in	imports	places	it	third	after	China	(20.1%)	and	Turkey	(17.5%;	
data	for	2012)185.
4.  russian-Kazakh relations
Kazakhstan	is	the	Central	Asian	country	with	which	Russia	has	always	had	
the	closest	relations186.	This	is	the	only	country	from	this	region	to	have	been	
mentioned	in	successive	Concepts	of	the	Foreign	Policy	of	the	Russian	Federa-
tion	(where	it	has	been	referred	to	in	the	context	of	integration	projects	for	the	
post-Soviet	area:	Astana	has	actively	participated	in	all	such	projects,	and	has	
initiated	some	of	them,	although	its	vision	of	integration	differs	slightly	from	
that	proposed	by	Moscow).	Kazakhstan	has	the	largest	oil	deposits	in	the	Cas-
pian	region	(also	taking	into	account	Azerbaijan),	and	significant	reserves	of	
natural	gas	(comparable	to	Uzbek	reserves;	only	Turkmenistan	has	larger).	It	
is	also	the	region’s	only	country	to	border	directly	on	Russia187.	For	this	reason	
Moscow	sees	it	as	a	natural	barrier	separating	it	from	threats	coming	from	the	
south	(terrorists,	drugs	and	extremist	ideas),	and	it	plays	an	important	role	in	
the	area	of	security.	Kazakhstan’s	southern	border	is	described	by	some	Rus-
sian	experts	 as	 the	 southern	strategic	 frontier	of	 the	Russian	Federation188.	
Russia	accounts	for	up	to	38.4%	of	Kazakh	exports	(first	ahead	of	China,	sec-
ond	with	16.8%,	and	Ukraine,	third	with	6.6%)	and	7.3%	of	its	imports	(fourth	
after	China	with	a	17.9%	share,	Italy	with	16.8%	and	Holland	with	8.1%;	data	
for	2012)189.
185	 https://www.cia.gov/library/publications/the-world-factbook/geos/tx.html
186	 This	country	is	often	treated	separately	from	this	region.	The	term	‘Middle	Asia	and	Ka-
zakhstan’	was	used	in	the	USSR.	
187	 The	length	of	the	border	between	the	two	countries	is	6846	km	(although	the	figure	of	7512	
km	is	also	provided	in	some	sources).	The	Kazakh	government	views	the	country’s	location	
and	vast	area	as	being	to	its	benefit,	offering	transit	services	to	its	neighbours.	
188	 Дмитрий Тренин,	‘Post-Imperium...’,	op. cit.,	page	180.
189	 http://www.stat.kz/digital/vnesh_torg/Pages/default.aspx
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4.1. russia’s assets
The military presence
A	number	of	military	facilities,	which	are	essential	for	Russia’s	defence,	have	
remained	in	Kazakhstan	since	the	collapse	of	the	USSR.	At	present,	the	total	
area	of	the	military	facilities	leased	by	Russia	in	Kazakhstan	is	11	million	ha.
The	Baikonur	complex190	(consisting	of	a	cosmodrome	of	the	same	name	and	
the	city	of	Baikonur,	formerly	known	as	Leninsk)	is	located	in	Kyzylorda	prov-
ince,	to	the	east	of	the	Aral	Sea.	The	first	Baikonur	lease	agreement	was	signed	
in	1994	for	a	20-year	term.	In	2004,	the	lease	was	extended	until	2050,	at	an	
annual	cost	of	US$115	million.	Russia	launches	Soyuz	and	Proton	type	rockets,	
carrying	orbital	complexes.	21	rocket	launches	were	carried	out	there	in	2012,	
the	largest	number	in	the	world191.
the case of baikonur
Russia’s	 Ministry	 of	 Defence	 transferred	 individual	 units	 forming	 the	
Baikonur	complex	to	Roskosmos	(Russian	Federal	Space	Agency)	between	
1997	and	2011.	At	present,	the	following	Russian	enterprises	operate	there:	
a	 branch	 of	 the	 Rocket	 and	 Space	 Corporation	 Energia	 (RSC	 Energia),	
a	branch	of	the	Progress	State	Research	and	Production	Rocket	and	Space	
Centre	(TsSKB	Progress),	a	branch	of	the	Khrunichev	State	Research	and	
Production	Space	Centre	 and	 the	Centre	 for	Operation	of	 Space	Ground-	
-Based	Infrastructure	(TsENKI).
In	2012,	Kazakhstan	did	not	allow	the	planned	launch	of	several	satellites,	
playing	for	time	during	arrangements	concerning	the	locations	where	the	
launchers	would	return	to	earth192.	Talgat	Musabayev,	the	head	of	the	Ka-
zakh	space	agency	Kazkosmos,	said	in	December	2012	that	Astana	and	Mos-
cow	were	considering	a	new	agreement	which	would	envisage	a	gradual	re-
placement	of	leasing	the	facilities	with	common	use	thereof	(Russia	would	
190	 Formally,	until	recently,	the	5th	State	Testing	Ground	of	the	Russian	Ministry	of	Defence.	
191	 http://novosti-kosmonavtiki.ru/news/4209/	
	 The	US	Space	Centre	on	Cape	Canaveral	in	Florida	was	ranked	second,	with	10	launches.
192	 Ольга Самофалова, ‘На правах хозяина. Казахстан мешает России выполнять запуски 
с	Байконура’,	Vz.ru,	26	May	2012,	http://vz.ru/economy/2012/5/26/580679.html
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relinquish	its	jurisdiction	over	the	city	of	Baikonur	to	Kazakhstan)193.	Then	
the	Kazakh	government	approved	the	schedule	for	Proton	rocket	launches,	
reducing	the	planned	number	of	launches	from	17	to	12,	thus	exposing	Rus-
sia	to	losses	reaching	of	US$500	million	(the	cost	of	withdrawal	from	the	
international	contracts	already	concluded).	In	response,	Russia’s	Ministry	
of	Foreign	Affairs	addressed	a	note	 to	Astana	 threatening	possible	with-
drawal	from	a	number	of	joint	space	projects	(including	the	Baiterek	com-
plex	project)194.	The	conflict	was	temporarily	resolved:	 following	the	first	
meeting	of	the	newly	established	Russian-Kazakh	intergovernmental	com-
mission	for	Baikonur	on	28	March	2013,	Russia’s	deputy	prime	minister	Igor	
Shuvalov	stated	 that	 there	were	no	disagreements	between	 the	 two	par-
ties,	and	the	launch	plan	for	2013	had	been	finally	approved.	In	turn,	Ka-
zakhstan’s	deputy	prime	minister,	Kairat	Kelimbetov,	stated	that	Astana	
did	not	intend	to	revise	the	lease	agreement195.	It	cannot	be	ruled	out	that	
Kazakhstan	wanted	to	induce	Russia	to	increase	its	financial	share	in	joint	
space	projects	in	this	way,	or	was	possibly	testing	Moscow’s	determination	
to	retain	Baikonur.	The	Russian	press	started	speculating	that	there	were	
plans	 to	 lease	 the	 cosmodrome	 to	 the	USA	 (following	 the	 termination	of	
Moscow’s	lease)196.	Baikonur	will	lose	its	importance	for	Moscow	when	the	
Vostochny	Cosmodrome,	which	is	being	built	 in	the	Amur	oblast,	 is	acti-
vated	in	2015–2018197.
193	 ‘Решение о статусе „Байконура” могут принять после 2050 г, считают в ГД’,	Ria.ru,	10	De-
cember	2012,	http://ria.ru/science/20121210/914211038.html
194	 Иван Чеберко, ‘Россия выдвинула ультиматум Казахстану на $500 млн’,	 Izvestia.ru,	
24	January	2013,	http://izvestia.ru/news/543574	
	 The	 Baiterek	 space	 launch	 complex	 is	 being	 built	 at	 Baikonur,	 using	 the	 cosmodrome’s	
infrastructure.	A	Kazakh-Russian	joint-stock	company	in	charge	of	its	construction,	and	
a	further	operation	was	set	up	in	2005.	The	complex	is	expected	to	come	into	operation	in	
2015	(http://www.bayterek.kz/about/).
195	 On	4	July	2013,	a	group	of	Kazakh	opposition	activists	and	representatives	of	political	par-
ties	appealed	to	the	government	to	ban	rocket	launches	from	Baikonur	and	to	close	all	sites	
leased	by	Russia.	The	opposition	activists	highlighted	the	risk	of	contamination	of	the	natu-
ral	environment	and	the	threat	to	local	residents.	
196	 Tatiana	Serwetnyk,	‘Kazachstan	dalej	od	Kremla?’,	Rzeczpospolita,	30	February	2013.
197	 ‘В 2018 году Россия начнет космические запуски с „Восточного’,	Infuture.ru,	http://www.
infuture.ru/article/9019	
	 Despite	the	construction	of	the	new	cosmodrome,	Moscow	intends	to	use	Baikonur	until	
the	expiry	of	its	lease	term.	Елена Объедкова, ‘Первую ракету с космодрома „Восточный” 
запустят в 2015 году’,	 Rg.ru,	 4	 April	 2013,	 http://www.rg.ru/2013/04/04/popovkin-site.
html
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The	other	military	facilities	leased	by	Russia	in	Kazakhstan	are198:
•	 an	independent	radar	node	of	the	3rd	Missile-Space	Defence	Army	of	the	Rus-
sian	Aerospace	Defence	Forces	(a	specialist	radar,	the	so-called	Balkhash	9	
site).	It	is	located	in	Priozersk	by	Lake	Balkhash	north	of	Almaty.	It	is	part	
of	the	united	missile	defence	warning	system.	It	also	registers	the	techni-
cal	parameters	of	the	combat	missile	complexes	being	tested	at	the	Sary-
Shagan	site199;
•	 the	 10th	 State	 Testing	 Range	 of	 the	 Russian	 Ministry	 of	 Defence	 (Sary-	
-Shagan).	This	site	extends	over	areas	located	in	four	provinces	of	Kazakh-
stan	(600	km	from	east	to	west	and	250	km	from	north	to	south200);
•	 the	929th	Chkalov	State	Flight-Test	Centre	of	 the	Russian	Ministry	of	De-
fence.	 Its	 headquarters	 are	 located	 in	 Russia’s	 Astrakhan	 oblast,	 but	 its	
testing	grounds	(numbers	85,	171	and	231)	are	situated	in	north-western	Ka-
zakhstan;
•	 the	5580th	Base	for	Securing	Research	Work	(former	11th	State	Testing	Range	
of	the	Russian	Ministry	of	Defence,	at	the	Emba	site).	Air	defence	weapons	
are	researched	and	tested	at	this	base.	
•	 an	 Independent	 Air	 Transport	 Regiment	 of	 the	 Russian	 Air	 Forces	 sta-
tioned	at	Kostanay	airport.	It	provides	transport	services	for	the	needs	of	
the	aforementioned	military	facilities.	
The	current	total	annual	 lease	rent	for	all	 the	sites	 in	Kazakhstan	is	US$27.5	
million.
198	 ‘Военные объекты, арендуемые Россией за рубежом’,	Ria.ru,	11	December	2012,	http://ria.
ru/spravka/20121211/914287081-print.html?ria=vqi2j1k4o8pcskkmornk3v7o6mknpmfi
199	 The	node	 is	owned	by	Kazakhstan;	 the	value	of	 the	rent	paid	by	Russia	 for	 its	use	 is	not	
known.	On	 29	 January	 2013,	 the	 defence	ministers	 of	 Russia	 and	Kazakhstan	 signed	 an	
agreement	setting	up	a	joint	regional	air	defence	system	(like	the	one	Russia	had	previously	
created	with	Belarus).	
200	 ‘Военные базы России за границей. Справка’,	Centrasia.ru,	16	February	2010,	http://www.
centrasia.ru/newsA.php?st=1266297300
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The economic presence
Russia’s	economic	presence	 in	Kazakhstan,	as	 in	Uzbekistan	and	Turkmeni-
stan,	is	mainly	focused	on	the	primary	sectors.	Russian	entities	are	principally	
interested	in	the	production	and	transport	of	raw	materials.	Their	goal	 is	 to	
help	Russia	remain	 the	dominant	 transit	country	 (although	no	 longer	a	mo-
nopoly)	while	investing	relatively	small	funds.	Kazakhstan	has	been	making	
consistent,	albeit	 small	steps	 in	order	 to	diversify	 its	 transport	routes201.	An	
oil	pipeline	connecting	the	fields	by	the	Caspian	Sea	with	western	China	was	
launched	in	2006.	A	new	opportunity	to	export	natural	gas	via	the	extended	
gas	 pipeline	 from	Turkmenistan	 to	 China	 (running	 via	Uzbekistan	 and	Ka-
zakhstan)	is	also	opening	up.	In	the	medium	term,	Kazakhstan	may	become	
Russia’s	key	competitor	on	the	European	and	Chinese	markets,	with	exports	
levels	reaching	150	million	tonnes	of	oil	annually.
luKoil in Kazakhstan
LUKoil	is	Russia’s	key	player	on	the	oil	&	gas	market;	it	has	been	present	in	
Kazakhstan	since	1995,	and	has	invested	over	US$4.7	billion	in	this	country	
thus	far.	The	company	accounts	for	a	tenth	of	the	country’s	hydrocarbon	
output,	and	its	assets	in	Kazakhstan	form	almost	90%	of	all	its	foreign	as-
sets.	LUKoil	participates	in	seven	production	projects	(as	LUKOIL	Overseas	
in	six	of	 them),	and	is	a	shareholder	 in	the	Caspian	Pipeline	Consortium	
(CPC),	which	built,	operates	and	will	develop	the	CPC	oil	pipeline	(Tengiz–
-Novorossiysk,	via	the	Lukarco	company).	These	projects	are:
–	the	Kumkol	field	in	Kyzylorda	province.	The	project	is	operated	by	Turgai	
Petroleum	(LUKoil	and	China’s	CNPC	hold	a	 50%	stake	each	 in	 this	 com-
pany;	a	joint	venture	was	set	up	with	Kazakhstan’s	PetroKazakhstan).	The	
field	operation	contract	was	signed	for	a	25-year	term	in	1996.	Its	output	in	
201	 Twelve	years	ago,	President	Nazarbayev	mentioned	this	in	an	interview	for	the	Polish	daily	
newspaper	Gazeta Wyborcza: “Kazakhstan	 is	making	efforts	 so	 that	 future	pipelines	will	
run	in	various	directions,	and	not	only	via	Russia,	as	is	the	case	now.	We	have	backed	the	
Baku–Ceyhan	project,	 and	our	participation	 in	 it	will	depend	on	 the	profitability	of	 this	
investment,	the	transit	charges,	the	situation	on	the	Mediterranean	oil	market,	etc.	A	pipe-
line	 running	 to	western	China	will	 also	be	 important.	However,	 this	 is	 a	project	 for	 the	
future;	we	have	not	reached	the	necessary	production	level	as	yet.	Last	but	not	least,	we	are	
not	ruling	out	a	route	running	through	Iran.”	‘Marzę	o	Unii	Eurazjatyckiej	[z	prezydentem	
Kazachstanu	Nursułtanem	Nazarbajevem	rozmawiają	Marek	J.	Karp	i	Wojciech	Górecki]’,	
Gazeta Wyborcza,	23	May	2002.
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2012	was	2.14	million	tonnes	of	oil	(including	LUKoil’s	share	of	1.07	million	
tonnes)	and	222	million	m3	of	natural	gas	(LUKoil’s	share	111	million	m3)202;
–	the	Karachaganak	field	in	West	Kazakhstan	province.	This	project	is	oper-
ated	by	Karachaganak	Petroleum	Operating	Company,	where	LUKoil	holds	
a	13.5%	stake.	The	PSA	was	signed	in	1997	for	a	forty-years’	term.	Its	output	in	
2012	reached	12.2	million	tonnes	of	oil	(including	LUKoil’s	share	of	1.4	million	
tonnes)	and	17.5	bcm	of	natural	gas	(LUKoil’s	share	being	2.1	bcm)203;
–	the	Arman	field	in	Mangystau	province.	The	project	is	operated	by	Ar-
man	company	(LUKoil	and	China’s	Sinopec	each	hold	a	50%	stake	in	it).	The	
field	operation	contract	was	signed	in	1994	for	a	30-year	term.	LUKoil	has	
participated	 in	 this	project	 since	2005.	 Its	output	 in	2012	 reached	67,200	
tonnes	of	oil	(including	LUKoil’s	share	of	39,500	tonnes)	and	10	million	m3	
of	natural	gas	(LUKoil’s	share	4.6	million	m3)204;
–	the	Severnye	Buzachi	field	in	Mangystau	province.	The	project	is	operated	
by	JV	Buzachi	(50%	of	its	shares	are	held	by	China’s	CNPC	and	50%	by	Cas-
pian	Investments,	in	which	LUKoil	and	Sinopec	each	hold	a	50%	stake).	The	
field	operation	contract	was	signed	in	1997	for	a	25-year	term.	LUKoil	has	
participated	in	this	project	since	2005.	Its	output	in	2012	reached	2	million	
tonnes	of	oil	(including	LUKoil’s	share	of	0.5	million	tonnes)	and	94	million	
m3	of	natural	gas	(LUKoil’s	share	23.5	million	m3)205;
–	the	Karakuduk	field	in	Mangystau	province.	The	project	is	operated	by	
KarakudukMunai	(in	which	LUKoil	and	Sinopec	each	hold	a	50%	stake).	The	
field	operation	contract	was	signed	in	1995	for	a	25-year	term.	LUKoil	has	
participated	in	this	project	since	2005.	Its	output	in	2012	reached	1.13	mil-
lion	tonnes	of	oil	(including	LUKoil’s	share	of	0.57	million	tonnes)	and	110	
million	m3	of	natural	gas	(LUKoil’s	share	56	million	m3)206;
–	 the	Alibekmola	and	Kozhasai	fields	forming	one	project	 in	Aktyubinsk	
province.	The	project	is	operated	by	Kazachoil	Aktobe	(in	which	Kazakh-
stan’s	KazMunaiGaz	holds	a	50%	stake,	and	LUKoil	and	Sinopec	each	hold	
202	 http://lukoil-overseas.ru/projects/kazakhstan/39.php
203	 http://lukoil-overseas.ru/projects/kazakhstan/61.php
204	 http://lukoil-overseas.ru/projects/kazakhstan/63.php	
205	 http://lukoil-overseas.ru/projects/kazakhstan/64.php
206	 http://lukoil-overseas.ru/projects/kazakhstan/65.php
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a	25%	stake).	The	field	operation	contract	was	signed	in	1999	for	a	25-year	
term.	LUKoil	has	participated	in	this	project	since	2005.	Its	output	in	2012	
reached	 1.25	 million	 tonnes	 of	 oil	 (including	 LUKoil’s	 share	 of	 313,000	
tonnes)	and	63	million	m3	of	natural	gas	(LUKoil’s	share	16	million	m3)207;
–	the	Tengiz	and	Korolevskoye	fields	(Tengiz	project)	in	Atyrau	province.	
The	project	 is	operated	by	Tengizchevroil.	LUKoil	(via	Lukarco,	 in	which	
it	bought	the	remaining	50%	shares	from	BP	in	2009)	currently	holds	a	5%	
stake	in	it	(the	other	shareholders	are:	Chevron	–	50%,	ExxonMobil	–	25%	
and	KazMunaiGaz	–	20%).	The	project	operation	contract	was	signed	in	1993	
for	a	40-year	term.	LUKoil	has	participated	in	this	project	since	1997.	The	
output	of	this	one	of	Kazakhstan’s	richest	fields	in	2012	reached	24.2	million	
tonnes	of	oil	(including	LUKoil’s	share	of	1.2	million	tonnes)	and	11.7	bcm	of	
natural	gas	(LUKoil’s	share	of	0.6	bcm)208;
In	addition	to	these,	LUKoil	has	acquired	stakes	in	several	projects	cover-
ing	fields	 in	the	Kazakh	sector	of	the	Caspian	Sea:	Atash,	Tyub-Karagan,	
Yuzhny	Zhambai	&	Yuzhnoye	Zaburunye	and	Khvalynskoye209;
LUKoil	also	holds	shares	in	the	CPC	consortium	(Lukarco	has	a	12.5%	stake).	
The	other	shareholders	of	CPC	are:	the	Russian	government	(represented	
by	Transneft,	24%	and	KTK	Company,	7%),	a	total	of	31%	shares,	the	govern-
ment	of	Kazakhstan	(represented	by	the	state-owned	company	KazMun-
aiGaz),	19%,	Chevron	Caspian	Pipeline	Consortium	Co.,	15%,	Mobil	Caspian	
Pipeline	Co.,	7.5%,	Rosneft–Shell	Caspian	Ventures	Ltd.,	7.5%,	Eni	Interna-
tional	(N.A.)	N.V.,	2%,	Oryx	Caspian	Pipeline	LLC,	1.75%,	BG	Overseas	Hold-
ings	 Ltd.,	 2%	 and	 Kazakhstan	 Pipeline	 Ventures	 LLC	 (a	 joint	 venture	 of	
KazMunaiGaz	and	BP),	1.75%210.	 In	2012,	this	pipeline	transported	around	
35	million	tonnes	of	oil211.
207	 http://lukoil-overseas.ru/projects/kazakhstan/67.php	
208	 http://lukoil-overseas.ru/projects/kazakhstan/3988.php
209	 Marek	 Menkiszak,	 Ewa	 Paszyc,	 Iwona	 Wiśniewska,	 ‘Aktywność	 gospodarcza	 Rosji...’,	
op. cit.	LUKoil	 acquired	 the	 shares	 in	Kazakhoil	Aktobe,	Buzachi,	KarakudukMunai	and	
Arman	companies	as	well	as	the	right	to	operate	at	Yuzhny	Zhambai	and	Yuzhnoye	Zabu-
runye	 by	 taking	 over	 100%	 control	 of	 the	 Bermuda-registered	 Nelson	 Resources	 Group,	
which	had	owned	these	shares,	in	October	2005	for	US$2	billion.	
210	 http://www.cpc.ru/RU/about/Pages/shareholders.aspx
211	 http://lukoil-overseas.ru/projects/kazakhstan/3989.php
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Rosneft	holds	shares	in	two	projects	in	Kazakhstan:	the	Adai	block	in	Atyrau	
province	(it	and	Sinopec	hold	a	50%	stake	each)212	and	the	Kurmangazy	field	
(the	Caspian	Sea	shelf,	a	25%	stake)213.	Both	projects	are	at	initial	phases	of	im-
plementation.
Gazprom	also	participates	in	two	projects.	The	first	covers	the	development	of	
the	resources	of	the	Tsentralnaya	structure	on	the	Caspian	Sea	shelf	(Gazprom	
and	 LUKoil	 set	 up	 a	 company	 named	 CentrKaspNeftegaz,	 in	 which	 each	 of	
them	holds	a	50%	stake;	in	turn	this	company	holds	half	of	the	shares	in	the	
project,	and	the	other	half	is	controlled	by	Kazakhstan’s	KazMunaiGaz).	The	
second	project,	which	is	at	an	initial	phase	of	implementation,	covers	the	Ima-
shevskoye	field	located	on	the	Kazakh-Russian	frontier.	Pursuant	to	an	inter-
governmental	agreement	of	2010,	work	on	this	project	has	been	entrusted	to	
Gazprom	and	KazMunaiGaz214.
Gazpromneft	has	been	present	in	Kazakhstan	since	2007.	Currently,	it	controls	
a	chain	of	50	filling	stations	in	this	country215.
Russia	is	an	active	player	on	the	Kazakh	uranium	mining	and	nuclear	energy	
market216.	Another	company	operating	there	is	Canada’s	Uranium	One	company,	
whose	main	shareholder	(51.4%	of	the	shares)	 is	Atomredmetzoloto,	a	Russian	
holding	controlled	by	the	state-owned	corporation	Rosatom.	Uranium	One’s	as-
sets	in	Kazakhstan	include	a	70%	stake	in	Betpak	Dala	company,	which	owns	the	
Akdala	mine	(its	output	in	2012	reached	1095	tonnes,	including	Uranium	One’s	
share	of	766	tonnes)	and	the	Yuzhny	Inkai	mine	(1870	tonnes,	including	Urani-
um	One’s	share	of	1309	tonnes);	a	50%	stake	in	Karatau	company,	which	owns	the	
Karatau	mine	(2135	tonnes,	including	Uranium	One’s	share	of	1068	tonnes),	and	
a	50%	stake	in	Akbastau	company,	which	owns	the	Akbastau	mine	(1203	tonnes,	
including	Uranium	One’s	 share	 of	 601	 tonnes);	 a	 49.67%	 stake	 in	 Zarechnoye	
company,	which	 owns	 the	Zarechnoye	mine	 (942	 tonnes,	 including	Uranium	
212	 http://www.rosneft.ru/Upstream/Exploration/international/aday_kazakhstan/
213	 A	50%	stake	is	held	by	Kazakhstan’s	KazMunaiGaz,	and	the	remaining	25%	have	not	been	
allocated.	 http://www.rosneft.ru/Upstream/Exploration/international/kurmangazy_ka-
zakhstan/
214	 http://www.gazprom.ru/about/production/projects/deposits/kazakhstan/
215	 See:	http://www.gpnbonus.ru/our_azs/
216	 2872	tonnes	of	uranium	were	mined	in	Russia	in	2012,	which	accounted	for	less	than	5%	of	
global	output	(6th	in	the	world).	Kazakhstan	is	first,	having	produced	21,317	tonnes	(36.5%	of	
global	 output).	 http://www.world-nuclear.org/info/Nuclear-Fuel-Cycle/Mining-of-Urani-
um/World-Uranium-Mining-Production/#.UdmV7ztFCf9
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One’s	share	of	468	tonnes)	and	a	30%	stake	in	Kyzylkum	company,	which	owns	
the	Kharasan	mine	(582	tonnes,	including	Uranium	One’s	share	of	175	tonnes)217.	
Russia	also	buys	uranium	ore	from	Kazakh	companies.	
On	 29	March	 2011,	 Kazakhstan	 and	Russia	 agreed	 on	 a	 comprehensive	 pro-
gramme	of	co-operation	in	the	area	of	peaceful	use	of	nuclear	energy,	which	
envisages	the	construction	of	a	nuclear	power	plant	near	the	city	of	Aktau218.	
A	joint	Russian-Kazakh	project	to	set	up	an	international	uranium	enrichment	
centre	in	Russia’s	Angarsk,	including	a	proposal	to	establish	an	international	
centre	for	the	disposal	of	spent	nuclear	fuel	and	an	international	nuclear	fuel	
bank,	was	initiated	in	May	2007219.	Russia	also	supplies	fuel	to	Kazakhstan’s	
test	reactors.	Moscow’s	activity	in	this	area	is	an	attempt	to	consolidate	the	nu-
clear	sector	in	the	post-Soviet	area	under	Russian	control.	WIth	this	purpose	
in	mind,	Russia	has	been	rebuilding	old	co-operation	contacts	and	using	exist-
ing	post-Soviet	infrastructure.	What	may	prevent	Moscow	from	achieving	this	
goal	are	the	strengthening	international	competition	and	fears	shared	by	some	
states	(including	Kazakhstan)	that	they	could	become	dependent	on	Russia	as	
part	of	such	nuclear	co-operation,	also	applying	to	the	primary	sector220.
Russian	corporations	hold	shares	in	the	companies	involved	in	the	production	
and	enrichment	of	lead-zinc	ores	at	Akzhal	mine,	and	operation	of	a	molybde-
num	mine221	and	hard	coal	mines222.
The	key	Russian	assets	in	the	electric	power	sector	include	a	50%	stake	held	
by	Inter	RAO	in	Ekibastuz	State	Power	Plant	2	(a	coal	power	plant,	known	as	
217	 Data	based	on:	http://www.armz.ru/media/File/facts/2013/armz_annual_report_20120608_
encr.pdf	
For	more	information	on	previous	ownership	shifts	in	the	uranium	production	sector,	see	
Marek	Menkiszak,	Ewa	Paszyc,	Iwona	Wiśniewska,	‘Aktywność	gospodarcza	Rosji...’,	op. cit.
218	 http://www.atomstroyexport.ru/about/projects/perspective/vber_300/
219	 This	initiative	was	put	forward	by	Rosatom’s	CEO,	Sergey	Kiriyenko	during	the	IAEA’s	ses-
sion	in	Vienna	on	18	September	2007.	Rosatom	and	IAEA	struck	a	deal	to	this	effect	on	29	
March	2010.	Under	this	deal,	a	low-enriched	uranium	storage	facility	(for	one	reactor	with	
a	capacity	of	1000	MW),	which	purchases	can	be	made	at	spot	prices,	was	built	in	Angarsk.	
Marek	Menkiszak,	Ewa	Paszyc,	Iwona	Wiśniewska,	‘Aktywność	gospodarcza	Rosji...’,	op. cit.
220	 Ibid.
221	 Ibid.
222	 RusAl	 company	 and	 the	 Kazakh	 holding	 Samruk	 established	 a	 joint	 venture	 known	 as	
Bogatyr	Komir,	which	owns	 the	 largest	bituminous	coal	deposits	 in	 the	CIS	 (Ekibastuz).	
http://rusal.ru/press-center/files/RUSAL%20Media%20Pack%202011%20RUS.pdf	
	 http://www.bogatyr.kz/ru/about/
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EGRES-2)	 in	Pavlodar	province,	which	produces	around	12%	of	Kazakhstan’s	
energy.	Two	blocks,	with	a	capacity	of	500	MW	each,	are	currently	in	operation.	
Two	more	blocks	are	planned	to	be	launched	by	2015,	although	this	timetable	
is	quite	unrealistic.	Part	of	the	energy	produced	is	exported	to	Russia	via	the	
Ekibastuz–Barnaul	power	transmission	line	(it	was	rebuilt	and	put	into	opera-
tion	thanks	to	an	investment	made	by	Inter	RAO	UES	worth	US$1.5	million)223.
In	2008,	Russia’s	AvtoVAZ	(the	manufacturer	of	Lada	cars)	bought	for	around	
US$80	million	25%	plus	1	share	in	Asia	Auto,	Kazakhstan’s	largest	car	manufac-
turer	(Lada,	Kia,	Skoda	and	Chevrolet	makes)224.
Russian	 entities	 are	 also	 present	 in	 other	 sectors	 of	 Kazakhstan’s	 economy,	
such	as	the	mobile	telecommunication	and	banking	sectors.	Up	to	9,201	(28.5%)	
of	the	32,257	registered	business	entities,	branches	and	agencies	with	foreign	
capital	represent	Russian	money225.
Soft power
In	accordance	with	Kazakhstan’s	constitution	(Article	7(2)),	Russian	has	an	‘of-
ficial	language’	status.	The	‘trilingualism’	programme	has	been	implemented	
in	 Kazakhstan	 since	 2007,	 and	 envisages	 that	 the	 country’s	 citizens	 should	
speak	three	languages	in	the	future:	Kazakh,	Russian	and	English226.	Accord-
ing	to	the	2009	census,	84.8%	residents	of	Kazakhstan	could	write	and	speak	
Russian	(62%	could	write	and	speak	Kazakh,	and	7.7%	English),	and	up	to	94.4%	
understood	Russian	(74%	Kazakh	and	15.4%	English)227.	 It	was	decided	in	De-
cember	2012	 that	 the	Cyrillic	script	would	be	replaced	with	 the	Latin	 in	 the	
written	Kazakh	language	by	2025,	a	move	which	is	expected	to	symbolise	the	
country’s	decreasing	dependence	on	Russia228.
223	 70%	of	energy	 imported	via	Russia	originates	 from	Kazakhstan.	Marek	Menkiszak,	Ewa	
Paszyc,	Iwona	Wiśniewska,	‘Aktywność	gospodarcza	Rosji...’,	op. cit.
224	 Ibid.
225	 Data	as	of	1	January	2013.	Turkish	capital	is	represented	by	3918	entities,	Chinese	by	2782	
entities	 and	 German	 by	 1253	 entities	 (http://www.stat.kz/digital/bizness_registr/Pages/
arhiv_12.aspx).
226	 ‘В Казахстане на госуровне принят культурный проект Триединство языков’,	Centr­ 
asia.ru,	24	July	2007,	http://www.centrasia.ru/newsA.php?st=1185221100
227	 http://demoscope.ru/weekly/2010/0443/panorm01.php#7	
	 According	to	data	as	of	2005,	66%	residents	of	Kazakhstan	spoke	Russian	in	their	everyday	life.	
228	 Раушан Нуршаева, ‘Казахстан перейдет с кириллицы на „современную” латиницу’,	
Ru.Reuters.com,	 14	 December	 2012,	 http://ru.reuters.com/article/topNews/idRUMSE8B-
D02D20121214
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Russian	is	still	a	popular	language	of	instruction	at	Kazakhstan’s	schools.	In	
the	school	year	2011/2012,	of	a	total	of	7706	general	education	schools	operating	
in	the	country	(including	7596	public	schools),	1508	(19.5%)	were	schools	with	
Russian	as	the	language	of	instruction.	A	definite	majority	of	bi-	and	multi-lin-
gual	schools	(2163	schools,	i.e.	28%)	had	classes	where	education	was	provided	
in	Russian229.	Russian	is	the	predominant	language	at	higher	education	schools	
and	in	science	in	Kazakhstan;	a	definite	majority	of	PhD	and	postdoctoral	the-
ses	are	written	in	this	language230.	Seven	branches	of	Russian	higher	education	
facilities,	 including	Moscow	State	University	 (since	2001231)	 and	 the	Moscow	
Aviation	Institute232	operate	there.
The	Russian	minority	accounts	for	over	twenty	percent	of	the	country’s	pop-
ulation233.	 Numerous	 Russian	 organisations234	 are	 active	 there,	 the	 largest	
(and	 oldest)	 of	which	 include	 the	 Semirechye	 Cossack	 Community	with	 six	
branches235,	the	Association	of	the	Steppe	Cossacks	(12	branches)236,	the	Lad Re-
publican	Slavonic	Movement	(14	branches)237,	 the	Russian	Community	of	Ka-
zakhstan	(14	branches)238,	the	Slavonic	Culture	Centre	(7	branches)239	and	the	
Rusichi Russian	National	Youth	Culture	Centre	240.	Some	organisations	publish	
229	 The	number	of	schools	with	Kazakh	as	the	language	of	instruction	was	3843,	i.e.	almost	50%.	
‘В Казахстане насчитали 3843 школы с казахским языком обучения и 1508 с русским’,	
News.nur.kz,	25	January	2012,	http://news.nur.kz/207313.html	
	 For	comparison,	in	the	last	years	of	the	Soviet	era,	only	two	schools	where	education	was	
provided	in	Kazakh	operated	in	Alma-Ata,	the	then	capital	of	the	Kazakh	SSR.
230	 http://echo.msk.ru/programs/linguafranca/1012040-echo/	
	 In	the	opinion	of	Kazakhstan’s	ambassador	to	Russia,	Galym	Obrazbakov,	Russian	is	more	
widespread	than	Kazakh	in	Kazakhstan.	Some	public	servants,	often	ethnic	Kazakhs,	do	
not	know	the	national	language	(ibid.).
231	 http://www.msu.kz/index.php
232	 http://www.mai.ru/info/subfac/voshod
233	 In	2009,	ethnic	Kazakhs	formed	around	63%,	and	Russians	less	than	24%	of	Kazakhstan’s	
population.	
234	 Data	on	38	organisations	is	available	on	the	websites	of	the	Russian	embassy	in	Astana	(see	
footnote	29).
235	 Семиреченская казачья община,	http://kazak-center.ru/index/0-64
236	 http://kazak-center.ru/news/roo_sojuz_kazakov_stepnogo_kraja_itogi_i_perspek-
tivy/2010-04-18-516
237	 The	organisation	states	on	the	website	http://www.arvedi.kz/lad.html	that	it	has	24	branch-
es	(although	only	14	are	specified)	and	50,000	members.	
238	 This	organisation	states	that	it	formally	has	60,000	members	(however	only	3000-4000	of	
them	are	active),	http://www.msrs.ru/organisations/kazakhstan/176/
239	 This	organisation	has	5000	members,	http://www.slavcentr.kz/	
240	 http://vserusskie.ru/org/?id=7216fc785998497187aaec87825c6b50
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their	own	newsletters	and	regularly	update	their	websites241,	while	others	do	
not	publicise	their	activity	so	much.	The	Association	of	Russian,	Slavonic	and	
Cossack	Organisations	of	Kazakhstan,	established	in	1999,	consists	of	over	40	
organisations,	and	publishes	the	Russkiy Vestnik weekly,	with	a	circulation	of	
5000	copies242.	
Two	agencies	of	Rossotrudnichestvo are	active	in	Kazakhstan	(in	Astana	and	Al-
maty).	They	co-operate	with	leading	scientific	and	cultural	institutions	in	this	
country243.	The	Russkiy Mir Foundation	runs	three	Russian	centres,	in	Astana,	
Aktyubinsk	 and	Ust-Kamenogorsk244,	 and	 also	 supports	 teachers	 of	Russian	
and	keeps	contacts	with	a	wide	range	of	Kazakh	media	and	Russian	national	
minority	organisations.
Russian	predominates	 in	Kazakhstan’s	 information	space	to	an	even	greater	
extent	 than	 in	Kyrgyzstan.	As	 there,	 the	Russian	 language	 is	used	 in	media	
originating	from	Russia	(which	is	generally	accessible)	and	local	Russian	me-
dia	(including	Argumenty i Fakty v Kazakhstane,	Komsomolskaya Pravda Kazakh­
stan)	and	Kazakh	Russian-speaking	media	 (including	TV	stations,	which	al-
locate	a	significant	portion	of	their	airtime	to	programmes	and	broadcasts	in	
Russian).	Russian	is	also	the	most	popular	language	among	news	and	analyti-
cal	internet	portals	(for	example,	Zonakz.net,	Risk.kz	and	Newskaz.ru;	the	latter	
also	has	a	Kazakh	version).	Press	agency	reports	are	usually	made	available	in	
Kazakh,	Russian	and	English	(Interfax.kz)	or	in	other	language	versions	(Ka-
zinform	also	has	an	Arabic	version	on	its	website,	Inform.kz)245.
In	addition	to	the	embassy	in	Astana,	Russia	also	has	consulates-general	in	Al-
maty,	 Uralsk	 and	Ust-Kamenogorsk.	 Furthermore,	 Bashkortostan,	 Dagestan	
241	 Other	examples	of	ethnic	Russian	websites	in	Kazakhstan	are:	http://www.arvedi.kz/	and	
http://www.rusazia.net/
242	 http://www.msrs.ru/organisations/kazakhstan/174/
243	 http://kaz.rs.gov.ru/	
	 This	website	 is	 frequently	 updated	 and	 publishes	 extensive	 information	 on	 all	 kinds	 of	
events	organised	and	co-organised	by	Rossotrudnichestvo’s	agencies.
244	 http://www.russkiymir.ru/russkiymir/ru/catalogue/company_view.html?id=4325&cata
log=&country=79&region=&city=,	http://www.russkiymir.ru/russkiymir/ru/catalogue/
company_view.html?id=3522&catalog=&country=79&region=&city=,	http://www.russ-
kiymir.ru/russkiymir/ru/catalogue/company_view.html?id=4324&catalog=&country=79
&region=&city=
245	 An	extensive	catalogue	of	websites	of	Kazakh	media	(including	local)	can	be	found	at	http://
www.nomad.su/?z=1
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and	Tatarstan	have	separate	agencies.	The	Russian	Trade	Agency	and	an	agen-
cy	of	the	Federal	Customs	Service	also	operate	in	this	country.
4.2. an outline of russian-Kazakh relations246
Ethnic	Kazakhs	did	not	form	an	absolute	majority	in	Kazakhstan	in	the	period	
immediately	preceding	the	collapse	of	the	USSR.	According	to	the	1989	census,	
they	accounted	 for	 39.7%	of	 the	 republic’s	population	 (Russians	were	 37.8%).	
This	 unfavourable	 situation	 for	 the	 titular	 nation,	 along	with	 the	 country’s	
vast	area	and	low	population	density,	were	among	the	reasons	why	President	
Nursultan	Nazarbayev	decided	to	move	the	capital	city	from	Alma-Ata	(now	
known	as	Almaty)	 in	 the	 southern	part	of	 the	 country	 to	Akmola	 (formerly	
known	as	Tselinograd,	and	now	as	Astana),	which	is	located	further	north,	and	
significantly	closer	to	the	Russian	border,	where	the	share	of	ethnic	Kazakhs	
was	the	lowest.	By	moving	the	central	administration	there,	ethnic	Kazakhs	
have	reinforced	their	position	in	this	part	of	the	country	(in	the	early	1990s,	
Russian	nationalists,	including	Vladimir	Zhirinovsky,	insisted	on	many	occa-
sions	that	northern	Kazakhstan	should	become	part	of	Russia).
Furthermore,	Nazarbayev	concluded	that	to	ensure	stability	and	security	for	
his	country,	the	most	beneficial	solution	would	be	to	make	it	part	of	a	network	
of	various	kinds	of	integration	projects.	Kazakhstan	has	actively	participated	
in	all	such	projects,	and	has	 initiated	some	of	 them.	The	enlarged	Common-
wealth	of	Independent	States	(before	that,	its	members	were	only	the	Slavonic	
republics	of	Russia,	Belarus	and	Ukraine)	was	formed	at	the	Alma-Ata	summit	
on	21	December	 1991.	 Furthermore,	 the	Eurasian	Economic	Community	was	
established	on	10	October	2000	in	Astana.	Kazakhstan’s	president	had	already	
put	forward	the	idea	of	creating	the	Eurasian	Union	in	1994.	On	the	one	hand	
this	policy	was	the	result	of	fear	of	Chinese	domination	and	a	wish	to	outbal-
ance	Chinese	influence	(Astana	was	engaged	in	close	co-operation	with	Beijing	
as	part	of	the	SCO	and	in	the	format	of	bilateral	relations),	while	on	the	other	
it	was	a	consequence	of	the	country’s	desire	to	build	its	image	as	a	promoter	of	
stability	and	international	co-operation,	and	as	a	distinctive,	independent	en-
tity	with	some	global	ambitions.	The	vision	of	Kazakhstan	as	a	multi-national	
246	 Given	the	intensity	of	Russian-Kazakh	contacts	(the	presidents	meet	several	times	a	year,	
and	contacts	at	lower	levels,	including	between	the	heads	of	the	frontier	regions,	are	equal-
ly	frequent),	this	outline	is	as	a	natural	consequence	more	general	than	those	on	Russia’s	
relations	with	other	countries	in	this	region,	and	is	focused	on	key	trends	and	tendencies.	
The	preceding	outlines	were	more	detailed	since	it	was	necessary	to	present	concrete	case	
studies,	such	as	the	one	concerning	Russia’s	playing	on	the	hydropower	plant	issues.	
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and	multi-cultural	state,	fostered	by	Nazarbayev,	contributed	to	that.	He	did	
not	allow	Kazakh	nationalism	to	develop,	thus	preventing	ethnic	conflicts	and	
tension247.
These	integrationist	ideas	have	bring	Kazakhstan	closer	to	Russia.	However,	
the	two	countries	have	different	visions	for	the	integration	of	the	post-Soviet	
area.	Nazarbayev	set	 the	boundaries	 for	 this	process	 (from	Astana’s	point	of	
view)	on	18	January	2013	at	a	meeting	with	the	heads	of	foreign	missions	ac-
credited	in	Kazakhstan,	when	he	stated	that	Astana	opposed	the	transforma-
tion	of	economic	projects	into	a	platform	for	political	integration	with	Russia	
as	the	leader	and	representative	of	the	member	states	(the	President	has	said	
that	“there	is	no	return	to	the	USSR”).	Furthermore,	unlike	Moscow,	Astana	
does	 not	want	 supranational	 bodies	 to	 be	 created.	 Kazakhstan’s	 decision	 to	
start	using	 the	Latin	 script	 is	 a	 symbolic	 gesture	 in	 this	 context.	Moreover,	
proofs	of	Kazakhstan’s	assertiveness	and	determinedness	in	defending	its	in-
terests	have	 included	periodical	 intensifications	of	 tension	between	 the	 two	
countries,	caused	 for	example	by	 the	aforementioned	controversies	over	 the	
Baikonur	cosmodrome248.
All	this	taken	into	account,	Russian-Kazakh	relations	can	nevertheless	(with	
some	 reservations)	 be	 determined	 as	 partnership-based,	 which	 cannot	 be	
said	 about	 Russia’s	 relations	 with	 Kyrgyzstan,	 Tajikistan,	 Uzbekistan	 and	
Turkmenistan249.	At	the	same	time,	Moscow	and	Astana	have	conflicting	eco-
247	 In	the	opinion	of	some	experts	(for	example,	as	given	in	OSW’s	conversation	with	Nikolai	
Kuzmin,	 a	 journalist	 from	 Expert	 weekly	 in	 Almaty,	 on	 12	 December	 2011),	 Nazarbayev	
also	views	 this	 integration	as	a	means	of	 resolving	 the	 country’s	domestic	problems;	 for	
example,	he	has	sometimes	attempted	to	shift	economic	issues	to	the	level	of	the	Eurasian	
Economic	Community	(EAEC)	and	security	issues	to	the	forum	of	the	Collective	Security	
Treaty	Organisation	 (CSTO),	and	at	other	 times	 to	dialogue	with	NATO.	Astana	has	also	
drawn	on	 ‘Eurasian’	 ideas	on	 such	occasions,	presenting	 them	as	an	explanation	 for	 the	
special	characteristics	of	the	country,	which	like	Russia	is	situated	on	two	continents	(see	
footnote	38).	More	information	on	integration	projects	will	be	provided	in	the	next	chapter.
248	 Aleksandra	 Jarosiewicz,	 ‘Kazakhstan	 distances	 itself	 from	 Moscow’s	 integration	 pro-
jects’,	 EastWeek,	 OSW,	 23	 January	 2013,	 http://www.osw.waw.pl/en/publikacje/analy-
ses/2013-01-23/kazakhstan-distances-itself-moscows-integration-projects
	 Before	 that,	 at	 the	Kazakh-Turkish	business	 forum	 in	 Istanbul	 on	 12	October	 2012,	Naz-
arbayev	said:	“When	the	last	Kazakh	Khan	was	killed	in	1861,	we	became	a	colony	of	the	
Russian	Empire	and	then	of	the	Soviet	Union.	Kazakhs	have	nearly	lost	their	national	tradi-
tions,	customs,	language	and	religion	over	the	past	150	years.	We	proclaimed	our	independ-
ence	in	1991	with	the	help	of	the	Almighty.”	http://inform.kz/rus/article/2502148
249	 Dmitri	Trenin	has	noted	that	“for	Moscow,	Astana	is	not	part	of	the	problem	[security	in	
Central	Asia,	added	by	WG]	but	a	key	element	of	the	solution	to	all	problems	of	this	region.”	
(Дмитрий Тренин,	Post-Imperium...,	op. cit.,	page	177).
80
O
SW
 S
TU
D
IE
S 
 4
/2
01
4
nomic	interests,	and	it	has	been	impossible	to	remove	the	existing	differences	
over	the	past	twenty	years.	As	has	already	been	mentioned,	Moscow	wants	to	
maintain	its	dominant	position	in	the	transport	of	Central	Asian	oil	and	gas	to	
global	 (above	all,	European)	markets.	 In	turn,	Kazakhstan	has	been	making	
efforts	to	undermine	this	position	and	reduce	its	dependence	on	the	transport	
routes	running	through	Russia.	In	the	medium	term,	Russia	will	maintain	and	
even	strengthen	its	position	(following	the	planned	increase	in	the	transport	
capacity	of	the	Tengiz–Novorossiysk	oil	pipeline250.	This	situation	may	change	
towards	the	end	of	the	decade,	when	production	at	the	Kashagan	field	starts	
and	the	planned	large	exports	of	oil	via	the	Caspian	Sea	commence251.
Nevertheless,	such	disagreements	are	unlikely	to	affect	the	close	co-operation	
of	the	two	countries,	and	the	emerging	tension	will	most	probably	be	soothed	
(like	before).	In	addition	to	the	factors	mentioned	above,	this	will	be	influenced	
by	their	shared	fear	of	destabilisation	in	the	entire	region	following	the	wind-
up	of	the	ISAF	mission	in	Afghanistan,	and	in	the	context	of	a	possible	succes-
sion	crisis	in	Uzbekistan252.
250	 The	Caspian	Pipeline	Consortium	(CPC),	which	is	the	pipeline’s	owner	and	operator,	final-
ly	decided	on	15	December	2010	to	increase	the	route’s	annual	capacity	from	the	present	
28	million	to	67	million	tonnes	of	oil.	Currently,	around	75%	of	Kazakhstan’s	exported	oil	
is	 transferred	via	Russia	 (the	pipeline	 running	 to	Novorossiysk	 carries	 around	40%	of	
Kazakh	oil	exports).	Kazakhstan	also	exports	oil	via	the	Caspian	Sea	and	the	Caucasus	
(around	15%)	and	directly	to	China	(around	10%).	The	greater	part	of	Kazakh	oil	(around	
75%)	is	sent	to	the	Black	Sea	basin,	from	where	it	is	directed	to	international	(including	
European)	markets.
251	 Aleksandra	Jarosiewicz,	‘Russia	as	the	main	corridor	for	oil	export	from	Kazakhstan’,	East­
Week,	OSW,	29	December	2010,	http://www.osw.waw.pl/en/publikacje/analyses/2010-12-29/
russia-main-corridor-oil-export-kazakhstan	
252	 A	 succession	 crisis	 is	 also	 possible	 in	 Kazakhstan	 itself.	 It	 is	 currently	 difficult	 to	 pre-
dict	how	power	will	be	transferred	and	to	what	extent	the	next	leader	will	continue	Naz-
arbayev’s	policies	(for	example,	concerning	the	degree	of	participation	in	integration	pro-
jects,	and	with	regard	to	ethnic	minorities).
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iii. the Multilateral and international context
1. central asia in Moscow’s integration initiatives
The	integration	of	the	post-Soviet	area	is	a	top	priority	issue	in	Russian	foreign	
policy.	 The	Concept	 of	 the	 Foreign	Policy	 of	 the	Russian	 Federation	 adopted	
on	12	February	2013	provides	that	Moscow	will	“actively	support	the	Eurasian	
economic	integration	process,	working	together	with	Belarus	and	Kazakhstan	
towards	 the	 transformation	 of	 the	 Eurasian	 Economic	 Community	 and	 the	
establishment	of	 the	Eurasian	Economic	Union,	contribute	to	engagement	of	
other	EAEC	Member	States	in	this	process,	take	steps	to	further	develop	and	
improve	mechanisms	and	the	legal	and	regulatory	framework	of	the	Customs	
Union	and	 the	Common	Economic	Space,	help	strengthen	 the	Eurasian	Eco-
nomic	 Commission	 as	 a	 common	 standing	 regulatory	 body	 of	 the	 Customs	
Union	and	the	Common	Economic	Space.”	The	Eurasian	Economic	Union,	also	
referred	to	as	 the	Eurasian	Union	(EAU),	which	 is	planned	to	be	 the	crown-
ing	achievement	of	the	initiated	integration	projects	–	a	structure	similar	to	
the	European	Union,	 albeit	with	 some	modifications	–	 is	 expected	 “not	only	
to	make	the	best	use	of	mutually	beneficial	economic	ties	in	the	CIS	space	but	
also	to	become	a	model	of	association	open	to	other	states,	a	model	that	would	
determine	the	future	of	the	Commonwealth	states.	The	new	union	that	is	being	
formed	on	the	basis	of	universal	integration	principles	is	designed	to	serve	as	
an	effective	link	between	Europe	and	the	Asia-Pacific	region”253.
It	 can	be	concluded	 that	Moscow	wants	 to	 cover	 the	entire	CIS	by	 this	kind	
of	deeper	integration.	However,	as	proven	by	the	experiences	of	the	last	two	
decades,	this	goal	appears	quite	unrealistic.	In	effect,	the	‘broad’	integration,	
covering	a	 larger	number	of	 countries	will	not	guarantee	 the	establishment	
of	closer	relations	between	them,	while,	apart	from	Russia,	only	two	or	three	
countries	at	most	are	interested	in	the	‘deep’	integration.	Moscow	does	not	con-
ceal	that	it	would	most	of	all	like	to	see	Ukraine	in	the	structures	it	has	been	
creating.	However,	at	present,	the	only	partners	Russia	can	rely	on	are	Kazakh-
stan	and	Belarus,	which	have	taken	part	in	all	its	initiatives254.	The	other	two	
members	 of	 the	 economic	 projects	 are	 currently	Kyrgyzstan	 and	Tajikistan	
253	 http://www.mid.ru/brp_4.nsf/0/76389FEC168189ED44257B2E0039B16D
254	 Alexey	Malashenko	has	noted	that	the	announced	EAU	is	currently	“a	union	between	Rus-
sia	and	Kazakhstan	with	weak	and	economically	helpless	Belarus	tacked	on	because	its	gov-
ernment	hopes	to	use	it	as	a	means	for	building	more	advantageous	relations	with	Russia”	
(‘The	Fight	for	Influence	...’,	op. cit.,	page	49).
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(they	have	already	joined	some	of	the	structures,	and	are	expecting	accession	
to	others;	furthermore,	it	was	reported	on	3	September	2013	that	Armenia	had	
decided	to	join	the	Customs	Union255).	If	not	for	the	Central	Asian	states,	Rus-
sia’s	only	constant	partner	would	have	been	Belarus.	Therefore,	Moscow	needs	
this	region	in	the	context	of	its	integration	projects.	
Due	 to	problems	with	reconciling	 the	 ‘broad’	and	 the	 ‘deep’	 integration,	 the	
Russian	government	has,	without	having	declared	so,	 in	practice	chosen	the	
latter	version	at	the	beginning	of	second	decade	of	this	century.	One	proof	of	
this	was	Moscow’s	determination	and	haste	in	setting	up	the	Customs	Union256,	
which	was	officially	established	on	1	July	2010	but	still	has	only	three	member	
states:	Russia,	Kazakhstan	and	Belarus.	On	18	November	2011,	the	presidents	of	
these	three	states	signed	a	declaration	of	economic	integration	based	on	WTO	
rules	and	standards	(which	envisages	the	establishment	of	the	Eurasian	Eco-
nomic	Union257	by	 the	beginning	of	2015)	and	an	agreement	establishing	 the	
Eurasian	Economic	Commission	(EEC)	as	the	standing	regulatory	authority	of	
the	Customs	Union	and	the	Common	Economic	Space.	The	commission	became	
the	first	supranational	decision-making	body	 in	 the	post-Soviet	area	 (whose	
competences	cover	the	current	operation	of	the	CU	and	the	CES)258.
255	 Szymon	Ananicz,	 ‘Armenia	 turns	away	 from	 the	EU’,	EastWeek,	OSW,	4	September	 2013,	
http://www.osw.waw.pl/en/publikacje/analyses/2013-09-04/armenia-turns-away-eu	
256	 The	first	economic	organisation	of	 former	Soviet	republics	was	the	CIS,	as	part	of	which	
a	number	of	structures	were	already	established	in	the	mid-1990s	aiming	at	the	integra-
tion	of	the	consenting	parties	(the	agreement	envisaging	the	establishment	of	an	economic	
union	of	1993,	the	1994	agreement	on	the	free	trade	zone	and	the	1995	agreement	between	
Russia,	Belarus	and	Kazakhstan	setting	up	a	customs	union).	These	structures	were	not	put	
into	operation.	On	10	October	2000,	Russia,	Kazakhstan,	Belarus,	Kyrgyzstan	and	Tajik-
istan	set	up	the	Eurasian	Economic	Community	(EAEC	or	EurAsEC,	in	Russian	Евразийское 
экономическое сообщество, ЕврАзЭС),	which	is	still	formed	by	the	same	members	(Uzbek-
istan	belonged	to	the	EAEC	in	2006–2008).	Its	goals	have	included	establishing	a	common	
market	in	its	member	states	by	developing	a	single	policy	for	tariffs,	prices,	customs,	etc.	
The	next	stage	of	integration	was	marked	by	the	establishment	on	1	July	2010	of	the	Customs	
Union	(CU,	in	Russian	Таможенный союз, ТС),	which	covered	the	EAEC’s	‘hard	core’	of	Rus-
sia,	Kazakhstan	and	Belarus.	Internal	customs	controls	in	the	CU	area	were	lifted	one	year	
later.	On	9	December	2010,	the	presidents	of	the	three	CU	member	states	signed	a	declara-
tion	establishing	 the	Common	Economic	Space	 (CES,	 in	Russian Единое экономическое 
пространство, ЕЭП)	 aimed	 at	 a	 comprehensive	 economic	 integration	 of	 these	 countries.	
The	CES	was	launched	on	1	January	2012.	No	new	members	have	joined	the	CU	or	the	CES	as	
yet	(these	projects	are	mutually	connected;	the	Common	Economic	Space	is	a	format	avail-
able	to	the	member	states	of	the	Customs	Union).	For	more	on	Russian	integration	projects,	
see	Iwona	Wiśniewska,	‘Eurasian	Integration.	Russia’s	attempt	at	the	economic	unification	
of	the	Post-Soviet	area’,	OSW Studies,	no.	44,	July	2013.
257	 EAEU:	in	Russian	Евразийский экономический союз, ЕЭС.
258	 Furthermore,	a	month	before,	on	18	October	2011,	an	agreement	setting	up	the	Free	Trade	
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While	focusing	on	deepening	relations	with	its	several	closest	partners,	Mos-
cow	has	not	given	up	the	idea	of	 ‘broad’	integration,	which	remains	its	stra-
tegic	goal.	One	proof	of	this	was	the	campaign	launched	in	midsummer	2013	
to	induce	Ukraine,	Moldova	and	Armenia	to	join	Russia’s	integration	projects.
The	 integration	projects	 are	 important	 for	Moscow	 in	 two	 aspects:	 the	 eco-
nomic	and	the	geopolitical.	 In	economic	terms,	they	are	expected	to	be	a	re-
sponse	primarily	to	China’s	economic	expansion.	As	regards	geopolitics,	they	
are	supposed	to	prove	that	Russia	is	a	major	power	and	offer	it	a	specific	kind	
of	capital,	and	advantage	in	relations	with	other	global	players259.	If	all	the	pro-
jects	were	implemented,	Russia	could	gain	the	hegemony	it	desires	in	the	CIS	
area.	However,	more	post-Soviet	countries	would	have	to	participate	in	this,	
especially	Ukraine,	and	in	Central	Asia	at	least	Kyrgyzstan	and	Tajikistan,	as	
mentioned	by	Vladimir	Putin260.	This	is	why	Moscow,	having	achieved	the	tem-
porary	success	which	the	beginnings	of	the	Customs	Union’s	operation	should	
be	seen	as,	has	not	given	up	the	idea	of	‘broad’,	integration	and	is	continuing	
its	 efforts	 to	attract	 these	 countries	 to	 the	Customs	Union	and	 the	Common	
Economic	Space261	–	which	has	given	rise	to	suspicions	that	it	wants	to	rebuild	
its	empire262.	These	attempts	(as	shown	by	various	statements	and	declarations	
Area	(FTA,	in	Russian	Зона свободной торговли, ЗСТ)	for	CIS	countries	was	signed.	The	
countries	which	joined	the	FTA	were	Russia,	Kazakhstan,	Belarus,	Armenia,	Moldova	and	
Ukraine,	as	well	as	Uzbekistan	in	spring	2013.
259	 Aleksandra	 Jarosiewicz,	Kamil	Kłysiński,	 Iwona	Wiśniewska,	 ‘Common	Economic	 Space:	
another	step	towards	integration	focused	on	Russia’,	EastWeek,	OSW,	15	December	2010:	“By	
strengthening	and	solidifying	its	neighbours’	interdependency,	Russia	may	act	as	the	rep-
resentative	of	the	entire	bloc	of	countries	(Kazakhstan	and	Belarus)	in	its	relations	with	the	
EU,	which	will	strengthen	Moscow’s	position	towards	Brussels.	For	this	reason	Russia	is	also	
now	especially	concerned	with	making	its	model	for	integrating	the	region’s	other	countries	
appear	convincing,	especially	to	Ukraine	(which	is	currently	uninterested	in	this	project).	
This	would	significantly	increase	the	potential	of	the	CES,	hence	its	 importance.	By	mov-
ing	towards	the	creation	of	the	CES,	Moscow	is	working	to	present	it	as	an	attractive	plan	
for	integration	in	this	region.”,	http://www.osw.waw.pl/en/publikacje/analyses/2010-12-15/
common-economic-space-another-step-towards-integration-focused-russia
260	 In	an	article	published	on	3	October	2011	in	Izvestia	newspaper,	following	the	announcement	
of	his	decision	that	he	would	run	for	the	presidency	again:	http://izvestia.ru/news/502761
261	 This	is	important	for	Moscow,	even	though	these	are	small	economies	and	unattractive	out-
lets,	and	despite	the	fact	that	neither	Bishkek	nor	Dushanbe	is	capable	of	implementing	the	
required	regulations	or	effectively	combating	smuggling	on	the	CU	borders,	and	regardless	
of	the	fact	that	the	free	movement	of	workers	is	likely	to	increase	the	number	of	Kyrgyz	and	
Tajik	expatriate	workers	in	Russia,	which	could	give	rise	to	new	social	tensions	there	(see	
e.g.	Arkady	Moshes,	 ‘Will	Ukraine	Join	(and	Save)	the	Eurasian	Custom	Union?’, PONARS 
Eurasia Policy Memo	247,	IV	2013).
262	 For	example,	the	US	Secretary	of	State	Hillary	Clinton	spoke	of	the	“move	to	re-Sovietise	the	
area”	(reconstruct	the	former	USSR)	during	lecture	in	Dublin	on	6	December	2012.	Uzbek-
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containing	references	to	the	aforementioned	foreign	policy	concept)	have	be-
come	more	intense	since	the	end	of	2012263.
Whatever	 the	 forecasts	 for	 the	 future	 operation	 of	 the	CU,	 the	CES	 and	 the	
EAEU,	 there	 are	 also	 opinions	 that	Moscow’s	 integration	 efforts	 could	 com-
pletely	ruin	 its	 influence	 in	Central	Asia	and	even	 throughout	 the	CIS264;	 its	
partners	in	these	structures	are	strongly	concerned	about	the	asymmetry	of	
relations	resulting	from	the	disproportion	in	the	potentials	of	Russia	and	the	
other	member	states	(for	example,	Kazakhstan’s	GDP	is	over	11	times	smaller	
than	Russia’s).	Kazakhstan,	as	mentioned	before,	also	fears	that	Moscow	could	
insist	on	political	 integration	 (President	Nazarbayev	has	emphasised	on	nu-
merous	occasions	that	his	country	is	participating	solely	in	the	creation	of	an	
economic	union),	while	the	candidates	to	join	these	structures,	Kyrgyzstan	and	
Tajikistan,	are	afraid	of	being	dominated	by	Russia	and	Kazakhstan	(Bishkek	
seems	more	ready	for	integration	at	present,	while	Dushanbe	is	using	the	ex-
cuse	that	it	has	no	common	border	with	the	Customs	Union	member	states265;	
experts	from	these	two	countries	have	warned	that	their	accession	to	the	CU	
will	entail	a	radical	increase	in	prices,	partly	resulting	from	the	requirement	
to	reduce	trade	with	China)266.	The	accession	of	the	two	smallest	Central	Asian	
countries	 to	 the	Eurasian	 structures	would	 show	Moscow’s	 real	 integration	
potential	but	also	its	limitations;	Russia	is	no	longer	capable	of	attracting	Uz-
bekistan	or	Turkmenistan,	while	Kazakhstan’s	participation	in	the	projects	is	
to	a	great	extent	a	result	of	Astana’s	policy	of	balancing	the	Chinese	influence.	
istan’s	President	 Islam	Karimov	fiercely	opposed	the	 integration	processes	 (as	 leading	 to	
the	reconstruction	of	the	empire)	a	year	before:	‘Президент Узбекистана Ислам Каримов 
выступил против интеграционного процесса, инициированного Россией’,	Fergananews.
com,	14	December	2011,	http://www.fergananews.com/news.php?id=17790&mode=snews
263	 At	present,	Kyrgyzstan	is	the	most	likely	to	join	this	structure,	followed	by	Tajikistan	and	
Armenia.	Moscow	still	views	Ukraine’s	participation	as	vital:	a	memorandum	on	enhanc-
ing	co-operation	between	Ukraine	and	the	Eurasian	Economic	Commission	was	signed	on	
31	May	 2013	 (Tadeusz	 Iwański,	 Szymon	Kardaś,	 ‘Ukraine	 closer	 to	 the	 Customs	Union?’,	
EastWeek,	OSW,	 5	 June	 2013,	 http://www.osw.waw.pl/en/publikacje/analyses/2013-06-05/
ukraine-closer-to-customs-union	).
264	 Alexey	Malashenko,	‘The	Fight	for	Influence	...’,	op. cit.,	page	53.
265	 Tajikistan,	which	joined	the	WTO	on	2	March	2013,	is	of	the	opinion	that	its	quick	accession	
to	the	CU	would	not	offer	it	any	tangible	benefits,	given	this	situation.	
266	 Iwona	Wiśniewska,	 ‘Eurasian	 Integration...’,	op. cit.	 Since	 the	Customs	Union	was	estab-
lished	and	the	customs	duty	rates	were	raised	to	the	level	applicable	in	Russia,	many	goods,	
including	food	and	cars,	have	also	become	more	expensive	in	Kazakhstan	to	the	dissatisfac-
tion	of	the	public.	(Aleksandra	Jarosiewicz,	‘Kazakhstan	distances...’,	op. cit.).
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2.  the csto as a means of military and political integration
The	 raison d’être of	 the	 Eurasian	 Economic	 Community	 and	 all	 the	 entities	
which	have	emerged	from	it	is	economic	integration	(regardless	of	Moscow’s	
geopolitical	goals).	In	turn,	the	Collective	Security	Treaty	Organisation	(known	
in	1992–2002	as	the	union	of	countries-parties	to	the	Collective	Security	Trea-
ty)	was	forged	as	a	political	and	defence	alliance.	At	the	peak	of	its	popular-
ity,	 its	members	 included	 up	 to	 nine	 of	 the	 former	 Soviet	 republics,	 among	
them	four	from	Central	Asia	(all	but	Turkmenistan),	which	made	it	the	second	
largest	structure	in	the	post-Soviet	area	after	the	CIS.	In	the	1990s,	the	CSTO	
guaranteed	Russia,	which	was	the	dominant	power,	that	it	would	maintain	its	
influence	in	the	member	states	while	being	forced	to	reduce	its	financial	out-
lays.	This	influence	was	manifested	especially	through	the	military	presence	
(bases)	and	also	 the	partners’	dependence	on	Russian	weapons	 (which	were	
supplied	to	them	at	attractive	prices).	For	their	part,	the	other	members	shared	
the	belief,	which	has	weakened	over	time,	that	in	exchange	for	their	loyalty	
Moscow	is	ready	 to	guarantee	 them	security.	They	have	also	benefited	 from	
supplies	of	weapons	and	uniforms,	training	at	Russian	military	academies,	etc.	
Russia’s	position	was	reinforced	when	the	union	of	states	was	transformed	
in	2002	into	a	full-scale	international	organisation.	Only	then	could	it	talk	to	
the	USA,	which	led	the	coalition	operation	in	Afghanistan,	as	an	equal	part-
ner	and	the	leader	of	a	group	of	states;	the	reorganisation	of	the	CSTO	and	the	
consolidation	of	the	Shanghai	Co-operation	Organisation	were	respectively	
the	responses	from	Russia	and	from	Russia	&	China	to	the	emergence	of	the	
West,	and	especially	the	United	States,	as	a	new	major	player	in	this	region.	
The	Collective	Operational	 Reaction	 Forces	 (CORF)267,	 consisting	 of	 around	
4000	 soldiers,	were	 established	 in	 2009	 as	 part	 of	 the	 CSTO.	 These	 forces	
have	taken	part	in	a	number	of	large-scale	exercises.	Meanwhile,	the	num-
ber	 of	 the	 CSTO	member	 states	was	 reduced	 to	 six	 (periodically	 seven268),	
three	(or	four)	of	which	represented	Central	Asia.	Russia	was	still	aiming	to	
monopolise	the	collective	security	system	in	Central	Asia,	and	to	receive	the	
strongest	possible	mandate	for	its	actions.	For	example,	the	declaration	of	co-
operation	between	the	CSTO	and	the	UN	signed	on	18	March	2010	served	this	
purposes,	as	it	meant	an	acknowledgement	of	the	CSTO’s	ability	to	contribute	
to	security	at	a	global	level.	
267	 Collective	Rapid	Reaction	Forces	previously	existed	as	part	of	the	CSTO.	In	late	2007/early	
2008	they	consisted	of	10	battalions:	5	Russian,	2	Kazakh,	2	Tajik	and	1	Kyrgyz.
268	 Uzbekistan	rejoined	the	organisation	between	2006	and	2012.
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The	passive	stance	taken	by	the	CSTO	(and	Russia	itself)	on	the	Uzbek-Kyrgyz	
ethnic	clashes	which	broke	out	on	10	June	2010	in	southern	Kyrgyzstan	has	
undermined	 the	 organisation’s	 reliability.	 On	 12	 June,	 Kyrgyzstan’s	 acting	
president,	Roza	Otunbayeva,	 asked	Russia	 to	bring	 its	peacekeeping	 forces	
into	the	conflict	area.	However,	Moscow	ruled	out	getting	involved,	restrict-
ing	 its	moves	 to	 sending	more	personnel	 to	 the	Kant	air	base.	 In	 turn,	 the	
secretaries	 of	 the	 security	 counsels	 of	 the	 CSTO	member	 states,	 who	 had	
gathered	at	an	emergency	meeting	in	Moscow,	promised	only	military-tech-
nical	(excluding	weapon	supplies)	and	logistic	assistance	to	Bishkek.	Russia’s	
decision	not	to	send	its	military	contingent	could	have	been	caused	by	resist-
ance	from	its	partners	(especially	Uzbekistan,	but	also	possibly	Kazakhstan).	
Nevertheless,	 the	most	 likely	reason	seems	 to	be	Moscow’s	 insufficient	de-
termination,	resulting	from	a	fear	of	becoming	involved	in	a	long-lasting	and	
violent	ethnic	conflict,	which	would	have	entailed	high	financial	costs	and	
risked	a	loss	of	face269.
The	official	reason	for	not	taking	any	action	at	all	was	the	fact	that	the	CSTO’s	
statute	 did	 not	 provide	 for	 an	 intervention	 in	 case	 of	 an	 internal	 crisis	 in	
a	member	state;	intervention	was	reserved	only	for	external	threats,	a	pretext	
Moscow	used	to	reinforce	this	formula.	The	crisis	reaction	strategy	adopted	at	
the	end	of	2010	already	envisaged	joint	actions	to	protect	stability	of	the	mem-
ber	states,	and	the	‘Stance	on	the	principles	of	emergency	response	from	the	
member	states	of	the	CSTO’,	adopted	one	year	later,	provided	for	the	possibility	
of	using	the	Collective	Operational	Reaction	Forces	in	situations	where	a	giv-
en	country	is	unable	to	overcome	the	crisis	by	itself270.	Thus	Russia	gained	an	
instrument	which	allowed	it	to	legally	launch	an	intervention	in	any	partner	
state.	It	seems	that	this	instrument	was	prepared	in	case	the	‘Arab	Spring’,	or	
another	wave	of	public	protests	and	revolts	following	the	so-called	 ‘coloured	
revolutions’	that	Moscow	feared,	spilled	onto	the	post-Soviet	area.	Since	these	
fears	were	shared	by	the	leaders	of	other	CTSO	member	states,	especially	those	
from	Central	Asia,	no	one	opposed	the	adoption	of	the	‘Stance’.
269	 Wojciech	Górecki,	‘Russia’s	position	on	…’,	op. cit.
270	 ‘События в Кыргызстане подвигли ОДКБ к принятию нового Положения о порядке 
реагирования на кризисную ситуацию’,	Kyrtag.kg,	10	December	2010,	http://www.kyrtag.
kg/?q=ru/news/2734	
	 ‘В Москве прошла очередная сессия Совета коллективной безопасности ОДКБ’,	Regnum.
ru,	20	December	2011,	http://www.regnum.ru/news/1481734.html
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Pursuant	 to	 the	 CSTO’s	 statute,	 its	 member	 states	 consult	 and	 coordinate	
their	positions	on	foreign	policy	issues	and	regional	security	problems271.	In	
December	2011,	the	leaders	of	the	organisation’s	member	states	agreed	that	
third-party	military	 bases	 could	 only	 be	 deployed	 on	 their	 territories	 fol-
lowing	consultations	with	the	other	partners272.	This	was	a	success	for	Rus-
sia,	since	the	United	States	could	not	entrench	its	military	presence	in	Kyr-
gyzstan,	 Tajikistan	 and	 Kazakhstan	 after	 the	 Afghan	mission	 ended	 (this	
did	not	 concern	Uzbekistan,	which	 left	 the	CSTO	half	 a	 year	 later),	 unless	
Moscow	agreed	to	 it.	Meanwhile	Russia,	without	having	consulted	anyone,	
opened	 a	 transit	 base	 in	 Ulyanovsk	 for	 the	 needs	 of	 NATO	 in	 September	
2012273.	Regardless	of	the	assurances	that	NATO	would	only	be	allowed	to	use	
the	civilian	facilities	there,	this	proves	that	Moscow	treats	the	CSTO	and	its	
commitments	to	its	allies	as	it	sees	convenient.
As	with	economic	integration,	Russia’s	military	and	political	co-operation	pro-
jects	 are	 to	 a	 great	 extent	based	on	Central	Asia.	Three	out	of	 the	 six	CSTO	
member	states	are	from	this	region.	The	ISAF	withdrawal	from	Afghanistan	
will	be	a	test	of	their	loyalty	to	Moscow.	It	cannot	be	ruled	out	that	they	could	
resort	 to	 formal	 and	 legal	 tricks	 to	 legalise	 some	 form	 of	Western	military	
presence	on	their	territories	after	2014	in	exchange	for	financial	and	material	
benefits	(such	as	weapons	left	by	the	withdrawing	armies,	which	are	more	at-
tractive	than	Russian	arms).	
The	economic	and	military	components	may	also	become	part	of	the	Eurasian	
Economic	Union/Eurasian	Union	currently	being	formed.	However,	it	is	quite	
unlikely	that	 the	CSTO	will	be	disbanded	after	 the	union	has	been	formally	
set	up.	In	turn,	the	existence	of	the	Eurasian	Economic	Community,	and	prob-
ably	also	of	the	Customs	Union	and	the	Common	Economic	Space,	may	become	
pointless.	
271	 http://www.dkb.gov.ru/b/azg.htm
272	 http://www.odkb.gov.ru/session_fortnight/a.htm
273	 http://politykawschodnia.pl/index.php/2012/09/25/natowski-tranzyt-przez-rosje-juz-mo-
zliwy/	
See	 the	 section	discussing	 the	prospects	of	winding	up	 the	 ISAF	mission	below	 in	 this	
chapter.	
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3. Moscow vs. the region in the context of the sco
The	Shanghai	Co-operation	Organisation	was	established	in	2001	as	a	conse-
quence	of	the	transformation	of	the	‘Shanghai	Five’	(formed	by	China	and	the	
former	Soviet	republics	which	bordered	on	it:	Russia,	Kazakhstan,	Kyrgyzstan	
and	Tajikistan274),	which	Uzbekistan	joined	as	well.	The	organisation’s	makeup	
has	not	changed	since	then,	but	five	other	countries	have	been	granted	observ-
er	status	(Mongolia,	 India,	 Iran,	Pakistan	and	Afghanistan),	and	three	more	
‘partner	in	dialogue’	status	(Belarus,	Sri	Lanka	and	Turkey).
The	tasks	of	the	Shanghai	Co-operation	Organisation	include	promoting	sta-
bility	in	the	member	states	(especially	in	Central	Asia)	and	good	neighbourly	
relations	between	 them;	 jointly	combating	 the	 ‘three	evils’	 (separatism,	 ter-
rorism	and	extremism);	fostering	effective	regional	co-operation	in	all	areas	
(including	politics,	trade	and	economy,	defence,	science	and	technology,	cul-
ture,	 etc.);	 establishing	 and	maintaining	 relations	with	 other	 countries	 and	
international	 organisations.	 On	 the	 one	 hand,	 the	 very	 broad	 spectrum	 of	
the	SCO’s	goals	makes	this	organisation	amorphous,	and	on	the	other	allows	
a	great	variety	of	initiatives	to	be	implemented	as	part	of	it	(security,	economy,	
transport,	protection	of	the	natural	environment,	and	many	others).
The	 Shanghai	 Co-operation	Organisation	 aspires	 to	 be	 Eurasia’s	 leading	 or-
ganisation	(the	areas	of	all	its	member	states	taken	together	form	60%	of	Eura-
sia’s	 territory)	 and	 to	 counterbalance	 the	global	dominance	of	 the	USA	 (and	
especially	the	US	military	presence	in	the	region)275.	The	ambivalent	attitude	
towards	the	coalition	of	powers	present	in	Afghanistan	(in	practice	–	towards	
the	United	States),	as	represented	by	China	and	Russia,	which	predominate	in	
this	 organisation,	 has	 been	manifested	 in	 the	 above-mentioned	 declaration	
adopted	on	5	July	2005	at	the	SCO	summit	in	Astana,	which	stated:	
Given	the	fact	that	the	active	war	phase	of	the	anti-terrorist	operation	has	been	
closed,	the	member	states	of	the	Shanghai	Co-operation	Organisation	believe	
that	 it	 is	necessary	for	relevant	participants	of	the	anti-terrorist	coalition	to	
determine	the	final	timeframe	of	their	temporary	use	of	the	aforementioned	
274	 The	aim	of	the	‘Five’	was	to	settle	border	issues	between	China	and	its	neighbours.	
275	 Krzysztof	Strachota,	 ‘The	Summit	of	the	Shanghai	Co-operation	Organisation’,	EastWeek,	
OSW,	 13	 June	 2012,	 http://www.osw.waw.pl/en/publikacje/analyses/2012-06-13/summit-
shanghai-cooperation-organisation	
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infrastructure	facilities	and	presence	of	their	military	contingents	in	the	SCO	
member	states.
However	it	was	also	stated	that	“We	support	and	will	continue	supporting	the	
efforts	of	the	international	coalition	engaged	in	the	anti-terrorist	operation	in	
Afghanistan.”276
A	number	of	specialist	agendas	and	co-operation	programmes	exist	as	part	of	
the	organisation.	The	Regional	Anti-Terrorist	Structure	(SCO	RATS)277	formed	
on	7	June	2002	is	in	charge	of	coordinating	the	member	states’	fight	against	ter-
rorism	and	extremism	(for	example,	a	common	database	has	been	created	and	
draft	international	legal	solutions	in	this	area	have	been	prepared).	Anti-ter-
rorist	military	exercises	(since	2003)	and	annual	exercises	codenamed	‘Peace-
keeping	Missions’,	in	which	primarily	Chinese	and	Russian	units	participate,	
have	been	held	since	2005	as	part	of	the	SCO278.
In	September	2003,	 the	government	heads	of	 the	SCO	member	states	signed	
a	‘Programme	of	Multilateral	Economic	and	Trade	Co-operation’	to	last	twen-
ty	years.	It	envisaged	boosting	trade,	as	well	as	co-operation	in	such	areas	as	
energy,	transport,	agriculture	and	telecommunications,	etc,	and	in	the	longer	
term,	establishing	a	free	trade	area	within	the	framework	of	the	organisation.	
However,	 these	 provisions	 have	 remained	 mere	 declarations.	 The	 Business	
Council	consisting	of	representatives	of	the	SCO	member	states’	financial	cir-
cles	was	formed	in	June	2006.	A	proposal	to	set	up	an	SCO	Energy	Club	was	
made	in	December	2012.	Many	more	such	initiatives	have	been	put	forward.
China	 and	 Russia	 view	 the	 SCO	 as	 a	 convenient	 forum	 for	 striking	 deals	
and	neutralising	 tension	 in	Central	Asia.	Beijing	has	been	making	efforts	 to	
strengthen	the	instruments	available	to	the	SCO	in	the	areas	of	economic	co-
operation	and	security	(the	Economic	Development	Fund	was	established	upon	
its	 initiative).	Meanwhile,	Moscow	is	opposed	to	this,	as	 it	 fears	that	China’s	
potential	and	vigour	could	thwart	its	own	integration	projects.	To	avoid	com-
petition	between	the	SCO	and	the	EAEC/CES,	which	are	made	up	of	a	similar	
set	of	members	(where	Russia	and	its	imitated	structures	would	certainly	be	
276	 http://www.akorda.kz/ru/page/deklaratsiya-glav-gosudarstv-chlenov-shankhaiskoi-or-
ganizatsii-sotrudnichestva_1341805545
277	 http://www.ecrats.com/ru/rats_history/1805
278	 ‘Максим Семенов, Российско­китайские учения „Мирная миссия­2013” завершились на 
Урале’,	Vz.ru,	15	August	2013,	http://vz.ru/news/2013/8/15/645837.html
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less	appealing	than	the	Chinese	offer),	Moscow	supports	co-operation	between	
these	 two	 formats279,	which	 in	 turn	 is	contrary	 to	China’s	 interests.	For	 this	
reason,	Beijing	prefers	to	focus	on	bilateral	economic	relations,	while	not	giv-
ing	up	its	attempts	to	take	the	initiative	at	the	SCO,	which	is	also	an	essential	
matter	of	prestige	for	China.	Russia	sees	the	political	component	of	the	organi-
sation	as	more	important,	as	balancing	China’s	influence	and,	jointly	with	Chi-
na,	US	 influence	 in	 the	region.	As	regards	 the	military	component,	Moscow	
definitely	prefers	co-operation	with	the	Central	Asian	countries	as	part	of	the	
CSTO,	which	is	under	its	control	(preserving	the	monopoly	on	‘hard’	security	
in	the	region	is	vital	for	it).	The	conflict	between	the	two	visions	of	the	SCO	has	
adversely	affected	the	organisation’s	effectiveness.	However,	participation	in	
it	has	contributed	–	at	least	thus	far	–	to	the	prevention	of	open	conflicts,	espe-
cially	between	Russia	and	China280.
4.  the perspective of winding up the isaf mission in afghanistan
The	ability	to	respond	to	continuing	instability	in	Central	Asia,	and	to	the	de-
velopment	of	the	situation	in	Afghanistan	in	the	context	of	the	withdrawal	of	
the	 ISAF	mission	 from	Afghanistan	and	of	 the	US	presence	 from	the	region	
after	2014,	will	be	a	test	for	both	the	SCO	itself	and	for	the	influence	of	Russia	
and	China	in	this	organisation.	This	will	also	be	a	test	for	other	regional	or-
ganisations	and,	last	but	not	least,	for	the	governments	of	all	the	Central	Asian	
countries	individually.	The	possibility	that	selected	US	units	will	remain	in	Af-
ghanistan	(including	at	the	Bagram	base)	has	met	with	an	(officially)	negative	
reaction	from	Russia	and	a	reserved	response	from	China,	while	the	Central	
Asian	countries	have	adopted	an	ambiguous	stance.	It	seems	that	Uzbekistan,	
Kyrgyzstan,	and	probably	also	Tajikistan	would	be	ready	to	accept	the	presence	
of	US	military	facilities	on	their	territories	firstly	for	security	reasons	(fear	of	
the	Taliban	and	the	threats	spreading	from	Afghanistan:	radical	Islam,	terror-
ism	and	drugs),	and	secondly	for	financial	reasons	(leasing	fees,	and	possibly	
279	 Marcin	Kaczmarski,	‘The	bear...’,	op. cit.,	page	30-31.
280	 As	Alexey	Malashenko	has	noted,	“The	Central	Asian	countries	would	be	faced	with	the	
dilemma	of	deciding	whether	the	SCO	or	the	Eurasian	Union	would	offer	them	the	greater	
benefits,	in	essence	having	to	tacitly	choose	between	China	and	Russia.”	Alexey	Malashen-
ko,	‘The	Fight	for	Influence	...’,	op. cit.,	pages	64.	In	another	section,	he	writes:	“The	dynamic	
of	China’s	utilization	of	the	SCO	has	been	straightforward	and	consistent:	at	the	first	stage	
was	the	“Shanghai	Five”	to	settle	border	disputes;	the	second	stage	was	its	transformation	
into	the	SCO	to	provide	a	basis	for	economic	cooperation;	and	the	third	stage	has	been	to	
gradually	acquire	a	political	dimension.	China’s	role	has	grown	at	each	stage,	as	evidenced	
by	the	way	that	the	emerging	outline	of	the	SCO’s	cooperation	with	the	United	States	has	
begun	to	appear	closer	to	a	kind	of	U.S.-Chinese	cooperation.”	(Ibid.,	page	70).
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military	equipment,	 training,	 etc.)281.	At	 the	 same	 time,	 since	 the	 latter	 two	
countries	belong	to	the	CSTO,	they	must	obtain	Moscow’s	consent	to	this.
Regardless	of	Moscow’s	resistance	to	the	continuation	of	the	US	forces’	pres-
ence	in	Afghanistan	after	2014,	a	likelihood	expressed	on	numerous	occasions,	
this	scenario	 is	seen	as	beneficial	by	Russia,	since	otherwise	Russian	troops	
(and	those	of	Russia’s	allies	from	the	CSTO)	will	find	themselves	on	the	front	
lines	(assuming	that	Afghanistan	becomes	a	hotbed	of	aggressive,	expansive	
extremism).	This	is	directly	stated	in	the	Concept	of	the	Foreign	Policy	of	the	
Russian	Federation	of	12	February	2013:	
The	ongoing	crisis	in	Afghanistan	and	the	forthcoming	withdrawal	of	inter-
national	military	contingents	from	the	country	pose	a	great	security	threat	to	
Russia	and	other	CIS	members.	The	Russian	Federation	together	with	Afghani-
stan	and	concerned	countries,	the	United	Nations,	the	CIS,	the	CSTO,	the	SCO	
and	other	multilateral	institutions	including	Russia-NATO	projects,	will	make	
consistent	efforts	 to	find	a	 just	and	 lasting	political	solution	to	the	problems	
faced	by	 this	 country	with	due	 respect	 for	 the	 rights	 and	 interests	 of	 all	 its	
ethnic	groups	and	achieve	a	post-conflict	recovery	of	Afghanistan	as	a	peace-
loving	sovereign	neutral	state	with	stable	economy.	Comprehensive	measures	
to	 reduce	 terrorist	 threat	 from	 Afghanistan	 and	 eliminate	 or	 reduce	 illicit	
drug	production	and	traffic	in	a	significant	and	measurable	manner	will	be	an	
integral	part	of	those	efforts.	Russia	is	committed	to	further	intensifying	in-
ternational	efforts	under	the	auspices	of	the	UN	aimed	at	helping	Afghanistan	
and	its	neighbouring	states	to	meet	these	challenge.282
As	already	mentioned,	Russia	made	the	transit	base	in	Ulyanovsk	available	to	
NATO	in	September	2012;	this	fits	with	Moscow’s	ambivalent	stance	on	its	co-
operation	with	Washington,	which	can	be	summed	up	as	“ideological	confron-
tation	 and	 pragmatic	 co-operation”283.	 This	 co-operation	 covers	 the	 Afghan	
281	 Some	hints	of	this	have	also	been	made	by	Kazakhstan.	On	26	April	2013,	at	a	conference	of	
foreign	ministers	of	the	so-called	Istanbul	Process	regarding	Afghanistan,	President	Naz-
arbayev	suggested	that	the	Caspian	port	of	Aktau	could	be	used	by	NATO	member	states	as	
an	ISAF	mission	transit	port.	Wiadomości,	OSW,	29	April	2013,	http://www.osw.waw.pl/pl/
wiadomosci/2013-04-29
282	 http://www.mid.ru/brp_4.nsf/0/76389FEC168189ED44257B2E0039B16D	
283	 Witold	Rodkiewicz,	‘Ideological	confrontation	and	pragmatic	co-operation	–	Moscow’s	re-
cipe	 for	 its	 relations	with	Washington’,	EastWeek,	 OSW,	 6	March	 2013,	 http://www.osw.
waw.pl/en/publikacje/analyses/2013-03-06/ideological-confrontation-and-pragmatic-co-
operation-moscows-recipe	
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issue	among	others.	When	stating	the	reasons	for	opening	the	base,	at	a	meet-
ing	with	soldiers	from	airborne	units	stationed	in	Ulyanovsk,	President	Putin	
said	that	assistance	had	to	be	offered	to	NATO	forces	fighting	in	Afghanistan	so	
that	it	would	not	be	necessary	to	send	Russian	troops	there.	However,	he	also	
expressed	his	regret	that	the	states	engaged	in	the	operation	were	mainly	con-
cerned	about	how	they	would	withdraw	from	there:	“They	have	assumed	some	
responsibilities,	so	why	would	they	not	bring	the	issue	to	a	conclusion?”284.	Fur-
thermore,	Moscow	also	made	its	territory	available	for	the	transit	needs	of	the	
ISAF	operation	for	financial	reasons	(transit	charges),	and	because	it	wanted	to	
restrict	transit	via	the	Central	Asian	countries285.
Russia	is	taking	various	scenarios	into	account,	and	is	preparing	itself	for	vari-
ous	possibilities,	one	proof	of	which	is	its	active	engagement	in	a	broad	variety	
of	Afghanistan-related	 initiatives,	as	observed	since	 the	end	of	 the	previous	
decade,	such	as	its	successful	attempt	to	get	Afghanistan	granted	observer	sta-
tus	at	the	SCO	(this	took	place	at	the	beginning	of	June	2012).	It	appears	that	
Moscow	 thus	wanted	 to	 create	another	platform	 for	dialogue	with	Afghani-
stan,	and	also	to	have	another	means	of	influence	on	this	country	(especially	
if	US	forces	remain	there).	Another	format	set	up	in	2009	is	the	annual	meet-
ings	of	 the	presidents	 of	Russia,	Afghanistan,	Pakistan	and	Tajikistan,	dur-
ing	which	first	of	all	 issues	 linked	to	stabilising	Afghanistan	in	the	regional	
context	are	discussed,	including	drug	production	and	trafficking	issues	(this	
format	is	especially	valued	by	Moscow	since	neither	the	USA	nor	China	par-
ticipate	in	it).
At	this	moment	(February	2014),	nobody	still	knows	how	the	situation	in	the	re-
gion	will	develop	following	the	withdrawal	of	the	ISAF	mission,	and	especially	
whether	and	to	what	extent	the	security	conditions	(in	the	broad	meaning	of	
the	term)	will	deteriorate.	Intensive	diplomatic	consultations	to	this	effect	are	
underway,	in	which	representatives	of	global	powers	and	Central	Asian	coun-
tries	are	involved.	The	‘year	2014	problem’	(when	ISAF	is	withdrawn)	has	been	
284	 ‘Putin:	 Trzeba	 pomóc	NATO	w	Afganistanie’,	Rp.pl,	 1	 August	 2012,	 http://www.rp.pl/ar-
tykul/921231.html
285	 In	practice,	 the	Ulyanovsk	base	 is	not	used	by	NATO	precisely	foe	to	the	very	high	tran-
sit	 costs;	 only	one	 test	 cargo	 transit	has	been	 transported	using	 this	base	until	mid-Au-
gust	 2013	 (Forbes.ru,	 15	 August	 2013,	 http://www.forbes.ru/news/243493-tranzit-gruzov-
iz-afganistana-cherez-ulyanovsk-ostalsya-nevostrebovannym).	 US	 troops	 decided	 they	
would	 not	 use	 the	 base	 in	 October	 2013	 (‘США не будут использовать транспортный 
узел в Ульяновске’,	 Gazeta.ru,	 28	 October	 2013,	 http://www.gazeta.ru/politics/news	
/2013/10/28/n_3284597.shtml).
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given	a	great	amount	of	attention	in	the	media	and	in	expert	discussions	in	this	
region286.	According	to	the	more	pessimistic	scenarios,	the	region	will	be	desta-
bilised,	extremist	circles	will	gain	influence	and	the	flow	of	drugs	from	there	
will	 increase.	The	Central	Asian	 countries	 also	 fear	 an	 influx	of	 refugees287.	
Discussing	such	scenarios	may	turn	out	beneficial	for	Russia’s	position	in	Cen-
tral	Asia,	since	this	will	strengthen	the	belief	(which	is	still	shared	by	part	of	
the	elites)	that	in	the	case	of	real	threat	Russia	will	remain	the	only	guarantor	
of	security288.	On	the	other	hand,	a	quite	different	scenario	also	seems	likely,	
where	the	reduction	of	US	military	presence	and	even	a	return	to	power	for	
the	Taliban	in	Afghanistan	will	not	initially	affect	the	region’s	security	in	any	
essential	way,	since	Afghanistan’s	major	political	forces	will	be	focused	on	the	
internal	situation.	However,	it	cannot	be	ruled	out	that	in	the	case	of	a	long-
term	conflict	(and	especially	of	a	civil	war	in	Afghanistan),	ethnic	Tajiks	and	
Uzbeks	will	migrate	on	a	mass	scale	from	Afghanistan	to	Central	Asia,	which	
may	lead	to	various	kinds	of	tension	and	destabilise	the	situation	there.	
286	 Numerous	conferences,	seminars	and	round	table	discussions	devoted	to	 this	 issue	have	
been	held.	One	of	the	many	examples	wasthe	international	conference	hosted	by	the	Bishkek	
Liberal	 Club	 and	 the	 Friedrich	 Ebert	 Foundation	 under	 the	 title	 ‘Страны Центральной 
Азии: влияние глобальных игроков и перспективы развития’	(Central	Asian	countries:	
the	influence	of	global	players	and	development	prospects,	Bishkek	29–30	March	2013).
287	 On	22–26	April	2013,	representatives	of	the	UNHCR	mission	in	Kyrgyzstan	and	of	the	Kyr-
gyz	ministry	for	emergency	situations	developed	a	preliminary	plan	in	case	a	large	wave	of	
refugees	from	Afghanistan	comes	to	the	region.	(‘Кыргызстан подготовил план на случай 
потенциального притока в страну беженцев’,	 Fergananews.com,	 29	 April	 2013,	 http://
www.fergananews.com/news/20592).
288	 The	existence	of	this	belief,	which	is	very	difficult	to	notice	and	cannot	be	quantified,	was	
observed	 by	 the	 author	 of	 this	 paper	 during	 conversations	 with	 numerous	 representa-
tives	of	expert,	academic	and	journalist	circles	on	his	trips	to	Central	Asian	countries	in	
2010–2013.	In	the	author’s	subjective	opinion,	this	belief	is	strongest	in	Kyrgyzstan	and	less	
strong	in	Tajikistan,	and	is	also	sometimes	present	in	Kazakhstan.
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conclusions
Moscow’s	influence	in	Central	Asia	has	strongly	eroded	during	the	period	of	
over	two	decades	since	the	collapse	of	the	USSR.	This	process	has	slowed	down	
as	a	consequence	of	President	Vladimir	Putin’s	active	policy,	and	due	to	fear	
of	a	destabilisation	of	the	situation	in	Afghanistan,	in	the	face	of	which	local	
leaders	would	prefer	their	relations	with	Russia	not	to	deteriorate.	However,	
it	cannot	be	said	that	the	trend	has	been	reversed.	One	symbolic	example	is	
the	network	of	air	connections	formed	over	the	past	few	years.	The	most	con-
venient	flight	 transfers	 from	the	region	 to	 the	West	are	offered	by	 Istanbul,	
Frankfurt,	Vienna	and	Riga,	while	at	 the	beginning	of	this	century	Moscow	
was	practically	the	only	air	hub	available	in	the	post-Soviet	area	(with	the	ex-
ception	of	the	Baltic	states)289.
Another	proof	of	Moscow’s	dissipating	attractiveness	to	Central	Asian	coun-
tries	(and	in	broader	terms,	to	the	CIS)	is	the	number	of	member	states	in	the	
organisations	 it	 has	 established	 and	 supported	 over	 the	 past	 two	 decades.	
Twelve	countries	joined	the	Commonwealth	of	Independent	States	(established	
in	 1991),	 nine	 joined	 the	 Collective	 Security	 Treaty	Organisation	 (1992),	 five	
joined	 the	Eurasian	Economic	Community	 (2000),	and	 three	 joined	 the	Cus-
toms	Union	(2010).	In	Central	Asia,	Russia’s	influence	is	the	strongest	in	Kyr-
gyzstan,	 strong	 in	Tajikistan	and	 significant	 in	Kazakhstan	 (albeit	 skilfully	
balanced	by	Astana	with	Beijing’s	and	Washington’s	influences).	It	cannot	be	
successfully	challenged	 in	 the	short	 term,	although	China’s	 increasing	pres-
ence	and	Kazakhstan’s	consistent	emancipation	may	change	this	even	in	the	
medium	term.	It	seems	quite	unlikely	that	Moscow	will	be	able	to	regain	its	
influence	in	Uzbekistan	and	Turkmenistan,	and	even	less	likely	that	the	entire	
region	will	again	find	itself	within	the	Russian	zone	of	influence.	Being	aware	
of	this,	Moscow	will	attempt	at	least	to	contain	the	expansion	of	other	actors	
(especially	in	the	area	of	security).	
All	this	considered,	Russia	is	still	an	important	and	at	times	even	key	player	in	
the	region.	Its	being	‘Eurasian’,	which	has	been	used	as	an	ideological	basis	for	
its	integration	projects,	is	in	fact	one	of	its	advantages.	This	is	the	only	power	
289	 The	significance	of	Turkish	airlines	and	of	Istanbul	as	a	transfer	airport	has	been	growing	
year	on	year.	At	present,	Istanbul	is	the	best	transfer	airport	for	flight	for	example	from	
Ashgabat	 to	Dushanbe,	 and	 the	visa-free	 regime	between	Turkmenistan	and	Turkey	ad-
ditionally	contributes	to	this	(the	small	number	of	direct	connections	in	Central	Asia	is	in	
turn	further	proof	of	the	poor	bilateral	relations	within	the	region).
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which	is	perceived	in	Central	Asia	not	as	foreign	but	as	part	of	the	region	(sensu 
largo).	Unlike	other	actors,	Moscow	has	been	involved	in	the	region	in	a	com-
prehensive	way,	while	China	has	focused	on	economic	co-operation	(although	
Beijing	has	also	hinted	at	taking	an	interest	in	the	security	area),	the	USA	on	
security	 issues	 and	 to	 a	 lesser	 extent	 on	 political	 co-operation,	 and	 Islamic	
states	on	spiritual	values	of	their	religion.	The	aforementioned	three	centres	of	
influence	(China,	the	USA,	and	more	generally	the	West	and	the	Islamic	umma)	
and	their	activity	pose	a	challenge,	and	at	the	same	time	set	a	point	of	reference	
for	Moscow.	With	the	exception	of	the	integration	projects	(which	are	primar-
ily	targeted	at	Ukraine	and	Central	Asia),	Russian	policy	towards	this	region	
has	been	shaped	by	relations	with	these	three	centres,	and	it	may	thus	give	the	
impression	of	being	inconsistent	and	reactive.	It	can	be	assumed	that	Russia	
could	have	achieved	more	in	this	region	if	it	had	treated	the	Central	Asian	gov-
ernments	more	like	partners	(although	its	support	for	the	local	authoritarian	
regimes	without	raising	human	rights	and	democratisation	issues	is	undoubt-
edly	very	important	for	them).
Russia	has	lost	its	monopoly	on	exports	of	Central	Asian	hydrocarbons	to	glob-
al	markets	 (pipelines	running	 from	the	region	 to	China	and	 Iran	have	been	
built),	 but	 it	has	maintained	 this	monopoly	 in	 its	 exports	 to	Europe.	There-
fore,	it	will	most	likely	consistently	continue	blocking	all	attempts	at	building	
trans-Caspian	routes	(in	its	official	statements	Moscow	does	not	present	its	re-
lations	with	China	in	terms	of	rivalry,	unlike	with	the	West,	although	it	does	
in	fact	see	them	as	such).
The	most	important	regional	problem	for	Russia	is	the	upcoming	withdrawal	
of	 the	 ISAF	mission	 from	Afghanistan.	Moscow	 seems	 to	 be	 less	 concerned	
about	 the	possible	 ‘hard’	 threats	 (it	 is	 separated	 from	 the	Afghan	border	by	
Kazakhstan	and	one	or	two	other	states)	but	more	about	 ‘soft’	 threats,	espe-
cially	drug	smuggling.	This	is	the	reason	why	it	attaches	so	much	importance	
to	 its	military	presence	 in	Central	Asian	countries	 (the	bases	 in	Kyrgyzstan	
and	Tajikistan,	and	the	desired	return	of	Russian	border	guards	to	the	Tajik	-	
-Afghan	border)	and	preventing	the	continued	military	presence	of	any	other	
player	whom	it	does	not	approved	of.	
Another	consequence	of	the	withdrawal	of	the	greater	part	of	US	troops	from	
Afghanistan	may	be	an	increase	in	tension	in	Russian-Chinese	relations.	Both	
Moscow	and	Beijing	have	consistently	opposed	the	US	military	presence	in	the	
region;	US	bases	have	been	the	constant	point	of	reference	and	catalyst	for	co-
operation	between	the	two	countries,	especially	at	the	SCO	forum.	After	2014,	
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when	this	factor	no	longer	plays	such	a	great	role,	the	room	for	co-operation	
between	Russia	and	China	will	be	reduced,	while	disagreements	between	them	
will	probably	intensify	(the	conflict	between	Russian	integration	projects	and	
the	co-operation	offered	to	Central	Asian	countries	by	China	may	play	a	major	
role.	It	is	also	possible	that	conlicts	will	arise	concerning	access	to	and	exports	
from	energy	deposits,	and	so	their	rivalry	may	become	more	bitter.	
Russia	will	most	likely	protect	its	possessions	in	the	region	with	determination	
and	great	engagement.	Apart	from	Belarus	and	Armenia,	Central	Asia	is	the	
last	strip	of	the	former	Russian	and	Soviet	empire	where	Moscow	can	still	feel	
like	a	political	leader.	Its	presence	and	influence	in	this	region	are	important	
for	it	from	both	the	geopolitical	and	symbolic	points	of	view,	as	its	position	as	
a	major	power	depends	on	this.	
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Map.	Post-Soviet	Central	Asia
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